Problems of Communism

JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1981

Book Reviews

Max Beloff
Rolf H.W. Theen
S.E. Goodman

CHINA

Politics
Parris H. Chang

Science
Richard P. Suttmeier

Egalitarianism
William L. Parish

Global Outlook
Jonathan D. Pollack

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Problems of Communism

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Problems of Communism

Articles

Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest
Parris H. Chang

Deng Xiaoping, in his campaign to modernize China by the year 2000, has pursued two ends with regard to China's elites. On the one hand, he has tried to eliminate or neutralize officials opposed to his policies and to replace those he considers to be inept or too old. On the other, he has endeavored to install a team of possible successors who are talented, pragmatic, and vigorous. The trial of the "gang of four" that began in November 1980 suggests that Deng—and the veteran officials who have supported him—have triumphed in this struggle.

Politics, Modernization, and Science in China
Richard P. Suttmeier

Beijing's considerable recent efforts to bring China's science and technology up to date are hindered by an absence of genuine societal modernization. Efficient technical solutions repeatedly encounter resistance from cadres promoted during the Cultural Revolution, who lack the necessary outlook and skills to cope with new approaches. It is not clear whether the current leadership can effectively manage these tensions.

Egalitarianism in Chinese Society
William L. Parish

Since 1976, China has moved rapidly to abandon the egalitarian goals which were so prominent a part of the 1966–76 radical decade. Information from former residents of China indicates that significant progress was made toward attaining equality of opportunity and consumption in China's cities during that decade, but that the urban-rural gap remained large. Excessive emphasis on urban egalitarianism brought costly declines in the quality of education, work ethics, and economic growth. The present Chinese leaders seem determined to restore a link between individual effort and individual reward in order to promote a greater sense of equity in Chinese society and more rapid national economic growth. Whether greater inequality will be required to accomplish these goals remains an open question.

Chinese Global Strategy and Soviet Power
Jonathan D. Pollack

Chinese assessments at the "higher plane of global strategy," particularly with regard to the Soviet Union, have shifted significantly over the past decade, as the Chinese perceived a growing Soviet effort to achieve world hegemony. Chinese strategic thinking could well exhibit this same dynamism in the decade of the 1980's, as the extent of Soviet hegemonic ambitions and capabilities becomes clear in Afghanistan, Poland, and elsewhere.

* * *

Essay-reviews (over)

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Essay-reviews

The Military Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy

Max Beloff

After an effort spanning almost two decades, the Soviet Union has succeeded in creating a capacity to project its power around the world. Soviet leaders have not failed to exploit this capability in their conduct of Soviet foreign policy. In the 1980's, they will continue to seek the maximum political and economic advantages from the Soviet Union's enhanced position of military strength.

The Soviet Political System Since Stalin

Rolf H.W. Theen

Over the last 20 years, there has been considerable debate about the applicability of the concept of totalitarianism to the Soviet political system in the post-Stalin period. This debate has led to a proliferation of alternative models which concern themselves primarily with the deviations of the present-day Soviet system from the classic totalitarian syndrome of the Stalin years. None of these alternative models adequately reflects the reality and complexity of Soviet politics. Indeed, there is serious question whether sufficient change has taken place in the Soviet political system to justify the wholesale scrapping of the totalitarian model.

Mathematization of Soviet Planning

S.E. Goodman

The introduction of mathematical techniques, cybernetic concepts, and computers into Soviet economic planning processes has been dictated since the death of Stalin by the growing size and complexity of the economy of the USSR. Debates continue, however, not only over the practical limits of mathematization, but also over the all-important question of the potential impact of the pervasive use of mathematical techniques and computers on the politics and structure of economic management.

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Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest

By Parris H. Chang

On November 20, 1980, the "gang of four," the most ardent supporters of the revolutionary line of former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong and the prime movers behind his radical crusade, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) of 1966–69, on which they rode to power, went on trial in Beijing on charges of sedition and other crimes.[1] While not a defendant himself, Hua Guofeng, who succeeded Mao in October 1976 and whose career benefited enormously from the GPCR and its aftermath, could ultimately become the primary victim. Even though Hua engineered the coup that ousted the four radicals from power soon after Mao died, many Chinese believe that Hua collaborated with the radicals prior to Mao's death and blame him for suppressing the Tienanmen Square demonstration of April 1976. Thus, the trial could constitute the prelude to his ouster as Party Chairman at the next CCP Central Committee plenum, scheduled for early 1981, or at the next CCP Congress, set for the spring.

Whatever its implications for Hua's fate, however, the trial has a larger significance as well. It symbolizes the triumph of veteran officials, led by CCP Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping, who twice fell victim to Mao and his radical associates during the 1966–76 period. Deng has apparently regarded the trial as a means of repudiating the GPCR, discrediting the Maoist legacy, and cementing support for his campaign to modernize China by the year 2000. These goals are ones he has been pursuing ever since his second political comeback in July 1977.

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To ensure the realization of his vision, Deng has mapped out a master plan with three major components. The first is to institute political reforms and to implement bold, more practical, less ideological measures designed to speed up China's economic growth. The second is to eliminate or neutralize officials opposed to his policies, and to replace those he considers to be inept or too old. The third is to install a team of possible successors who are talented, pragmatic, and in their "prime of life"—and thus likely to continue the efforts to modernize China after Deng, now 77 years old, is gone.

This journal has already devoted substantial attention to the first element of Deng's plan.[2] Therefore, the present article will focus on the second and third elements. Specifically, it will examine the changing makeup of the leadership at the center, in the provinces, and within military ranks since Deng's political comeback in 1977. It will also identify groups with diverse views within the leadership and look at the conflicts among them. Finally, it will analyze the background and outlook of the reconstituted leadership.

Deng's Political Resurrection

When Premier Zhou Enlai passed away in early 1976 after a lengthy illness, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, who had served as de facto Premier throughout 1975, was widely regarded as Zhou's likely successor. Instead, he became the target and victim of an antirightist campaign launched by Chairman Mao and his radical followers. Deng was vehemently attacked for negating the GPCR and implementing a "revisionist" line that sought to restore capitalism in

[1] See *Beijing Review*, Dec. 1, 1980, pp. 3–4, 9–28.
[2] See, for example, *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–December 1979.

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From the trial of the "gang of four," which began in November 1980: Mao Zedong's widow, Jiang Qing (identified on the sign as "Defendant"); and testifying, another member of the gang, Wang Hongwen.

—Photoreporters.

China.[3] On April 7, 1976, the CCP Politburo, at Mao's urging, ousted Deng from his leading party, government, and military positions, ostensibly for instigating a massive riot in Beijing's Tienanmen Square two days earlier. The Politburo also named Vice-Premier Hua Guofeng, a political figure then relatively unknown outside China, to succeed Zhou as Premier and appointed him First CCP Vice-Chairman—a position which enabled him to contend for Mao's mantle a few months later.

After April 1976, according to sources inside China, Deng slipped out of Beijing and fled to South China. There he met secretly with CCP Vice-Chairman and Defense Minister Ye Jianying and provincial party and military leaders from Guangdong, Fujian, and Sichuan to discuss contingency measures to counter the radicals.[4] Immediately after Mao's death on September 9, 1976, Deng is said to have returned to Beijing to seek more support from other provincial leaders attending Mao's memorial service. Although Deng did not have a direct role in the coup staged by Hua and Ye on October 6 that resulted in the overthrow of the radical leaders, he may have mobilized considerable support for that move beforehand. Those who carried out the coup apparently acted with the knowledge that there was support from many party and military leaders throughout China for such a step.

As soon as the radicals were gone from the top leadership, Deng's rehabilitation became an issue of controversy within high party circles. In the wake of the radicals' downfall, he wrote a letter to the CCP Central Committee, headed by the new Chairman, Hua Guofeng, to ask for a reversal of his case. But quite a few Politburo members who had voted for his

[3] For analysis of the 1975–76 anti-Deng campaign, which has had considerable bearing on political conflict and personal antagonisms in the leadership in recent years, see Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?" ibid., July–August 1976, pp. 1–17.

[4] See a speech by Zhang Pinghua (Director of the CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department) to a national conference of propaganda and cultural officials on July 23, 1978, published in *Chungkuo Ta-lu* (Taipei), No. 135, Nov. 15, 1978, p. 55. (The text has not appeared in the People's Republic of China media.)

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dismissal earlier and feared that he would take his revenge against them tried to block his reinstatement. One of them, Wu De, mayor of Beijing, publicly called for a continuation of the campaign against Deng in accordance with Chairman Mao's previous behest.[5] Wang Dongxing, Mao's former chief bodyguard, contended that the reversal of Mao's decision on Deng would tarnish the late Chairman's memory.[6] In these and other ways, Wu, Wang, and their fellow Maoists—subsequently labeled the "whatever" faction, because, seizing and building upon some remarks of Hua, they coined the statement that "whatever policy Chairman Mao has decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions the Chairman has issued, we shall steadfastly obey" and propagated it in the media[7]—attempted to invoke Mao's sacred authority to prevent the rehabilitation of Deng and other GPCR victims. Confronted by this division within the Politburo, Hua wavered and dragged his feet on Deng's request.

Nevertheless, Deng's allies and supporters in the party fought hard on his behalf. Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing (two powerful regional leaders in the Politburo) and many provincial officials who had been associated with Deng or had been brought back to power by him in 1975 exerted immense political pressure on Hua to speed up Deng's rehabilitation.

Eventually, a compromise was arranged by Ye Jianying at a Central Committee work conference in March 1977. Deng was formally reinstated to his three leadership positions in a Central Committee plenum in July 1977, but in return he had to make a major concession. He wrote a letter to the Central Committee in which he pledged his support to Chairman Hua and conceded that he had committed political errors in 1975.[8]

Removing Ideological Constraints

Once back in the leadership, Deng, with the help of like-minded colleagues, kept up the pressure for a revamping of policy and lost no time in consolidating his position and expanding his base of support. In this



In the aftermath of the April 1976 Tienanmen Incident crowds mass under a portrait of Mao Zedong outside the Great Hall of the People to hear denunciations of Deng Xiaoping.

—Camera Press.

connection, it is important to bear in mind that since the autumn of 1976, two broad trends have characterized Chinese politics. On one hand, there has been a consensus within the leadership to depart from Mao's revolutionary radicalism and to promote the program of "four modernizations"—i.e., the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and the military. On the other hand, the elites have been divided about a wide range of crucial politi-

[5] Wu De made public speeches on October 24 and November 30, 1976, calling for a continuation of the anti-Deng campaign. See *Peking Review*, Oct. 29, 1976, p. 13, and Dec. 10, 1976, p. 11. It was also Wu who, on Apr. 5, 1976, had addressed the crowds at Tienanmen Square and had characterized the demonstration as a "counterrevolutionary" event.

[6] Hu Jiwei (editor of *Renmin Ribao*), "The Struggle at the Higher Circles of the Party," *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), No. 34, August 1980, p. 51. This is a portion of a classified speech that Hu made to the Central Party School on Sept. 13, 1979. None of the speech has been published in the media inside China. See also Lo Ping, "The Political Eclipse of the 'Whatever Faction,'" ibid., No. 16, 1979, pp. 5–8.

[7] The statement appeared first in a joint editorial entitled "Study Well the Documents and Grasp the Key Link," in *Renmin Ribao*, *Hongqi*, and *Jiefangjun Bao* (all Beijing), Feb. 7, 1977.

[8] See the Communique of the July 1977 Central Committee Plenum, *Peking Review*, July 29, 1977, p. 5. Although the communique did not disclose the contents of Deng's two letters or Ye's mediating role, such information had been widely disseminated among cadres through inner party channels.

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Li Xiannian, left, and Yu Qiuli—members of the "petroleum" faction in the CCP leadership.

—Katherine Young and Eastfoto.

cal and economic issues which involve not only ideology but also power. The resulting conflict has been largely, but not exclusively, a rivalry between groups led by Hua and those led by Deng.

The coalition under Hua has consisted of two diverse elements (see Table 1 on pages 6–8). One has been the leftist "whatever" faction, whose members rose to political prominence during the GPCR and have had numerous followers among the rank and file of the party. Another has been the "petroleum" faction, a group of economists and technocrats who ran the Chinese economy under the late Premier Zhou's stewardship during 1966–76, have been identified with the remarkable development of China's petroleum industry, and have been strongly represented in the economic ministries of the State Council. According to a Hong Kong Communist publication, CCP Vice-Chairman Li Xiannian is its behind-the-scenes leader.[9] In addition, the Hua coalition has also drawn support from such elder statesmen as Marshal Ye Jianying and from a few leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

This coalition was in the ascendancy and largely controlled policy councils until the spring of 1978. Indeed, the political line of the 11th Party Congress in August 1977 and the 10-year National Development Plan sanctioned by the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in March 1978 bore the mark of the coalition's influence.

The coalition behind Deng, on the other hand, has consisted essentially of veteran officials, great numbers of whom were victims of the GPCR. Many of them are long-time associates of Deng (e.g., Hu Yaobang and Wan Li), some are Deng's peers and political allies (e.g., Chen Yun and Peng Zhen), and some are co-optees into Deng's group (e.g., Zhao Ziyang, Yang Dezhi, and Geng Biao).

The balance of power within the party has gradually but steadily shifted in favor of this coalition. At the 11th CCP Congress, for example, Deng was successful in bringing about the return to the Central Committee and the Politburo of many veteran officials sidelined by the GPCR.[10] Hu Yaobang, one of Deng's closest associates, was appointed Director of the powerful Central Committee Organization Department, which screens and selects cadres for appointment to key leadership positions and, in recent years, has also handled rehabilitation of cadres persecuted during the GPCR. Luo Ruiqing, another Deng cohort, was named secretary-general of the CCP Military Affairs Commission, the regime's highest decision-making body on military matters. Similarly, at the Fifth NPC, Deng placed many allies and associates in key positions in the State Council—including Zhao Cangbi as Minister of Public Security.

One of the most important and far-reaching tasks which Deng and his supporters have sought to accomplish is destruction of the cult of Mao and dilution of Mao's ideological authority. In pursuing this goal, they have had two larger purposes: (1) to remove ideological constraints on pragmatic modernization programs, constraints resulting from invocation of Mao by the opposition to stonewall against change; (2) to undercut the major source of power possessed by Hua, whose claim to rule rests on Mao's personal imprimatur.

With such an objective clearly in mind, Deng since the spring of 1978 has been promoting a new ideological tenet: "practice is the sole criterion of truth."[11] In plain language, the precept means that any policy, including any favored by Mao, should not be venerated as truth if it does not work or if it fails to produce positive results. Rather, it should be abolished or changed. Deng's clarion call is to "seek truth from facts." In a system in which party and state constitutions have sanctified Marxism-Leninism-Mao

[9] Lo Ping, "The NPC Session and the Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang Leadership Structure," *Cheng Ming*, No. 34, August 1980, pp. 5–7.

[10] Of the Eleventh Central Committee's 201 members and 132 alternate members, 73 and 75 respectively are "new"—in the sense that they were not members of the Ninth or Tenth Central Committees, elected in 1969 or 1973—but had been ranking officials before the GPCR. Indeed, quite a few were even members of the Eighth Central Committee, elected in 1956 and 1958. Two thirds of these veterans are Deng's associates and allies. In the Politburo, 10 of the 23 members are new, and 6 of them are Deng's supporters and allies.

[11] This new ideological concept first surfaced in an article in *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), May 11, 1978. Deng personally promoted it in a major speech to the Political Work Conference of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in early June. See *Renmin Ribao*, June 6, 1978.

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Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology, the idea that Deng has been trying to foster is truly iconoclastic and revolutionary.

As one might expect, Deng's promotion of the new precept touched off quite a controversy in the party. Such top leaders as Hua and Ye refused to endorse Deng's formula. The "whatever" faction and other defenders of the Maoist legacy attacked Deng for, among other things, opposition to the late Chairman and trying to "cut down the banner" of Mao Zedong Thought.[12] At the same time, acceptance of the need to base policy on actual conditions and to free the Chinese people from the dominating influence of Mao's legacy, was widespread. During the summer and fall of 1978, for instance, many leaders, especially party and PLA leaders in the provinces, contributed articles to the media to register their support for Deng's new ideological line. The issue was roundly debated in a Central Committee work conference in November 1978. Deng subsequently scored a major victory when a Central Committee plenum held during the following month "highly evaluated the discussion of whether practice is the sole criterion for testing truth."[13]

Deng, however, has not hesitated to invoke Mao to constrain Hua and dilute his influence as CCP Chairman. Thus, on July 1, 1978, *Renmin Ribao* published a speech that Mao had delivered to a party meeting in January 1962, in which he acknowledged that he had made many wrong decisions on the Great Leap and was mainly responsible for China's economic disaster during the late 1950's and early 1960's. In the same speech, Mao had called for earnest implementation of the principle of democratic centralism—namely, collegial decision-making in the party committees—to prevent abuse of power by individuals. Obviously, Deng publicized the speech to show that Mao had not been infallible, and to justify modification of policies which Mao had put forth. But by drawing attention to Mao's emphasis on the principle of democratic centralism, Deng also sought to curtail the power of Hua, who may well have derived special prerogatives from his post as CCP Chairman.

Purging the Maoists

Deng and his brain trust also plainly realize that their pragmatic programs aimed at speeding up China's economic growth must have the support of substantial numbers of power holders in the leadership. Thus, in conjunction with his efforts to legislate a new ideological line, Deng has been striving to establish control over the regime's decision-making councils and policy-implementation processes by pressing a purge of Maoists and of officials antagonistic to his policies.

A concerted campaign that began in January 1978 against the "wind faction," "slippery faction," or "faction of quakers" was part of such a design. A series of articles which first appeared in *Jiefangjun Bao* and was then reprinted in *Renmin Ribao* mounted stinging attacks on those cadres who "followed the wind" without regard for principle, who "slipped away" from responsibility for past political errors and allegiances, and who hid behind the positions of power awaiting an opportunity to create political "earthquakes."[14] To put it simply, the targets of the campaign were those officials who had once supported and collaborated with the gang of four and had then lined up behind Chairman Hua after October 1976, or had otherwise dragged their feet on Deng's policies. As subsequent developments would show, the campaign was directed against at least half a dozen Politburo members, 10 provincial party first secretaries, and hundreds of other officials of somewhat lower rank.

Chairman Hua, however, resisted Deng's efforts to purge the leadership bodies. Aside from the fact that those under attack were not only fellow beneficiaries of the GPCR but also his supporters, Hua may have reasoned that an expanded purge would divide the party ranks, destabilize the political order, and hamper efforts to carry out the "four modernizations." Hence, he favored a winding down of the campaign. His report to the NPC session in February 1978, for example, stated that the movement to expose and criticize the gang of four had been "sound and vigorous" and that the investigation into the individuals and incidents associated with their conspiracy to usurp power "had in the main been completed in most of the localities and departments." He called for the nation to be conciliatory to comrades who "had made mistakes, including serious mistakes," so as to "win over all those that can be won over."[15] In the same vein, Ye Jianying, elected Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee in March 1978, subsequently urged his fellow committee members at a meeting in September 1978 to strive for national stability and unity, and admonished each and every one to refrain from doing or

[12] See the two sources cited in fn. 6.

[13] "Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" (adopted on Dec. 2, 1978), *Peking Review*, Dec. 29, 1978, p. 15.

[14] *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 6, 10, and, 15, 1978.

[15] *Peking Review*, Mar. 10, 1978, pp. 17-18.

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Table 1: Chinese Leadership Factions Since 1977

	Positions in party				Positions in government		Positions in military		Remarks
	Politburo	Central Committee	Secretariat	Other	State Council	NPC	MAC	PLA hierarchy	
1. "Whatever" group									
Hua Guofeng	Member, SC	Chairman			Premier (resign. 9/80)		Chairman		
Wang Dongxing	Member, SC (oust. 2/80)	Vice-Chmn. (oust. 2/80)		Director, CC General Office (oust. 10/78)				Cmdr. "8341"st (oust. 12/78)	
Wu De	Member (oust. 2/80)	Member		1st Secretary, Beijing Commit. (oust. 10/78)		Vice-Chairman (oust. 4/80)			
Chen Xilian	Member (oust. 2/80)	Member			Vice-Premier (oust. 4/80)		Member, SC	Cmdr. Beijing MR (oust. 1/80)	
Ji Dengkui	Member (oust. 2/80)	Member			Vice-Premier (oust. 4/80)			1st Pol. Commis., Beijing MR (oust. 11/78)	
Chen Yonggui	Member	Member			Vice-Premier (oust. 9/80)				
Ni Zhifu	Member	Member		2nd Secretary, Beijing Commit. (oust. 12/78)					Pres,. All-China Fed. of Labor
Chang Pinghua		Member		Director, CC Prop. Dept. (oust. 12/78)					
Quo Yufeng		Member		Director, CC Org. Dept. (oust. 12/78)					
2. "Petroleum" faction									
Li Xiannian	Member, SC	Vice-Chmn.			Vice-Premier (Resign. 9/80)				
Yu Qiuli	Member	Member	Member		Vice-Premier; Director, Energy Com.				Replaced by Yao Yilin as Dir., State Plan. Com. 8/80
Kang Shi'en		Member			Vice-Premier; Min., State Econ. Com.				Public reprimand 8/80
Chen Muhua	Alt. Member	Member			Vice-Premier; Min., For. Econ. Relations				
Gu Mu		Member	Member		Vice-Premier; Min., Capital Const. Com. (oust. 12/80); Min., For. Inv. Control Com.				

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Lin Hujia				1st Secretary, Beijing Commit.				Under attack,
Tang Ke		Member			Min., Metallurg. Industry			Under attack
Song Zhenming					Min., Petroleum Industry (oust. 8/80)			
Sun Jingwen					Min., Chemical Industry			Under attack
Wang Lei					Min., Commerce			Under attack
3. Pragmatic coalition								
A. Deng Group								
Deng Xiaoping	Member, SC	Vice-Chmn.			Vice-Premier (resign. 9/80)		Vice-Chmn.	Chief of Staff (resign. 1/80)
Hu Yaobang	Member, SC	Member	General Secretary	Dir., CC Org. Dept (77–78); Dir., CC Prop. Dept. (78–79)				
Zhao Ziyang	Member, SC	Member		1st Secretary, Sichuan Commit. (75–79)	Premier			
Wan Li		Member	Member		Sr. Vice-Premier; Min., Agric. Commission			
Wei Guoqing	Member	Member				Vice-Chairman	Member, SC	Dir., Gen. Polit. Dept.
Geng Biao	Member	Member			Vice-Premier		Sec. Gen., SC	de facto Def. Min.
Peng Chong	Member	Member	Member			Vice-Chairman		
Fang Yi	Member	Member	Member		Vice-Premier; Chmn., Sci. & Tech. Com.			
Zhang Tingfa	Member	Member					Member, SC	AF Commander
Yang Dezhi		Member	Member				Member, SC	Chief of Staff
Hu Qiaomu		Member	Member					Pres., Chinese Academy of Soc. Sciences
Song Renqiong		Member	Member	Director, CC Org. Dept.				
Wang Renzhong		Member	Member	Director, CC Prop. Dept.	Vice-Premier (resign. 9/80)			
B. Chen Yun Group								
Chen Yun	Member, SC	Vice-Chmn.		Head, CC Finan. & Econ. Group; 1st Sec., Disc. Inspect. Com.	Vice-Premier (resign. 9/80)			

NPC—National People's Congress; MAC—Military Affairs Commission; PLA—People's Liberation Army; SC—Standing Committee; CC—Central Committee; MR—Military Region.

(Table continued on reverse side)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Positions in party				Positions in government		Positions in military		Remarks
	Politburo	Central Committee	Secretariat	Other	State Council	NPC	MAC	PLA hierarchy	
B. Chen Yun Group (continued)									
Yao Yilin		Member	Member	Director, CC General Office	Vice-Premier; Min., State Plan. Com.				
Bo Yibo		Member			Vice-Premier; Min., Mach-bldg. Ind. Com.				
C. Peng Zhen group									
Peng Zhen	Member	Member				Vice-Chairman; Chmn., NPC Legal Com.			
Ulanhu	Member	Member		Dir., CC United Front Dept.		Vice-Chairman			
4. "Elder Statesmen"									
Ye Jianying	Member, SC	Vice-Chmn.				Chairman	Vice-Chmn.		Hua ally; against de-Maoization
Xu Xiangqian	Member	Member			Vice-Premier & Def. Min. (resign. 9/80)		Vice-Chmn.		
Deng Yingchao	Member	Member				Vice-Chairman			
Nie Rongzhen	Member	Member				Vice-Chairman (resign. 9/80)	Vice-Chmn.		Against de-Maoization
5. "Independents"									
Wang Zhen	Member	Member			Vice-Premier (resign. 9/80)		Member, SC		Against de-Maoization
Xu Shiyou	Member	Member					Member, SC	Cmdr., Guangzhou MR (oust. 1/80)	Alienated Deng backer; against de-Maoization
Li Desheng	Member	Member						Cmdr., Mukden MR	Close to Hua
Ji Pengfei		Member		Director, CC Intntl. Liaison	Vice-Premier				

NPC—National People's Congress; MAC—Military Affairs Commission; PLA—People's Liberation Army; SC—Standing Committee; CC—Central Committee; MR—Military Region.

SOURCES: Factional alignments and information on positions occupied are based on press reports from China, Hongkong, and Taiwan, and on other information available to the author.

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saying "what isn't good for unity."[16] On several occasions, moreover, Hua visited, and appeared in public with, officials under the gun (e.g., Zeng Shaoshan and Xie Xuegong, party first secretaries of Liaoning and Tianjin provinces respectively, on May 10 and 11, 1978), in an apparent effort to lend his support and save them from ouster. But these undertakings were to no avail.

Notwithstanding the opposition of Hua and Ye, Deng was able to purge those who had collaborated with the gang of four or were otherwise antagonistic to his policies, and to consolidate his network of support in the provinces. During 1978 alone, eight such province-level first secretaries and numerous secretaries were dismissed and replaced by Deng backers. To be sure, Deng did not fire all of them at a stroke. That could have harmed China's image of stability. What he did, to the contrary, was to undertake carefully controlled surgery. He eliminated one or several at a time at intervals of several months. Thus, Liu Zihou, Ren Rong, and Wang Qian, first secretaries of Hebei, Tibet, and Shanxi respectively, survived until 1980. Similarly, even when Seypidin and Wu De were relieved of their leadership positions in Xinjiang and Beijing in January and October 1978 respectively, they were allowed to retain their Politburo seats—at least for the time being.

In retrospect, it was at the Central Committee work conference of November 11–December 15, 1978, and the follow-up Central Committee plenum a few days later that the political forces led by Deng made the big breakthrough in their drive to alter the party's ideological and organizational features. This was the consequence of a well-timed political struggle orchestrated by Deng. During the summer and fall of 1978, most of the leaders in the provincial party and military hierarchy published articles to endorse Deng's ideological formula, "practice is the sole criterion of truth."[17] As the work conference went into session, the Beijing CCP Committee passed a resolution to affirm that the Tienanmen Square demonstration of April 5, 1976, in honor of the late Premier Zhou, had been a "revolutionary" event—thereby making heroes of the people who had taken part in it and casting a political shadow on Hua and others who took actions to suppress it.[18] In the meantime, a spate of inspired big-character posters went up on Beijing's Xidan "Democracy Wall" which, among other things, denounced those leaders responsible for arresting and persecuting the demonstrators, criticized Mao's leadership, and challenged the way Hua was appointed in the wake of the riots.[19]

In such a political atmosphere, which obviously exerted heavy political pressure on the Maoists and was favorable to the Deng camp, many important personnel and political changes were effected at the conference and the plenum. Four veteran officials—Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao (the widow of Zhou Enlai), Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen, all of whom are certain to back Deng on most issues—were elected to the Politburo. The plenum also added nine veteran cadres to the Central Committee; like Deng, all of them had been victims of the GPCR.[20]

Other personnel changes and appointments were even more revealing. Chen Yun was named a CCP Vice-Chairman, a position that he had held during 1956–66, and was placed in charge of a 100-member Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, which was to enforce discipline among party members. Furthermore, he was appointed head of an ad hoc Financial and Economic Group, a body assigned overall responsibility for China's economic and financial policy. This was a highly significant appointment in light of Chen's reputation as a seasoned economist, an outspoken critic of Mao's radical Great Leap program, and the main architect of China's recovery after the Great Leap.[21] One of the specific tasks assigned to the group was to map out a three-year readjustment program, for the Chinese leaders now concluded that the 10-year National Development Plan, which had been formulated chiefly by Hua, Li Xiannian, and Yu Qiuli and announced at the NPC nine months earlier, was unrealistic in its targets and unsound in its emphasis

[16] See New China News Agency (Beijing), Sept. 13, 1978; *Peking Review*, Sept. 28, 1978, p. 3.

[17] See, for instance, articles by Wang Enmao, An Pingsheng, Ren Zhongyi, and Wang Feng in *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 2, 7, and 20, and Nov. 4, 1978; Special Commentator, "The Basic Marxist Principle," *Jiefangjun Bao*, June 24, 1978. Wang Enmao, An, Ren, and Wang Feng were provincial party first secretaries of Jilin, Yunnan, Liaoning, and Xinjiang respectively.

[18] *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 16, 1978.

[19] See Fox Butterfield's articles in *The New York Times*, Nov. 17, 26, 27, and 28, 1978; Jay Mathews' articles in *The Washington Post*, Nov. 26 and Dec. 5, 1978.

[20] The nine new Central Committee members were Huang Kezheng, Song Renqiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Wang Renzhong, Huang Huoqing, Chen Zaidao, Han Guang, and Zhou Hui. According to the 1977 CCP Constitution, Central Committee members are elected by the Party Congress, but "in view of the changed situation in party life" since the Party Congress and "current urgent needs in party work," the Plenum decided, "in a provisional measure," to add these members to the Central Committee, "subject to future confirmation" by the 12th Party Congress. See *Peking Review*, Dec. 29, 1978, p. 7.

[21] For an account of Chen Yun's career and his role at the Third Plenum, see Parris H. Chang, *Power and Policy in China*, 2nd and enlarged edition, University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978, pp. 138–39; and *Cheng Ming*, No. 15, January 1971, pp. 21–23, and No. 20, June 1979, pp. 14–16.

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and allocation of resources.

In addition, Deng's closest aide and most important brain-truster, Hu Yaobang, was named Secretary-General of the CCP Central Committee and concurrently Director of the Central Committee Propaganda Department. In the latter case, he replaced Zhang Pinghau, a Hua supporter. Hu yielded his position as Director of the Central Committee Organization Department to Song Renqiong, another close associate of Deng. As CCP Secretary-General, Hu was responsible for daily work at headquarters and supervision of party organizations at all levels; consequently, he was in a position to checkmate Chairman Hua and dilute his power.

According to reports of the Communist press in Hong Kong, several Politburo members of the "whatever" faction came under strong attack at the meetings for their ties to the radicals and lost much of their political influence.[22] CCP Vice-Chairman Wang Dongxing, who had previously been Director of the Central Committee General Office (which oversees vital party files) and had consequently been able to block the political rehabilitation of such ranking leaders as Peng Zhen (former mayor of Beijing and Politburo member), yielded the job to Yao Yilin, a close friend of Chen Yun and Peng Zhen. Wang was also relieved of command of the 8341 army unit, a formidable political weapon. Under Wang, this unit had evolved into a special security force—a sort of praetorian guard—which had charge of leadership security but operated outside the regime's established security apparatus and even ran its own espionage network.[23] The unit is believed to have been disbanded in 1979. Others besides Wang who encountered much criticism and a loss of influence included Wu De, Ji Dengkui, Chen Xilian, Ni Zhifu, and Chen Yonggui, all of whom had benefited from the GPCR.

Although Hua Guofeng has to date retained his post as CCP Chairman, a number of developments at the Central Committee work conference and plenum severely eroded his power and influence. First, those leaders who had been his supporters or in alliance with him suffered an eclipse, and the party machinery came under the control of Deng's men. Second, he lost many of the prerogatives of Chairman. The plenum placed a new emphasis on collective leadership, and it prohibited him from issuing "an instruction" without a collegial decision.[24] Third, he had to



Chen Yun, elected a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo and a party Vice-Chairman, at a plenary session of the Central Committee in December 1978. Chen was also placed in charge of the important new Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline.

—Eastfoto.

make a self-criticism at the Central Committee work conference, in which he admitted a number of political errors, including failure to act on Deng's rehabilitation in good time.[25] Fourth, without saying so, the CCP discarded the ideological and political line that Hua had put forth at the 11th Party Congress in 1977 and at the NPC in 1978. Not only did the plenum fail to endorse his "strategic decision to grasp the key link of class struggle and bring about great order across the land" (Hua's political line after 1977) and the 10-year National Development Plan, but it was even conspicuously silent on the campaigns to learn from Daching (Taching) and from Dazhai (Tazhai) both of which Hua had actively promoted as late as February 1978, when he exhorted the nation to work hard to ensure that "by 1980 one third of our enterprises become Taching-type enterprises and one third of our counties Tachai-type counties."[26]

At the same time, the plenum endorsed Deng's ideological precept of seeking truth from facts and

[22] Chi Hsin, "The CCP Made a Drastic Turn," *The Seventies* (Hong Kong), No. 109, February 1979, p. 8; and *Cheng Ming*, No. 15, January 1979, p. 18.

[23] Chang, *Power and Policy in China*, pp. 234–36.

[24] See the communique of the Third Plenum, loc. cit., p. 16.

[25] Hu Jiwei, loc. cit., p. 62; also Chi Hsin, loc. cit., p. 8.

[26] *Peking Review*, Mar. 10, 1978, p. 20.

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voted to declare the April 1976 Tienanmen demonstration a revolutionary event and to revoke the documents that the Central Committee had issued supporting the anti-Deng campaign and condemning the Tienanmen demonstration. It also overturned past verdicts on the late Marshal Peng Dehuai and many other leaders purged by Mao and the Maoists, although it put off decisions on the rehabilitation of two of the most prominent of the victims, Peng Zhen and the late head of state, Liu Shaoqi. It even made a limited, implicit, but unprecedented public criticism of Mao, stating that "it would not be Marxist to demand that a revolutionary leader be free of all shortcomings and errors," nor would it "conform to comrade Mao Zedong's consistent evaluation of himself." Nevertheless, it decided to postpone assessment of the "shortcomings and mistakes" of the GPCR and called on the party to shift its energies to the task of modernization.[27]

It is of interest that in the last stage of the Central Committee work conference, Beijing and Washington reached an agreement on diplomatic normalization, largely on the terms upon which the Chinese government had insisted. This diplomatic breakthrough could have strengthened the position of Deng, who had charge of the negotiations, within leadership circles at a crucial juncture. Whether or not the Carter Administration was aware of the struggle taking place inside Chinese policy councils and went ahead with normalization and issued the invitation to Deng to visit the United States with an eye to helping the cause of a pragmatic leader remains a matter for conjecture.

Consolidation of Power

After the Third Central Committee Plenum in December 1978, Vice-Chairman Deng emerged as the most powerful man in China and the main architect of China's modernization programs. Moreover, his triumphant tour of the United States in January-February 1979 boosted his prestige enormously. Nevertheless, a series of developments afforded Deng's opponents an opportunity to mount a strong attack on his leadership and policies.

First, the poster campaign that the veteran officials had inspired and exploited in the fall of 1978 had acquired a momentum of its own, going far beyond what they had apparently intended. In the winter months of 1978-79, there was not only an increased outpouring of posters but also a burgeoning of many underground dissident publications in Beijing and throughout China. Aside from demanding democracy and human rights, quite a few posters and articles expressed doubts about socialism, attacked repressive Communist rule, and even went so far as to challenge the legitimacy of the leading role of the CCP. Accompanying the rise of the dissident movement were demonstrations by petitioners and sit-ins by discontented students, unemployed youths, and others in Beijing and various other Chinese cities, as many social elements besieged the authorities with their grievances.

Second, China's punitive action against the Hanoi government in the Sino-Vietnamese war of February-March 1979 did not proceed as smoothly as the CCP leadership had anticipated. The heavy losses sustained by Chinese troops generated a great deal of second-guessing and controversy within leadership circles.[28]

Third, the devaluation of Mao, the reversal of verdicts with respect to victims of the GPCR, the new emphasis on material incentives and the role of experts and intellectuals, and the regime's overall liberalization created turmoil within party ranks. Not only did they generate much confusion and cynicism, but they also antagonized those with interests at stake.

Taking advantage of such circumstances, the Maoists in the leadership sought to reassert themselves and launched an offensive against Deng and his policies, especially those adopted at the Third Central Committee Plenum. According to the Communist press in Hong Kong, a number of provincial party secretaries and State Council ministers who apparently felt their vested interests threatened by Deng's new policies joined the attack.[29] This coalition charged that the Third Plenum had "negated Chairman Mao" and "cut down the banner of Mao Zedong Thought"; the coalition also labeled Deng "rightist" and "revisionist," and blamed Deng's promotion of liberalization for causing social turmoil and undermining stability and unity.[30]

Confronted with this challenge, Deng felt compelled to take a step backward. In a speech to an enlarged

[27] See fn. 24.

[28] See *Renmin Ribao* editorial, Mar. 26, 1979; also *Jiefangjun Bao* editorial, Mar. 26, 1979, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), Mar. 27, 1979.

[29] Lu Chung-chien, "The Victory of the Pragmatic Faction as Seen from the [June 1979] NPC Session," *Cheng Ming*, No. 21, July 1979, pp. 5-6.

[30] The viewpoints of Deng's critics are alluded to and refuted by many articles. See, for instance, "Use the Spirit of the Third Plenum to Unify Our Thinking," an editorial commentary in *Wenhui Bao* (Shanghai), Apr. 13, 1979; and "Distinguish the Two Ideological Lines; Uphold the Four Basic Principles," by a "guest commentator" in *Guangming Ribao*, May 11, 1979.

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Politburo session on March 30, 1979, he expressed strong support of the need to "uphold the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought" (the so-called "four upholds" or "four basic principles").[31]

Consequently, the Chinese authorities carried out a crackdown on democracy and on human rights activities and tightened political and social control. Several of the more outspoken underground journals were closed down, and some dissidents—including Wei Jingsheng and Fu Yuehua, who have received much attention in the Western media[32]—were placed under arrest. In quick succession in March and April, many provinces, in the name of maintaining stability and unity, issued notices banning demonstrations and posters critical of the party.

However, the left "adverse current" failed to reverse Deng's major policies and did not deter him from continuing his efforts to consolidate his position within the leadership. The opposition did not succeed in accomplishing its end because it no longer carried sufficient political weight in policy councils. Moreover, Deng clearly enjoyed political backing of an extensive nature throughout the system and was able to mobilize the necessary support to prevail. For example, a large number of provincial party and PLA leaders spoke up in support of his policies and attacked his critics in

[31] *Studies on Chinese Communism* (Taipei), May 19, 1979, p. 22.
[32] See *The New York Times*, Oct. 17 and 18, and Nov. 12, 1979, for dispatches by its Beijing correspondent, Fox Butterfield; also Jay Mathews' dispatch from Beijing, *The Washington Post*, Oct. 26, 1979.

A crowd of protesters outside Revolutionary Committee (i.e., government) and Communist Party headquarters in Shanghai in January 1979. In addition to the official designations of the building (at far left and far right), the banners read (clockwise from lower left): "Strongly demand meeting with [Mayor] Peng Chong"; "Decidedly will not leave without seeing Peng Chong and [Vice Mayor] Wang Yiping"; "Middle Technical School—half study and half work, going into the hills and down to the countryside is wrong"; "Strongly demand meeting with Wang Yiping"; "We have waited one day and one night! We are willing to stay on."

—G. de Villiers/SYGMA.

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May and June 1979.[33]

By then, it appears that Deng had solidified his position sufficiently to forge ahead again. Thus, Peng Zhen's long-awaited rehabilitation was carried out, and at the Second Session of the Fifth NPC in June, Peng was named an NPC vice-chairman and director of the NPC's Legal Commission, with responsibility for restructuring China's legal system. At the same session, three veteran economists—Chen Yun, Yao Yilin, and Bo Yibo—were elected vice-premiers. Three months later, the Fourth Central Committee Plenum, held on September 25-28, elevated Peng Zhen to the Politburo; promoted Zhao Ziyang, an alternate member of the Politburo, to full membership; and elected 12 more victims of the GPCR purge to the Central Committee.[34] In addition, the plenum discussed and approved a major policy document which

Peng Zhen, newly appointed Director of the Legal Commission of the National People's Congress and NPC Vice-Chairman, explains several draft laws at the Fifth NPC's Second Session, on June 26, 1979.

—Eastfoto.

reviewed the three decades of Communist rule and addressed controversial issues which the Third Plenum had sidestepped, such as Mao's leadership errors and defects of the GPCR. The document is said to have been drafted by CCP Secretary-General Hu Yaobang in June, circulated widely among the party cadres for comments, and revised by Deng and Ye before it was finally approved. Ye Jianying's speech on September 29 at a Beijing rally in celebration of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic was based on the document.[35]

The ascendancy of Deng and his supporters was manifested once again when the Fifth Plenum met behind closed doors on February 23-29, 1980, to deliberate on major policy and personnel matters. This plenum approved the posthumous rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi (Mao's chief antagonist during the GPCR), which had been an issue of intense controversy within the leadership for some time.[36] It also made sweeping leadership changes. These included the ouster of four leaders of the "whatever" faction—Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Chen Xilian, and Ji Dengkui—from the Politburo; the elevation of two close associates of Deng, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, to the Politburo's Standing Committee; and the reestablishment of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat and the appointment of Hu Yaobang to be General Secretary and ten other veteran officials, most of them Deng's associates and allies, to be secretaries to manage the daily affairs of the party.[37]

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[33] The Deng-controlled media prominently reported the remarks and speeches of the officials. For example, see *Renmin Ribao*, May 23 (Zhao Ziyang), May 28 (Liao Hansheng, First Political Commissar of Nanjing Military Region), May 29 (Li Desheng, Commander of Mukden Military Region), June 2 (Wan Li, First Secretary, Anhui CCP Committee), and June 9 (Song Ping, First Secretary, Gansu CCP Committee), 1979. On May 22, the paper reproduced a *Jiefangjun Bao* commentator's article of the previous day which attacked Deng's critics and called for PLA cadres to resolutely support and implement policies adopted at the Third Plenum.

[34] With these changes, virtually every member or alternate member of the Eighth Central Committee who is still alive has returned to the Central Committee. The few exceptions collaborated with the Lin Biao and the gang of four groups.

[35] Lo Ping, "Developments in the Party after the Fourth CC Plenum," *Cheng Ming*, No. 25, November 1979, pp. 5-6. Reportedly, divergent views persisted among the elites on the assessment of post-1957 Communist rule. Consequently, the antagonists had to compromise on or avoid some of the most controversial issues. For Ye's speech, see *Beijing Review*, Oct. 5, 1979, pp. 7-32.

[36] Several major political obstacles are said to have blocked the rehabilitation of China's "Khrushchev," the label pinned on Liu during the GPCR, prior to the Fifth Plenum. One was that the investigation report of the 1968 Central Committee resolution which had condemned Liu as a "traitor, renegade, and scab" had been based on a report compiled by an ad hoc investigative group headed by the late Zhou Enlai. Zhou, during 1977-78, had acquired the status of a new Communist saint in China, and his name may have been invoked to block the restoration of Liu's honor. Another major obstacle was opposition by Ye Jianying. Ye had to be confronted with new evidence assembled by Liu's defenders showing that Kang Sheng had actually controlled the investigative group, had extorted false charges from Liu's associates by coercion and torture, and had framed Liu. (Kang, a party vice-chairman who died in 1975, has been expelled from the party posthumously.) Apparently, Ye agreed to Liu's rehabilitation grudgingly, and when Deng held a memorial service for Liu on May 17, 1980, an event attended by virtually every top official, Ye chose not to attend. Another notable absentee was Xu Shiyou.

Information on the controversy described above is based partly on a quite revealing editorial, "Restore the True Feature of Mao Zedong Thought—on Liu Shaoqi's Rehabilitation," *Renmin Ribao*, May 16, 1980, and partly on stories circulating inside China which, in the opinion of the author, seem highly reliable.

[37] See the Communique of the CCP's Fifth Central Committee Plenum, *Beijing Review*, Mar. 10, 1980, pp. 7-10.

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The four diehard Maoists had been targeted for removal by Deng since 1978, and, as previously noted, they had come under strong attack at the Third Central Committee Plenum. Deng had temporized, possibly because he lacked sufficient power or because he wanted to avoid a divisive leadership fight that could endanger resolution of more pressing issues. However, efforts to preserve an appearance of leadership unity and resurgence of the Left in the following spring had produced a curious sense of political uncertainty in party ranks and had emboldened many cadres to oppose or drag their feet on the programs that the Deng group wanted to pursue. Hence, Deng had decided to strike against them immediately rather than to wait until the next party congress in 1981.

Deng apparently realized as well that because of his advanced age, many cadres had adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward his pragmatic programs. They feared that just as the post-Mao leadership had done away with Mao's programs, Deng's successors might scrap his "revisionist" line and punish those who implemented it. To remove such reservations once and for all and to prevent his adversaries from taking over the leadership in the future, Deng has sought to structure his succession in advance and to put into positions of power a group of possible successors committed to his line and likely to continue his policies after he is gone.

Hu Yaobang, who as General Secretary of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party has control over the CCP's daily operations.

—Gamma-Liaison.

With this objective in mind, Deng installed his closest aide, Hu Yaobang, as head of the Central Committee Secretariat and staffed the Secretariat mostly with his supporters, whom he expects to hold aloft his banner after he is out of the political picture. As a day-to-day decision-making body, the Secretariat now runs the party and has already preempted many of Hua's functions as CCP Chairman. Deng's evident design is to dilute Hua's control over policy and the party organization, and eventually to ease him out of the chairmanship. At 64, Hu is pragmatic, talented, and imaginative, and he is blessed with extensive ties with the power holders in the system. If Deng and Hu have their way, Hu will succeed Hua as Party Chairman at the next CCP Central Committee plenum or the next CCP congress.

In a similar vein, Deng has steadily packed the State Council with his own backers and ousted his opponents. The NPC Standing Committee in April 1980 appointed two of Deng's supporters, Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li, to be vice-premiers and relieved Chen Xilian and Ji Dengkui of their posts as vice-premiers. Deng's next goal was to force Premier Hua Guofeng out of the State Council and to replace him with Zhao Ziyang. At 62, Zhao is a highly pragmatic and experienced former provincial official, with a very successful record as the leader of Sichuan, China's most populous province (population over 100 million). Although he was not too closely associated with Deng before the GPCR (as were Hu Yaobang, Wan Li, and others), his pragmatism, his good record in Sichuan, and especially his strong backing of Deng's programs apparently impressed Deng a great deal; hence, he has been co-opted into the Deng camp. To no one's surprise, the NPC in September 1980 approved Hua's resignation as premier and appointed Zhao as his replacement.

The same NPC session also confirmed the expected resignations of seven vice-premiers. These individuals included Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian, Wang Zhen, Wang Renzhong, and Chen Yongqui. Now the State Council is in the hands of Premier Zhao and senior Vice-Premier Wan Li. According to the official view, all the resignations except that of Chen Yongqui, who was in political disgrace (and was actually fired), were either designed to separate party and government functions (as in the cases

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Hua Guofeng, left, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and at the time Premier, chats with Vice-Premier Zhao Ziyang on September 3, 1980, shortly before handing over the premiership to Zhao at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress.

—Eastfoto.

of Hua and Wang Renzhong) or due to advanced age (which applies to the rest).[38] Obviously, this explanation contains more than a grain of truth. There have been consistent efforts in recent years to eliminate overconcentrations of power and to infuse leadership bodies at all levels with younger blood and competent cadres. But such motivations alone do not account for the changes. Deng instigated these changes in part to undercut his adversaries. That Deng had maneuvered Hua into giving up his government post is already quite well established.[39] What is little understood outside China, however, is that Deng, by offering to step down from his government post on many occasions, had sought to induce (if not compel) Vice-Premier Li Xiannian to follow suit. Li, China's top economic official during 1966–78, had not seen eye to eye with the modernization programs promoted by Deng and Deng's ally Chen Yun, and he had apparently encouraged the "petroleum" faction to stonewall against Deng/Chen attempts to readjust economic plans.[40] Li's departure from the State Council (although he remains a CCP vice-chairman) is likely to weaken the influence of the "petroleum" faction in the State Council, and correspondingly strengthen the position of Deng's backers. Of late, Li has even been attacked in big-character posters in Beijing.

As a matter of fact, since the summer of 1980 several officials identified with the "petroleum" faction have come under heavy fire from the Deng camp for

[38] *Beijing Review*, Sept. 15, 1980.

[39] Beginning in 1979, for example, Deng, through interviews with foreign visitors and inspired press leaks, had expressed his desire to resign from the post of vice-premier and had conducted a campaign to "persuade" Hua to relinquish the premiership.

[40] See fn. 9.

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

Wan Li, protégé of Deng Xiaoping, who has become senior Vice-Premier of China.

—Eastfoto.

their opposition to the readjustment program. Yu Qiuli, a vice-premier and concurrently director of the powerful State Planning Commission, yielded his Planning Commission post to Vice-Premier Yao Yilin and became head of the less important State Energy Commission. Deng's supporters also seized upon the death of 72 workers in the capsizing of an offshore oil rig in 1979 to mount a strong attack on officials of the "petroleum" faction. As a result of this attack, Petroleum Minister Song Zhenming suffered summary dismissal, Vice-Premier Kang Shi'en received a "demerit of the first grade" (a severe public reprimand), and Yu Qiuli had to make a humiliating self-criticism.[41] On the basis of articles in the Chinese media in recent months that have criticized the gigantic Baoshan Steel project and other major construction undertakings for waste, faulty investment plans, and other deficiencies, it seems likely that the government officials responsible for these projects (who also belong to the "petroleum" faction) will be replaced at the next NPC meeting.[42]

In addition, Deng, who undoubtedly believes Mao's celebrated dictum that political power grows from the barrel of a gun, has made special efforts to establish control over the military. Soon after his reinstatement as PLA Chief of Staff in the summer of 1977, he began to place his supporters in key military posts. For example, Wei Guoqing was appointed Director of the General Political Department; Luo Ruiqing was made Secretary-General of the Military Affairs Commission; and Yang Yong was named Deputy Chief of Staff. (Yang Chengwu, who had served as de facto Chief of Staff prior to Deng's return but has not been close to Deng, was transferred to the post of Fuzhou Military Region commander.) At the same time, Deng undertook to purge many PLA officials (e.g., Chen Xilian) who had collaborated with the gang of four or had opposed his policies, and to replace those he considered inept or too old. Indeed, many old PLA cadres have now been relieved of their leadership positions and serve only as advisers to various military bodies.[43] Recently, Deng himself has even taken over the chairmanship of the Military Affairs Commission.

Today, many veteran military men are highly apprehensive because the military modernization program put forth under Deng's aegis threatens their careers with its aim to retire "dead wood" in favor of younger officers. Furthermore, there is widespread discontent within military ranks about de-Maoization and other "revisionist" measures Deng and his associates have promoted since the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum in 1978. Some PLA leaders who supported Deng's rehabilitation—notably Xu Shiyou—apparently retain profound personal loyalty to Chairman Mao. They have expressed strong reservations about sullying the memory of the late Chairman, whom they regard as very much like a father to them despite all of his failures and mistakes.[44]

[41] The actions taken against Song and Kang were prominently reported in the Chinese media. See, for instance, "A Profound Lesson," *Renmin Ribao,* Aug. 27, 1980. However, the news that Yu made a self-criticism has not been publicly divulged, although it has been known to many inside China.

[42] Among those singled out for public criticism were Tang Ke, Minister of Metallurgical Industry; Li Guocai, Vice-Minister of Chemical Industry (and, indirectly, his minister, Sun Jingwen); and Wang Lei, Minister of Commerce. See *Beijing Review,* Sept. 29, 1980, p. 35; Oct. 13, 1980, pp. 3–4; and Nov. 3, 1980, pp. 6–7.

[43] By the summer of 1980, more than 10,000 PLA ranking cadres, including such officials as Deputy Chief of Staff Li Da, Deputy Air Force Commanders Xue Shaoqing and Kuang Rennong, and Fuzhou Military Region Political Commissar Li Zhimin, had stepped down from their leadership posts and become "advisers." See Huang Jung-Yueh, "Military Cadre Problems," *Studies on Chinese Communism,* Aug. 15, 1980, p. 117.

[44] See "Persist in Four Basic Principles and Continuously Emancipate Our Thought," *Jiefangjun Bao,* Apr. 30, 1979, as reprinted in *Renmin Ribao*, May 3, 1979; and the editorial in *Jiefangjun Bao,* Aug. 1, 1980, as transmittted by New China News Agency, Aug. 1, 1980. For Xu Shiyou's ambivalent attitude toward de-Maoization, see his article "Chairman Mao Lives Forever in Our Hearts," *Hongqi,* September 1978.

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To cope with these problems, Deng has employed a variety of means. He has pushed a campaign to strengthen political work and "ideological education" among PLA officers and soldiers. Perhaps to persuade the discontented cadres to support his policy of abolishing lifelong cadre tenure, Deng himself stepped down as Chief of Staff in early 1980 and appointed Yang Dezhi, commander of Kunming Military Region, as his successor. Since Yang had not been seen particularly close to Deng but had performed well in China's war against Vietnam in 1979, the choice of Yang over Xu Shiyou probably disarmed many of Deng's critics. Most important of all, however, Deng has carried a big political stick and has not hesitated to use it when necessary. In the past three years or so, sweeping leadership changes have been made in the PLA hierarchy, from the center down to the provinces. For instance, 10 out of China's 11 military regions have new commanders (the only Maoist-era holdover is Li Desheng of Mukden Military Region, in Manchuria), and the first political commissars in all 11 military regions are also new. In addition, new appointees command 22 out of China's 28 province-level military districts. Through these reshuffles, Deng appears to have strengthened his control, although criticism of and resistance to the current party line have continued.[45]

The Reconstituted Leadership

As the preceding analysis illustrates, Deng, since his political comeback in the summer of 1977, has steadily restructured China's leadership. Several salient characteristics of the reconstituted leadership are clearly discernible.

First, the "old guard" predominates in the leadership bodies at all levels. These veteran officials were victims of the GPCR purges and have been rehabilitated only in recent years. Deng's restoration to power has seemingly legitimated their raison d'être, and their political resuscitation symbolizes a stinging repudiation of Mao's rule. As a group, they are quite old, largely in their 70's and late 60's. In the Politburo, for example, the average age of the members is over 70. While the average age of the Secretariat members is slightly younger, it is still above the mid-60's. The picture is much the same for the leaders in the provincial party apparatus and in the PLA hierarchy.[46]

[45] These statistics were culled by the author from Chinese national and provincial press reports, and the compilation is believed accurate through the fall of 1980.

Xu Shiyou, right, a prominent military leader and a member of the CCP Politburo, chats with CCP Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping at the September 1980 session of the Fifth National People's Congress.

—Eastfoto.

Ironically, the flood of rehabilitations has pushed out many younger cadres who were promoted during the GPCR. To be sure, there is now a policy of persuading old cadres to step back into the so-called "second or third line," and of promoting middle-aged and young cadres to leadership responsibilities at all levels, and some beginnings have been made in this regard.[47] However, progress is slow, for resistance among veteran cadres is quite strong.

Second, supporters (real or imagined) of the gang of four and Lin Biao—including those labeled the "wind faction," the "slippery faction," and the "quakers," as well as those diehard Maoists who oppose the current

[46] According to Chinese sources, the average age of PLA cadres at the army level is over 60; at the division level, over 55; at the regiment level, over 50; and at the battalion level, over 35. Moreover, the average age of leadership cadres in the Military Affairs Commission and the major military organs is between 65 and 75. See Wu Liping, "A Major Reform in the Cadre System," and Special Commentator, "Be a Promoter for Reform of the Cadre Structure," *Hongqi*, Nos. 10 and 11, 1980.

[47] See Hua Guofeng's speech to the September 1980 session of the National People's Congress, *Beijing Review*, Sept. 22, 1980, pp. 26–27. It is interesting to note that such senior military region commanders as Xu Shiyou (Guangzhou), Yang Dezhi (Kunming), Han Xianchu (Lanzhou), and Wang Pizheng (Wuhan) have been replaced by young PLA officers. Except for Qin Jiwei (Beijing), Yang Chengwu (Fuzhou), and Wu Kehua (Guangzhou), who are in their late 60's, the other eight commanders (six of them appointed in 1980) are in their mid-60's or younger. In addition, these 11 military region commanders and many other newly appointed military district officials are Korean war veterans.

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Table 2: Province-level Party First Secretaries Purged or Demoted Since October 1976

Locality	Name	Date	Remarks
Anhui	Song Peichang	Late 76	
Beijing	Wu De	10/78	
Gansu	Xian Henghan	Early 77	
Guizhou	Lu Ruilin	3/77	Last iden. 10/77 Dep. Pol. Com'sar, Guangzhou Mil. Reg.
Hebei	Liu Zihou	3/80	
Heilongjiang	Wang Jiadao	2/77	
	Liu Guangtao	12/77	
Henan	Liu Jianxun	10/78	
Hubei	Zhao Xinchu	6/78	Vice-Dir., State Planning Com.
Inner Mong.	Yu Taizhong	7/78	Comdr., Chengdu Mil. Reg. 1/80
Jilin	Wang Huaixiang	2/77	Last iden. 7/77 Dep. Pol. Com'sar, Wuhan Mil. Reg.
Liaoning	Zeng Shaoshan	9/78	
Shaanxi	Li Ruishan	12/78	Vice-Dir., State Agric. Com.
Shandong	Pai Juping	12/80	
Shanghai	Zhang Chunqiao	10/76	Leader of the gang of four
Shanxi	Wang Qian	11/80	
Tianjin	Xie Xuegong	6/78	
Tibet	Ren Rong	5/80	
Xinjiang	Seypidin	1/78	
Yunnan	Jia Qiyun	2/77	

SOURCE: Chinese press reports and public appearances of Chinese officials. The information includes all changes that have come to the author's attention through December 1980.

pragmatic policy line—have been ousted from the leadership bodies at all levels.[48] Their removals solve some problems for Deng and his colleagues but create others. Among these newly purged officials are many relatively young cadres who were promoted during the GPCR decade, and their treatment runs counter to the policy of opening up leadership positions for the middle-aged and the young. Most serious of all, half of China's 38 million party members joined the party after 1966, and a large number of them, strongly imbued with Maoist values, have been alienated by the wholesale dismissals of GPCR "upstarts," which they see as an assault on their belief system and a total negation of their political interests.

Third, there is a trend toward specialization of functions and separation of party and government (or military) work. This is particularly discernible at the provincial level. Now the party first secretaries in 28 out of China's 29 province-level administrative units no longer hold the top government posts concurrently (as was invariably the case during the GPCR and until 1978). The only exception is Beijing municipality, where Lin Hujia is both first secretary and mayor. (The shuffling of provincial first secretaries is evident in Table 2.) In the same vein, few PLA officers are concurrently top party or government leaders. At the height of the GPCR, in contrast, PLA officers headed 21 out of the 29 province-level administrative units and constituted the backbone elements in all of them. Also, there is a new tendency to appoint noted experts, scientists, and scholars to government leadership positions at the provincial level (vice-governors, vice-mayors, department chiefs, etc.). This appears to be more than a "united front" or public relations gimmick—it seems to underlie the new policy of recruiting people of greater professional competence into leadership positions in order to implement the "four modernizations."

Fourth, in spite of the ascendancy of veteran officials and Deng's predominance, factionalism continues, and conflicting viewpoints on major policy issues persist. This factionalism exists in the party, the government, and the PLA hierarchy. In party policy councils, different approaches to economic construction are represented by Deng, Chen Yun, and their colleagues, on the one hand, and by Hua, Li Xiannian, and the "petroleum" faction, on the other. In the State Council, the forces of the "petroleum" faction are strongly entrenched, as they control many of the economic and industrial ministries. The party and government elites also differ markedly on de-Maoization and on how to assess the history of Mao's rule, with Ye Jianying the leader of the opposition. In the PLA, there are divisions within leadership ranks over the devaluation of Mao and the current pragmatic line, and a large number of former associates of Lin Biao, now out of political favor, are severely discontented.

Looking Ahead

These problems notwithstanding, Deng and his colleagues have managed to establish control over the

[48] At the provincial level, quite a few officials who were guilty of graft, abuse of power, corruption, and other irregularities and misconduct have also been dismissed. Moreover, some officials who were in the "wrong" jobs and did not perform as expected have been moved to different localities or departments. An outstanding example is the transfer of Xi Zhongxun from the post of First Secretary of the Guangdong CCP Committee in November 1980. Lin Hujia, Party First Secretary and mayor of Beijing is also to be replaced, for he had conflicts with CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang and will now go to Shandong. For hints of the friction between Lin and Hu, see *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 19, 1980. Hu's impending transfer has been widely reported in the Hong Kong Communist press.

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leadership bodies and have taken many initiatives to implement the modernization program on all fronts. They can be expected to further consolidate and strengthen their positions at the next high-level party gathering. Above all, a showdown on Chairman Hua Guofeng's future is a foregone conclusion.

There is no question that many of Deng's supporters resent the fact that Hua remains CCP Chairman, even if he is only in office and not really in power, for they see him as the last vestige of Mao's legacy. In fact, clear signs have appeared that they seek to remove him. For example, a two-part article in *Renmin Ribao* on September 18 and 19, 1980, openly questioned the legitimacy of Hua's succession to Chairman Mao in 1976. Hua's major justification for taking over Mao's mantle was that he had been handpicked by Mao. As evidence, he has cited Mao's purported statement that "with you in charge, I am at ease." The *Renmin Ribao* article, however, said that "the system of succession which puts the political destiny of a country in the hands of one man alone is extremely dangerous." "The power of a leader," it went on, "is bestowed by the people"; therefore, "he has no right to appoint the successor to his post, which does not belong to him." Furthermore, not only have portraits of Mao been removed from public places since mid-August, but some pictures of Hua have also been taken down. The most prominent one was that in Beijing's Central Railway Station, which showed Hua and Mao together and symbolically represented Mao's handing over of the leadership to Hua.

As the late Chairman used to pontificate, a revolutionary leader is not appointed; he has to emerge from struggle. Hua's problem is that, despite his elevation



Ye Jianying, CCP Vice-Chairman, delivers the major address at a rally in Beijing's Great Hall of the People on September 29, 1979, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. With Ye at the speaker's table, from right to left: Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Xu Xiangqian.

—Eastfoto.

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Symptomatic of a de-Maoization of Chinese politics—a giant portrait of the late Mao Zedong is taken down from its place in a Beijing square in January 1980.

—Liu/Contact.

to the party chairmanship under the political exigencies of 1976, he seems to have failed to prevail in the subsequent struggles and thereby to prove that he deserves to be China's supreme leader. A number of factors account for Hua's difficulties. Because his training was limited and his leadership experience was confined largely to provincial politics prior to the 1970's, Hua has not been equal to the tasks thrust upon him. Indeed, his performance as Party Chairman and Premier during 1976–80 has been highly undistinguished. Moreover, in a system like China's, where personal ties are the cement of political power, Hua simply lacks extensive networks of such links with China's power holders in the party and the PLA. True, he did have the support of the "whatever" faction and of leaders like Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, but such support has not been sufficient to enable him to meet Deng's challenge.

In current perspective, Hua appears to be a transitional and tragic figure. Although a Maoist, he nevertheless set in motion de-Maoization. He rose to political prominence on the waves of the GPCR and depended for support on the sacred aura of Mao's authority. With the wholesale restoration of "capitalist-roaders" and the growing repudiation of the Maoist legacy, however, he has increasingly become an anachronistic figure, a specter of the past to be exorcised.

After Hua's probable step-down from the CCP chairmanship, who will then succeed him? This will depend on a variety of considerations. At present, Deng is China's most powerful and authoritative leader, so he is the logical choice. But because of his age and his campaign to groom younger cadres for future leadership, and in order to defuse opposition to his policies and to Hua's removal, he might decline and push instead for the elevation of Hu Yaobang to the position. At the same time, there is a strong possibility that, in order to avoid a highly divisive battle, party leaders might choose to abolish the post of CCP Chairman altogether and accent collective leadership. Such a move would to some extent save face for Hua but would still leave open the leading role in the future for Hu Yaobang, who is a member of the Politburo

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Standing Committee and also CCP General Secretary. (It should be noted that the top party leader in the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, holds the post of General Secretary. There is no Party Chairman.)

Notwithstanding Deng's grooming of Hu for future leadership, it remains to be seen whether Deng will be more successful than Mao was in structuring an orderly transfer of power at the top. As is well known, Mao selected, first, Liu Shaoqi and, then, Lin Biao as his heir-apparent, but he subsequently lost confidence in both of them and had to engineer their ousters at enormous political costs. Furthermore, Mao's support for Hua in 1976 has now become a political liability for Hua. Will Deng in time become disillusioned with men like Hu, Zhao Ziyang, and Wan Li, to whom he has been passing the task of propelling China into the modern era? After Deng is out of the political picture, will these "second-generation" leaders be able to work together as a cohesive team? Above all, will the probable removal of Hua contribute to leadership unity and political stability and facilitate economic development? If not, Deng's quest for China's modernization could prove futile.

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Politics, Modernization, and Science in China

By Richard P. Suttmeier

Three years after the post-Mao leadership signaled the arrival of major new policies for science and technology, China's record in implementing those policies includes some notable successes. Furthermore, the successful completion of such complex technological missions as the launch last year of a multi-stage ICBM reminds us that China has developed a not inconsiderable research and development (R&D) capability. However, the record of the last three years also includes failures of implementation, which indicate that a number of intractable problems long impeding the development of science and technology (S&T) in that country have not yet been solved. Because many of these problems are at the core of China's modernization difficulties, they warrant our careful attention.

Since May 1977, the "modernization of science and technology" has frequently been mentioned as the key to the other three modernizations (industrial, agricultural, and military). Preparatory activities for new S&T policies, begun in 1977, culminated in a National Science Conference held in Beijing in March 1978 and in the announcement of an ambitious program for scientific development. This program can be thought of as having four main components: (1) institutional reform, including important improvements in the treatment and official status accorded technical intellectuals; (2) a national research plan expressing research priorities; (3) educational reform and plans for manpower development; and (4) initiatives designed to establish active scientific and technological relations with other nations, particularly the advanced capitalist countries.[1]

A comparison of China's recent S&T policies with those of the industrialized nations reveals assumptions and objectives that set Beijing's policies somewhat apart. Of the four main objectives noted above, for instance, the first, third, and fourth are, in large part, concerned with defining and clarifying the social position of science and with re-creating an internationally involved national scientific community. Science policy in the industrialized countries *assumes* the existence of a viable scientific community and seeks to improve its performance through increases and adjustments in levels of funding for pure and applied research, the establishment of national research priorities, the strengthening of mechanisms whereby scientific advice is communicated to policymakers, and the fostering of an atmosphere conducive to technological innovation.

The extraordinary concern shown in China for the enhancement of the social standing of science and the development of a scientific community reflects the belief of the country's leaders that the Cultural Revolution years and the machinations of the "gang of four" were disastrous for the Chinese scientific community,

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[1] For a more detailed discussion, see Richard P. Suttmeier, *Science, Technology and China's Drive for Modernization*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

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The important role of science in China's current effort to make itself "a modern great power within this century" is suggested in this poster photographed in Lanzhou in 1979. The four social elements shown striving for this goal are peasants, workers, soldiers, and technocrats.

—Derek Davies/*Far Eastern Economic Review.*

and that attention from the highest political authorities was needed if China was to overcome the resulting damage to S&T. The fact that science policy issues of a more conventional, performance-oriented nature (such as issues of expenditure levels, science advice, innovation) are now surfacing with greater frequency in China, is one measure of the success of the policies initiated in 1977–78. Progress has indeed been made in upgrading the status of scientists, in establishing international scientific relations, and in reactivating the communications channels and professional organizations that make possible a scientific community as a social institution.

However, abundant evidence from the last few years reveals that implementation of a number of S&T-related policies has been remarkably slow and continues to encounter widespread resistance. Indeed, the evidence suggests that further rationalization of performance is critically dependent on further progress toward institutional reform. Yet, it is also evident that such progress is partially blocked by impediments deeply rooted in the political system.

An understanding of the relationships between the institutionalization and performance objectives of policy, and of the constraints on implementation, requires as a first step some attention to terminology. Of particular importance is the term "modernization." For the student of comparative modernization theory, modernization is understood to involve a total societal transformation resulting in certain specified characteristics. Some of these, e.g., high literacy, urbanization, industrialization, and high per capita energy consumption, are rather easy to identify and measure. Others, such as a high degree of division of labor, a highly differentiated social structure, secularization, the predominance of achievement criteria in organizational recruitment and promotion, and the quest for rationality and "scientific thinking," are more difficult to observe and measure, but nonetheless are taken as defining. Politically, modernization leads to the

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emergence of a variety of new participatory roles. Structural pluralism and ideological diversity are tolerated and protected by law and custom. Norms of instrumental rationality contribute to a degree of administrative flexibility. Modernization need not imply the development of political democracy, nor need it entail "Westernization."

The term the Chinese use for "modernization" —*xiandai hua*—however, does not have the theoretical significance connoted by the term "modernization" in Western usage. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the Chinese wish to reject much of the Western theory of modernization and are searching for a "Chinese theory."[2] Until such a theory is articulated, the significance of the term *xiandai hua* does not extend much beyond its rather literal meaning, i.e., "to make modern." In discussion of the policies and processes pertaining to what we in the West would call the "modernization of science and technology," such a narrow meaning is of limited usefulness. I therefore avoid the phrase "modernization of S&T." The term "modernization" is used below in accordance with its Western theoretical meaning, and the phrase "S&T development" is used to denote the acquisition of capabilities needed to make more modern or "up to date" the products of scientific research and development and the products and processes we call "technology."

This attention to definition is necessary if we are to avoid simplistic interpretations both of the role of S&T in Chinese modernization and of the requirements for S&T development. The causal relationship between S&T development and modernization is not simple and unidirectional, as implied in Chinese claims that the "modernization of S&T" is the key to the other three "modernizations." Instead, S&T development and modernization interact in rather complex ways. The mere establishment of an indigenous R&D system will not make a significant contribution to modernization, for instance, if the society has no capacity for technological innovation. The capacity for innovation in turn requires, among other things, institutional flexibility and the existence of rewards for risk-taking. In the absence of a capacity for innovation, it is unlikely that an R&D system can command the political support which will enable it to prosper over the long term. Thus, to the extent that an innovative capacity is a feature of modernization, a degree of modernization logically precedes continuous S&T development.

[2] See, for instance, Ke Weiran, "Theoretical Workers Must Make New Contributions to the Four Modernizations," *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 5, May 4, 1979, in *Joint Publications Research Service: China Report* (Arlington, VA—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 73839, July 13, 1979.

Modernization in Abeyance

The experience of the last three years suggests that Chinese society continues to suffer from a lack of modernization, which, in turn, holds back S&T development. For instance, looking again at the issue of innovation, we find that institutional flexibility has not been notable in China, and that cases of risk aversion are numerous. Then, too, decision-makers persist in undervaluing expert technical judgment. (Such a decision-making style not only leads to inefficient outcomes, but in an increasingly technological society, the results can be dangerous to life, property, and environmental quality. The Bohai oil rig disaster, in which a party cadre ordered the rig moved in bad weather against the advice of his engineering staff, dramatically illustrates the problem.[3]) Persistence of such historical characteristics as excessive bureaucratism, and the observable low levels of tolerance for structural pluralism (or sub-system autonomy) and for heterodox thoughts and values, also point to low levels of modernization.

We have seen in the last three years that the barriers to modernizing change are profoundly political. Jobs, positions, and the distribution of status and authority are all at stake, and all the actors concerned with the allocation of these goods proceed with the knowledge that political lines have been known to change in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and that grief can come to those who overlook this fact. These critical dimensions of China's "politics of modernization" impinge directly on policies for S&T development.

Writing nearly three years ago about the politics of modernization in China, Kenneth Lieberthal called attention to divisions within the political elite over the pace and some of the objectives of the "four modernizations" programs.[4] Lieberthal argued that Deng Xiaoping and his followers had been trying to force the pace of modernization in order to lock China onto a course of socioeconomic change. Lieberthal recognized the kinds of politically inspired resistance to change alluded to above, and for that reason he argued that Deng and his supporters had to push for the implementation of the program at every opportunity in order to overcome a deeply rooted conservatism.

An examination of the political environment in which Beijing's S&T policy must operate supports

[3] *The New York Times*, July 7, 1980.

[4] Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Politics of Modernization in the PRC," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May–June 1978, pp. 1–17.

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Lieberthal's argument, but also offers an opportunity to elaborate on it somewhat. For instance, during the last three years, the official status of the technical intellectual community has been elevated to its highest level since the founding of the PRC. This grant of status is based on the belief of Deng Xiaoping and his supporters that the success of the four modernizations is linked in critical ways with the technical intellectuals. The latter, in turn, have become perhaps the leadership's friendliest constituency. At the same time, the technical community has begun to use its new-found status to press for policies which *it* feels, in *its* expert judgment, would be best for the four modernizations programs and, not incidentally, for the technical community as well. Thus, the granting of status to the intellectual community in the cause of modernization begins to change the politics of modernization by providing new modes of interest representation in Chinese politics.

It is clear that a substantial number of nontechnical cadres regard these new modes with some unease. Current policy emphasizes the importance of technical expertise for occupants of leadership positions in a whole range of organizations. The majority of cadres who rose through the ranks in the days of Maoist populism do not possess such expertise, and, indeed, have a deep-seated suspicion of intellectuals.[5] The policy prescriptions and expressions of interests from the technical community are probably viewed with even greater alarm, for they imply that the success of the four modernizations must come at the expense of the status and authority of the established cadres. Moreover, since the beginning of 1980, there has been wide discussion of the need for major reforms to "modernize" and raise "the professional level" of cadres at all levels.[6]

One sees, then, a political situation of potentially serious contradictions. The technical intellectual community has a sense of what needs to be done to move toward the achievement of the four modernizations. However, adoption of the "rational" policy prescriptions of this community would threaten hundreds of thousands of cadres who prospered under Maoist political criteria. The continuing political support of these cadres is as necessary as their continuing incumbency in leadership positions is problematic for the implementation of such policies. One sees, in short, a classic tension between the requirements for efficient goal achievement, technically understood, and the requirements for continued political consensus and integration.

China's leadership faces the challenge of managing this tension productively. To be "effective,"[7] Beijing's science policy must allow for the interests of S&T in policy without alienating the majority of cadres, and elicit support and participation from nonexpert cadres without making the intellectual community the scapegoat for China's underdevelopment. Students of modern China will recognize how elusive such a policy has been. I will argue that it may still elude the current leadership. To sustain this argument, it is necessary to review in some detail developments over the last three years in each of the four main areas of China's science policy.

Institutional Reform

Formally, the achievements in the area of institutional reform have been notable. In the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), for instance, the number of institutes under central Academy jurisdiction has grown back from a post-Cultural Revolution low of 36 to well over 100. Twelve branch academies have been added in provinces and major cities to achieve a measure of efficiency through decentralization. Leading scientists have once again been organized into academic committees to provide greater professional control over the governance of the CAS institutes, and provision has been made to expand the membership of the prestigious Academy-wide "department committees."[8]

[5] See, for instance, Fox Butterfield, "A Little Knowledge is Dangerous to Many of China's Leadership," *The New York Times*, June 1, 1980. Butterfield's report is consistent with numerous Chinese sources, two notable examples of which are: Deng Xiaoping, "Report on the Current Situation and Tasks," *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), Mar. 1, 1980; and Zhou Peiyuan, "Make Concerted All-out Efforts, Strive to Modernize China's Science and Technology" (Report delivered to the Second National Congress of the Chinese Science and Technology Association, Mar. 15, 1980), Beijing Xinhua, Mar. 23, 1980, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Mar. 26, 1980, pp. L/7-18.

[6] For one important statement of these reform proposals, see "Be Promoters in Reforming the Structure of Cadre Ranks," *Hongqi*, No. 11, June 1, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 17, 1980, pp. L/6-10.

[7] My use of "effective" is inspired by, but not identical to, the usage in Chester I. Barnard's distinction between "effectiveness" and "efficiency." See his *The Function of the Executive*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1938.

[8] The CAS is organized into five departments: Mathematics, Physics, and Astronomy; Chemistry; Technical Sciences; Biology; and Earth Sciences. Each department has a "department committee" composed of the most eminent scientists in the relevant fields. Membership is thus somewhat analogous to the honorific title of "academician." The department committees were founded in 1955, and by 1957 their combined membership was approximately 195. (This figure excludes social scientists, who were at the time included in the CAS but now

(continued on page 26)

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In higher education, entrance examinations have been reintroduced, certain universities have been designated for priority investment of resources, new universities have been established, a system of postgraduate studies has been reestablished in cooperation with the CAS, and principles for awarding academic degrees have been formulated.

There have also been changes in the structure of administrative organs charged with aspects of science policy. The Science and Technology Commission (STC) has been reestablished, as has the State Council's Scientific and Technical Cadres Bureau. The latter body is intended to rationalize the assignment and employment of scientists and engineers, and plays a role in the administration of the postgraduate training program.[9] Science-and-technology committees and S&T cadre offices have been established at provincial and local government levels.[10]

In the area of professional life, academic societies have been reconstituted, scientific journals are again appearing, and academic meetings and symposia abound. The work of the Science and Technology Association (STA) has been strengthened, and as we shall see below, the STA and its member societies are being increasingly called upon to provide expert advice for policymakers. A system of academic awards carrying certificates of merit and cash prizes has been reinstituted.[11]

The treatment of technical intellectuals has improved dramatically. Political and ideological stigmas are no longer officially attached to the category "intellectual." Although there are growing complaints that salaries and living conditions are inadequate, a large number of scientists and engineers have received promotions. Many technical intellectuals who had been assigned duties beneath their qualifications during the Cultural Revolution years have been reassigned—a process of no small importance given the critical shortage of highly trained personnel. In addition, a move is under way to recruit scientists into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in order to increase "the percentage of scientists and technicians in the party committee of each institute to over 50 percent."[12]

Zhang Wenyu, Director of the Institute of High-energy Physics under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, discusses with an assistant a piece of equipment being used in building China's first experimental center of high-energy physics.

—Eastfoto.

Despite the major commitment to, and achievement of significant progress toward, institutional reform, it is in this area that resistance to change has been most evident. In his speech to the National Science Conference in 1978, Deng Xiaoping spelled out in no uncertain terms a policy that required leadership in research institutes to be in the hands of professionally competent scientists. Party committees were instructed to insure that policies were being carried out, and to serve as facilitators of the work of scientific research. Nevertheless, one reads in 1979 and 1980 of the powerlessness of scientists, and of the continued disregard of their views and recommendations by party and administrative cadres. For instance, a February 1980 commentary in the Guangzhou daily *Nanfang Ribao* noted:

. . . in certain scientific research units some experts who are nominally the directors and deputy directors

have their own Academy of Social Sciences.) Over the years, membership and activity declined. Chu-yuan Cheng, *Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949-1963,* Washington, DC, National Science Foundation, 1965, p. 322. There were only 115 members in mid-1979, when plans were announced to expand membership to 300 by the end of the year. Beijing Xinhua, Aug. 8, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 17, 1980, p. L/19.

[9] Beijing Xinhua, Mar. 3, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 5, 1980, pp. L/11-12.

[10] Provision for these was first announced by Fang Yi in "On the Situation in China's Science and Education," *Peking Review,* Jan. 13, 1978, pp. 16-17.

[11] Beijing Xinhua, Dec. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 7, 1980, pp. L/5-6.

[12] Statement by Fang Yi to an enlarged meeting of the party organization of the CAS. Beijing Xinhua, May 27, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 28, 1980, pp. L/1-2.

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of research institutes. . . have no power to take an interest in anything related to scientific research work. They even lack decision-making powers in assigning science and technology workers to carry out an experiment. This shows that they have the technical titles in name only.[13]

At a meeting in December 1979, key management cadres of S&T institutions admitted to problems in utilizing technical intellectuals. A member of the Technical Cadres Office of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry stated:

At present many technical personnel have no authority or responsibility. Their words are not respected. Even worse, it still happens that on important scientific and technological problems, the chief engineer is not consulted.

And the CCP committee secretary of the CAS's Institute of Chemistry noted:

At present, many research offices were not established in accordance with academic concepts. Without unified thinking, there will certainly be serious internal friction. The reason for this is that the leading academic person of the research office has no authority over personnel affairs and therefore has no means of carrying out his academic ideas.[14]

The following excerpt indicates how conservatism on the part of nontechnical cadres caused similar attitudes among engineers at a plant in Fushun. The latter, attacked during the Cultural Revolution years, had only recently been rehabilitated. The nontechnical cadres had

. . . doubts whether or not the leadership's allowing these engineers to control part of the technical leadership authority is "excessiveness" in implementing the policy. . . . There were some leading cadres who had no understanding of the situation and were worried about taking the "wrong class standpoint" again. When the engineers who were just promoted heard the rumors, they were reluctant to work, fearing people would say they were cocky and self-satisfied.[15]

Thus, in spite of the elevation of intellectuals, one continues to see indications of widespread anti-intellectualism, directed against both the ideas of intellectuals and intellectuals as persons. There are also signs of resistance to the recruitment of technical personnel into the CCP.[16]

The regime has also been slow to implement policies to improve the wages and living conditions of technical intellectuals. According to one report,

At present, the salaries of many scientific and technical personnel are a bit too low, or even unreasonably low. (It is said that some senior scientific researchers earn less than their wives, who do temporary jobs.). . . Another acute problem facing scientific and technical personnel is the shortage of houses.[17]

A survey conducted by the Technical Cadres Office of the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry found that the average monthly wage for 6,184 "technical cadres" in six research institutes was 65 yuan (in comparison with 60 yuan for industrial workers). Middle-aged technical personnel in particular were identified as being seriously underpaid.[18]

In the area of personnel reassignments, too, one sees evidence of remarkable bureaucratic inertia. According to a 1978 survey in Guangdong Province, for instance, some 30,000 S&T personnel were not properly employed. Since then, some progress has been made in reassignments, but still there are cases of ". . . microwave experts who are working as factory mechanics and people who were engaged in nuclear magnetic resonance research for over 10 years. . . repairing computers." The explanation given for this slow progress captures nicely the essence of rational resistance to change that purports to advance rationality:

Of course, there are many reasons why it is currently not possible to readjust and transfer these people. One is that their present units will not let them go, and another is that the units to which they should be transferred stress that it will not be easy to solve the

[13] Guangzhou, Guangdong Provincial Service, Feb. 20, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 25, 1980, p. P/1.

[14] "Correctly Recognize the Status and Role of Intellectuals in the Building of the Four Modernizations," *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), Dec. 7, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 75023, Jan. 29, 1980.

[15] "Give Full Play to the Backbone of Intellectuals in the Four Modernizations," *Guangming Ribao*, Sept. 14, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 74552, Nov. 9, 1979.

[16] "Entry into the Party for Scientists and Technicians Is Difficult Too," a letter to the editor of *Guangming Ribao*, Nov. 7, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 74748, Dec. 11, 1979.

[17] Ren Zhongyi, "Is It Necessary to Regard the Broad Masses of Intellectuals as Part of the Working Class," *Guangming Ribao*, Jan. 8, 1980, in *JPRS*, No. 75104, Feb. 11, 1980.

[18] "Correctly Recognize the Status and Role of Intellectuals. . .," loc. cit. For an indication that the "livelihood" problems of S&T personnel are now receiving attention at the highest level, see Deng Xiaoping, "Report on the Current Situation and Tasks," loc. cit.; and Fang Yi, "Several Current Problems in Scientific and Technological Work," *Hongqi*, No. 2, Jan. 16, 1980, in *JPRS*, No. 75317, Mar. 17, 1980.

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problem of registered permanent residence if the number of staff exceeds their establishment, or else are unwilling to accept them on the ground that there is no housing available. Some of the scientific and technical cadres themselves are unwilling to go because they do not like the new units or their locations.[19]

Given China's shortage of S&T personnel, one would expect that the proper matching of skills and jobs would have the highest priority, particularly since such a step seemingly is relatively costless. But what is relatively costless in the eyes of a central policymaker may not be so to officials at lower levels, who see "rational" reassignments as entailing the loss of talented, if underemployed, subordinates.

One final problem of an institutional nature is the unresolved conflict over the use of buildings in China's system of higher education. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) occupied many college and university facilities during the Cultural Revolution, and PLA units have been unwilling to vacate these buildings in spite of the clear wishes of the State Council and Ministry of Education. Reportedly only one quarter of the space thus occupied has been returned during the last two years.[20]

National Research Plan

The National Science Conference was the occasion for China to announce its research priorities. Eight fields—agriculture, energy, materials, space, computers, lasers, high-energy physics, and genetic engineering—were singled out for particular attention.[21] A full assessment of progress in each of these fields during the last three years is beyond my scope here. Moreover, data on manpower and expenditures necessary to test whether these fields are in fact being accorded the priority they were said to have been assigned in 1978 are not readily available. Nevertheless, a few observations can be offered.

[19] Guangzhou, Guangdong Provincial Service, Apr. 18, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 22, 1980, p. P/3.

[20] Beijing Xinhua, Sept. 29, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 30, 1980, pp. L/18-20.

[21] "'Abridgement' of Fang Yi Report to National Science Conference," Beijing Xinhua, Mar. 28, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 29, 1978, pp. E/1-22.

Underlining the priority accorded certain areas of scientific research is the attendance of then Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping (center) at the 1980 International Conference on Lasers, held in Beijing in May 1980.

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First, there is a general consensus among Western observers that, with the possible exception of high-energy physics, China's chosen priorities were well thought out and quite sensible. Readjustments in economic plans during 1979 have probably resulted in greater emphasis being placed on agricultural and energy-related research than in 1978,[22] but work clearly is progressing in all eight areas.

Second, although the reestablishment of planning and the setting of priorities have undoubtedly benefited S&T development, the persistence of institutional problems may impede full realization of the promises of planning. In agriculture, for instance, there have been reports of inefficiencies in the operation of research institutes and resistance to the recommendations made by agricultural scientists.[23] One suspects that this resistance is related to the fact that the prescriptions for agricultural improvement coming from agricultural research centers have not been narrowly technical, but have involved an integrated program of technical and socioeconomic reform of local management systems, crop selection, and marketing arrangements.[24] Once again, one sees the problematic interdependence of S&T development and broader societal modernization.

In some cases, the rationalizing potential of research planning is lost in the execution, with the result often a maldistribution of efforts within a given field of science. For instance, in optics, researchers around the country have rushed to initiate research on lasers. This has led to duplication of research in that area and neglect of other areas of optics. Such distortions have been attributed to poor research management, as manifested in weak national coordination, superficial analyses and assessments of the details of research plans, and the underdeveloped state of analytic tools needed for the evaluation of the quality of research.[25]

Education and Manpower

A shortage of highly trained S&T manpower is often regarded as the largest single constraint on China's plans for S&T development. A major cause of this problem has been the disruption of higher education that began during the Cultural Revolution. As many as 1 million individuals may have missed opportunities for higher education as a result.[26] Educational reform was therefore accorded high priority in the new S&T policies of 1977-78. Considerable progress has been made since then. There has been a major effort to upgrade the quality of textbooks, and a system of academic degrees has been introduced. As noted above, entrance examinations have been reinstated, postgraduate programs have been initiated, and new institutions of higher education have been established. Reportedly, by the end of 1979, there were 1.02 million students enrolled in 633 institutions of higher education, an increase of 164,000 students and 35 institutions over 1978. Some 275,000 first-year students were enrolled during 1979.[27] In 1979, according to one report, 41 percent of all students at universities were in areas of science and engineering.[28]

While detailed manpower figures are still not available, data released during the last few years have improved our basis for estimating S&T manpower in China. That there are many Chinese working in S&T-related activities is clear. Reportedly there were 6 million "science and technology workers" in early 1980,[29] about 4.750 million in "units owned by the whole people."[30] However, since institutions of higher education reportedly have graduated only 2.946 million students (4 percent of the work force) during the last 30 years,[31] it is clear that the category "S&T worker" is a rather inclusive one.

A frequently noted objective of China's national S&T manpower policy—first mentioned by Fang Yi, Minister in Charge of the Science and Technology Commission, in his address to the National Science Conference—is to have 800,000 "research workers" by 1985. As of late 1979, however, there were reportedly

[22] There have been no explicit reports on readjustments in research plans, but the latter do tend to reflect economic priorities.

[23] See, for instance, a speech by Wang Renzhong at the National Conference on Surveys of Natural Agricultural Resources and Their Distribution in Agricultural Regions, *Hongqi*, No. 6, June 1, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 73956, Aug. 3, 1979.

[24] See Jiang Shan, "Vigorous Support Should Be Given for the Work of Scientific Experiment Centers for Agricultural Modernization," Beijing Xinhua, Mar. 24, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 27, 1980, pp. L/11-13.

[25] Yen Polin, "Why Is It That Scientific Research Projects Are Unnecessarily Overlapped in Large Numbers?" *Guangming Ribao*, Mar. 20, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 73693, June 15, 1979.

[26] Liu Da, "Rectify Our Understanding of Intellectuals," *Hongqi*, No. 1, Jan. 1, 1980, in *JPRS*, No. 75231, Feb. 29, 1980.

[27] "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1979 National Economic Plan," *Beijing Review* (hereafter *BR*), May 19, 1980, p. 22.

[28] Beijing Xinhua, Sept. 23, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1979, pp. L/12-13. This percentage is somewhat lower than that assumed by Western observers, and seems to contradict a recent report that the ratio of "liberal arts" students to science and engineering students in recent years has been 2 to 3. Beijing Xinhua, June 6, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 10, 1980, pp. L/7-8.

[29] *BR*, Mar. 31, 1980, p. 20

[30] "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1979 National Economic Plan," loc. cit.

[31] Yu Xiahu, "Liberate the Mind and Broaden the Avenue of Education," *Guangming Ribao*, June 4, 1980, in *JPRS*, No. 76175, Aug. 7, 1980.

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

A geometry class at Beijing Middle School Number 23 in 1968, when the science curriculum had been simplified as a result of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

—Photoreporters.

only 300,000 S&T personnel, working in 2,400 national research organizations, 600 institutions of higher education, and 80 vocational associations.[32] If we assume that Fang Yi's target figure of 800,000 employs the same categorization of personnel as the 300,000 figure, then China is faced with the exceedingly difficult task of producing an additional 500,000 research personnel in the next five years. If we assume that the educational system will graduate an average of 270,000 students per year or a total of 1.35 million during this period, and that 41 percent of these—553,500—are in sciences and engineering, almost all of these S&T graduates would have to enter research to meet Fang Yi's target. In view of the variety of other demands for S&T personnel, such an outcome is unlikely.[33] Even if attained, such numbers would still leave China far below the ratio of research personnel to total labor force characteristic of other major economies.[34]

The most serious difficulty China faces with regard to S&T manpower, however, is not one of absolute numbers. It is, rather, a problem of having seasoned S&T personnel capable of exercising scientific leadership and of conducting independent research. In a recent study, I estimated that there were 30,000 scientists and engineers from whom such leadership

[32] *BR*, Nov. 16, 1979, p. 3.

[33] For a more detailed analysis of the 800,000 figure as it relates to China's manpower problems more generally, see Suttmeier, op. cit., Ch. 4. For an excellent summary of the manpower and education problems (including a discussion of Fang Yi's target figure), see Leo A. Orleans, *Manpower for Science and Engineering in China*, prepared for the Subcommittee on Scientific Research and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology, Washington, DC, Committee Print, June 1980.

[34] For instance, the US had 595,000 scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in 1978, out of a total labor force of about 100 million. National Science Board, *Science Indicators 1978*, Washington, DC, National Science Foundation, 1979, p. 7. Japan had 273,000 "researchers" (read scientists and engineers engaged in R&D) in 1978 and ranked third behind the USSR and the US in terms of numbers of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D per 10,000 labor force population. Ibid., p. 8; and Japanese Science and Technology Agency, *1978 White Paper on Science and Technology*, Tokyo, Foreign Press Center, 1979, p. 25.

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could be expected.[35] More contemporary figures than I had available for that study reinforce the judgment that only a very small percentage of total S&T manpower would qualify for scientific leadership positions. For instance, in late 1979 it was reported that the CAS employed a total of 80,000 personnel. Of these, 23,000 were "scientific workers" (read "scientists"), and 13,000 were technicians. But only 1,600 held the rank of assistant researcher (equivalent to assistant professor) or higher.[36] This figure indicates that only about 7 percent of the total number of scientists, or roughly 4 percent of the total technical staff, were capable of holding leadership positions. Approximately the same percentages can be derived from a report on the institutes under the Changchun branch of the CAS. Out of 2,111 "technical cadres" (scientists and technicians), there were only 92 researchers and assistant researchers.[37] In addition, the average age of assistant researchers nationwide is reportedly 58.[38]

A report on promotions of teachers in higher education also reflects the paucity of individuals for leadership positions. Somewhat more than one third (61,300) of the teachers in higher education recently received new titles. Of these, only 1,000 (1.6 percent) were designated professors, 6,000 were named associate professors, and the remaining 54,000 received the title of lecturer.[39] This figure, in turn, is consistent with a 1979 report that there were only approximately 8,100 teachers at the assistant professor level or above out of a total of 200,000 teaching personnel in institutions of higher education. Such a situation contrasts sharply with that in 1957, when 13 percent of the teaching staff was at the associate professor level or above.[40]

Aside from upgrading the knowledge and skills of existing S&T personnel through mid-career training, China will attempt to increase the number of personnel qualified for scientific leadership positions through the recently established postgraduate program. However, postgraduate enrollments have dropped from 10,500 in 1978 to 9,500 in 1979 and 8,000 in 1980.[41] This decline indicates the limits of China's ca-

[35] Suttmeier, op. cit., pp. 56-59. See also the discussion in Orleans, op. cit., pp. 27 ff.

[36] Beijing Xinhua, Nov. 1, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 74625, Nov. 23, 1979.

[37] *Guangming Ribao*, Feb. 2, 1980, in *JPRS*, No. 75448, Apr. 7, 1980.

[38] Chen Qun and Liu Li, "The Aging and Weakening of the Force of Scientists and Technicians," *Beijing Wanbao* (Beijing), May 27, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 13, 1980, pp. L/11-12.

[39] Beijing Xinhua, Jan. 13, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 15, 1980, p. L/2.

[40] See Orleans, op. cit., pp. 9, 14.

[41] Ibid., p. 42.

Professor Tang Aoqing consulting with students on means of improving postgraduate education in China. Professor Tang teaches quantum mechanics and quantum chemistry at the postgraduate level.

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pabilities to provide advanced training. (In this context, opportunities for advanced training abroad made possible by new international S&T relations can be seen as particularly important for China's S&T development.)

It should be recognized that the political and administrative problems of managing China's system of higher education are enormous. The fact that between 5 and 6 million young people a year have been competing for approximately 270,000 places in higher education indicates that access to higher education is a highly valued but scarce good in contemporary China. As with economic planning, educational planning has required considerable rethinking since the initial enthusiastic rush to implement the four modernizations in 1977–78.[42] Enrollment figures have leveled off,[43] and recently a more decentralized, two-stage approach to national entrance examinations has been introduced.[44] There is, in short, no easy way to avoid the creation of a highly privileged minority.

The serious problems of scarcity faced by the higher educational system are exacerbated by wasteful institutional practices which result in the underutilization of the resources available. The shortage of space that has impeded further expansion of enrollments could be eased, as we have seen, if PLA units vacated the buildings they currently occupy. Recent reports also indicate a tremendous underutilization of human resources in higher education. Faculty-student ratios in 1979 were below those of 1965. Approximately 30 percent of the nation's faculty members enjoy special appointments without teaching responsibility. Finally, as in the United States, educational resources in China are siphoned off to a proliferating number of positions in educational administration, the number of which has increased by 67 percent since 1965.[45]

In addition to questions of quantity, there are also issues of quality that should be recognized in assessing the adequacy of the S&T manpower pool. For instance, the quality of training for different age cohorts has varied considerably.[46] There has also long been an issue of intergenerational tensions in the Chinese scientific community. These are a product of the differences in educational background of different cohorts and of the routinized use of seniority principles. In spite of clear policy statements that achievement rather than age should be the basis for holding leadership positions in research institutes and universities, there have been repeated complaints made about the mindless application of seniority in promotions.[47]

International Relations

In one of the most notable breaks with past policies, China in the last three years has established a range of S&T relations with other nations (and international organizations) that is unprecedented in the history of the People's Republic. These relations are conducted at three levels: (1) the professional, involving scientific exchanges, various other forms of scientist-to-scientist interaction, and international relations conducted by Chinese scientific societies; (2) the governmental, involving intergovernmental agreements, often augmented by a series of "bilateral" agency-to-agency protocols; and (3) the commercial, typically involving relations that are more clearly technological than scientific.

No attempt will be made here to catalog all aspects of these relations. Instead, it will suffice to note their significance.

First, and perhaps most obvious, the relations give China access to types of high technology that would be exceedingly difficult to develop domestically. Such technology, if selected and employed wisely, offers opportunities both for rapid increases in productivity and for technological learning or the acquisition of "know-how."

[42] For a recent statement outlining principles for education policy, see the report on a meeting convened by the Secretariat of the CCP and presided over by Fang Yi. Beijing Xinhua, June 6, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 9, 1980, pp. L/2–4. These principles may be summarized as follows: (1) resources should be concentrated in the "key schools"; (2) diversity and experimentation should be encouraged with regard to both length of training and educational formats (e.g., night schools, correspondence courses, television universities); (3) local initiative should be encouraged, and total reliance on state investment should be avoided; (4) overemphasis on science and engineering should be avoided, and greater attention to the liberal arts is needed, particularly as the latter relates to the education of future generalist administrators.

The inclusion of this last principle indicates the growing importance attached to management in China. In spite of the scarcity of S&T manpower, the leadership is coming to realize that the utilization of R&D results in production and the absorption of foreign technology are not simply technical tasks.

[43] Yao Yilin, "Report on the Arrangements for the National Economic Plans for 1980 and 1981," *BR*, Sept. 22, 1980, p. 37.

[44] Beijing Xinhua, May 9 and 10, 1980, in *FBIS–CHI*, May 13, 1980, pp. L/2–9.

[45] Song Ziming, "There Are Great Potentials to Be Tapped in Institutions of Higher Learning," *Guangming Ribao*, June 17, 1980, in *JPRS*, No. 76237, Aug. 15, 1980; also Yu Xiahu, "Liberate the Mind. . . ," loc. cit.

[46] This aspect is discussed in Orleans, op. cit., pp. 27 ff.

[47] See, for example, the statement by Fang Yi to a meeting convened by the Scientific and Technical Cadres Bureau, Beijing Xinhua, Jan. 12, 1980, in *FBIS–CHI*, Jan. 14, 1980, pp. L/6–7.

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

Fang Yi, Minister of China's Science and Technology Commission, examines West German spacelab simulators during a visit to Köln.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

Second, China's new S&T relations offer ways of compensating for problems of higher education and the availability of manpower. Educational opportunities abroad, especially for mid-career scientists whose advanced training was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution and increasingly for regular graduate students, greatly expand China's chances to build a leadership corps of scientists to guide S&T development for the remainder of the century. By the beginning of 1980, more than 2,700 students and scholars had been sent abroad under official exchanges to 41 countries, with the largest number going to the US.[48] The total number—that is, including those not on governmentally sanctioned exchanges—is probably several times the official figure.

American scientists of Chinese descent have been particularly useful to the process of expanding S&T relations. They have gone to China to lecture, teach, engage in collaborative research, provide advice to scientists and officials alike, and have facilitated the process by which Chinese students come to the US.

Third, and of no small significance, international S&T relations offer China opportunities to gauge the performance of Chinese S&T against international standards. The state of Chinese science policy thinking is such that the more "aids to decision" available, the better. The benchmark function of international relations, if properly employed, offers possibilities of significant economies in decision-making and planning. In addition, international contacts have domestic political implications, for the insight such ties give into China's backwardness in certain areas of S&T undoubtedly can be and is used by vigorous pro-modernization advocates against more conservative cadres.[49]

A final note on the international dimension of S&T policy concerns China's approach to technology transfers. While China has in no way turned against the idea of importing foreign technology, one clearly sees today some moderation in Chinese discussions of this question in comparison with those of 1978. First, it is plain that the scale of technology imports has been much less than some Western observers expected three years ago, and—from a macroeconomic perspective—the approach to technology transfer has become more discriminating. There are indications that Japanese experience with technology imports has been subject to systematic analysis in China and that initial assumptions about the value of energy-intensive, highly mechanized models of agricultural production (associated with imported agricultural technology) are being scrutinized.[50]

Furthermore, discussions conducted from a microeconomic perspective have become more mature and sophisticated in their assessments of both the promises and problems of technology transfers.[51]

Dilemmas of China's Science Policy

As suggested at the outset, Chinese attempts to conceive and implement a more modern science policy have run up against the limited capacity for change of a largely unmodernized society. In particular, one witnesses in China a sharp disjunction be-

[48] Beijing Xinhua, Jan. 4, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 9, 1980, pp. L/4-5. See also Orleans, op. cit., pp. 43 ff.

[49] There has been speculation as well that the benchmark function contributed to the Chinese decision to move ahead with normalization of relations with the US. See *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Mar. 16, 1979, p. 55.

[50] Peng Jinshun, "How Does Japan Introduce Advanced Foreign Technology?" *Gongren Ribao* (Beijing), May 20, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 73941, Aug. 2, 1979; and Hao Zhongtian, "Some Opinions on Modernizing Our Country's Agriculture," *Hongqi*, No. 11, Nov. 2, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 74908, Jan. 11, 1980.

[51] For instance, a report from a chemical plant in Sichuan indicated that the effective use of foreign technology required major new approaches to management and the training of personnel. See Hu Maozhou, "Properly Use and Manage Imported Technical Equipment," *Hongqi*, May 4, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 73839, July 13, 1979.

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tween the dynamics of S&T development and politically grounded resistance to change. This contradiction is becoming evident in two areas, with manifestations characteristic of science-government relations in industrialized countries. These areas are the quest of scientists for active participation in political life, and the effort of policymakers to achieve greater rationality in S&T policy.

The Chinese discuss the change in the political status of scientists in recent years in terms of removing technical intellectuals from the "stinking 9th category" of class enemies and of including them in the category of "members of the working class." But from the perspective of Western political analysis what is important is the appearance of scientists in the role of political participants. The policy changes of 1977–78 have had the effect of creating new opportunities for scientists to develop a sense of their collective interests and new structures for attempting to advance them. As a result, one sees Chinese scientists qua political actors beginning to play in China what in the industrialized societies have come to be three classic participatory roles—those of adviser, advocate, and adversary.[52]

Although formal science advisory mechanisms in China are still somewhat inchoate, the adviser role has been mentioned in at least three contexts. First, cadres throughout the country have been urged in rather general terms to solicit the views of S&T personnel as part of a national effort to bring greater expertise into decision-making. Second, academic committees have been established in research organizations and universities as formal mechanisms to strengthen the hand of the professional community in academic governance and to advise leadership cadres in such organizations. As we have seen, academic committees have been reconstituted in the CAS at the institute level, and "department committees" have been reinstituted at the departmental and all-Academy levels. Finally, the present leadership seems to be exploring ways to formalize advisory structures for the government more generally. Proposals for the establishment of formal units to advise the party Secretariat and the State Council are being discussed.[53] The CAS and particularly the STA and its member societies are emerging as the key scientific organizations involved. During the past year, the government-STA relationship has evolved into a more formal one at national and local levels. There is little doubt that the political elite is actively soliciting scientific advice, and that members of the scientific community are more than ready to assume this new advisory role.[54]

The line between adviser and advocate is sometimes a blurred one in the industrialized countries, and such seems to be the case in China as well. Nevertheless, the advocate role is analytically distinct. In China one can find evidence that it is empirically distinct as well. Advocacy from the scientific community is evident in two forms. The first is special-interest advocacy, in which a given field or organization presses demands for project authorizations and funding. A good recent instance is the urging of the nuclear science and engineering community, acting through the Chinese Nuclear Society, that China proceed with plans to develop civilian nuclear power plants.[55] As an indication of how the legitimation of the advocacy role leads to new forms of interest representation and hence to the beginnings of a new politics of science, the demands of the nuclear community have been met by the establishment of a nuclear energy advisory panel under the STC.[56]

The second form of advocacy is the pressing of demands in the interest of the scientific community as a whole. In the last year, and particularly at the second national convention of the STA, there have been vigorous demands for the institutional autonomy of academic organizations, for the preservation of academic freedom and noninterference in research, and for better wages and living conditions for scientists.[57]

The role of adversary is one in which scientists forgo the "insider" advisory position and instead stake out an "outside" position to criticize policy on the basis of expert judgment. While there still are limits on the vigor with which the adversarial role can be played in China, indications have appeared that the legitimacy of the role is being explored and that the role is being

[52] Sanford A. Lakoff, "Scientists, Technologists and Political Power," in Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de Solla Price, Eds., *Science, Technology and Society*, London and Beverly Hills, CA, SAGE Publications, 1977, pp. 374–79.

[53] *BR*, Dec. 8, 1980, p. 5.

[54] See Yu Guangyuan, "Attach Great Importance to the Work of Doing a Good Job in Promoting Recommendations Made by Scientists and Also in Developing the Economics of Technology," Guangzhou, Guangdong Provincial Service, Mar. 31, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 4, 1980, pp. P/2–3; and Zhou Peiyuan, "Make Concerted All-Out Efforts. . . ," loc. cit.

[55] See reports on the First National Congress of the Chinese Nuclear Society. Beijing Xinhua, Feb. 22 and 23, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 25, 1980, pp. L/1–4; and Beijing Xinhua, Feb. 28, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 29, 1980, p. L/6.

[56] Beijing Xinhua, Nov. 3, 1980, in *JPRS*, No. 76822, Nov. 14, 1980.

[57] Zhou Peiyuan,"Make Concerted All-Out Efforts. . . . ," loc. cit. For discussions of the need for greater autonomy and academic freedom in the social sciences, see Beijing, Xinhua, Sept. 15, 1979, in *JPRS*, No. 74296, Oct. 3, 1979; and Jiang Chunze, " 'Official' Opinion and Academic Viewpoints—Notes on Reading," *Guangming Ribao*, Oct. 6, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 12, 1979, pp. L/10–12.

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played. Among the more notable and interesting recent examples are "outsider" critiques of policies relating to energy, land use, and major waterwork projects.[58]

Thus, the new *policies for science* have led to the creation of new structures for interest representation and opportunities for *science in policy.* Such a development is quite familiar to students of science policy in the industrialized nations, but it has not been seen in China since before the Cultural Revolution. In terms of political modernization, it implies a degree of tolerance for structural pluralism and ideological flexibility that has not been characteristic of the Chinese Communist political system, and indeed that is still not as evident in nontechnical areas. Continued tolerance would seem to be necessary for further S&T development, but since it is difficult to hold tendencies toward pluralism and ideological diversity at minimal levels, continued tolerance would also seem to require acquiescence in some significant changes in the political system.

As institutional changes in the last three years have begun to take hold (despite opposition), there is evidence that attention has turned toward the problems of rationalizing policy in order to enhance the performance of the R&D system. This quest for rationalization is evident in an important article by Fang Yi which speaks of the importance of knowing ". . . the direction of development of science and technology" and of *"determining"* a "correct" S&T policy.[59] It is also evident in discussions of innovation, of the need for a technology policy, and of the problems of overlapping research.

Fang Yi has expressed his sense of the difficulties in setting priorities:

. . . among basic, applied and developmental research, what proportionate relationship should be maintained? Again, for example, what should be the position occupied by the "big sciences?" The emergence of the "big sciences" is an important and outstanding feature in modern scientific and technological development. We cannot ignore them. But our national power is limited, and we cannot take up many items at the same time. Which items should be done, which should not, which should be done now and which later on must all be covered by a long-term plan.[60]

In the area of technological innovation, China's leaders expect that investments in R&D and in technology transfer will produce innovation-born gains in productivity. As a result, leaders like Fang Yi have begun to sense a need not only for a "technology policy" but also for organizational reform designed to achieve a closer linkage of research and production.[61] However, if current Western interpretations of the innovation process are correct, innovation is not solely or even primarily a problem of R&D, but more a problem of the organization and articulation of demand, and of the creation of incentives to innovate.[62] Socialist economies have not been notably successful in organizing and articulating demand or in creating attractive packages of incentives. Recent economic reforms in China seem to be moving the economy in a direction that would be more conducive to innovation, but it is not clear how quickly these reforms will spread, or how entrenched resistance to them will be. Success in the quest for rationalization, too, would seem to require institutional reform. Yet, institutional reform carries with it the danger of upsetting what are, to many, comfortable political arrangements.

Finally, there is the problem of overlapping and duplicated research, arising in part from competition among institutes for shares of the work in "cutting-edge" fields of scientific research that have been accorded high priority in the plans. Here, issues are more complex. While mindless competition would seem to be both wasteful and unconducive to S&T development, administratively inspired rationalization may not be the most appropriate response. Redundancy and competition in research are not ipso facto undesirable, particularly if they reflect priorities which the scientific community works out for itself. While the propensity of China's science planners will probably be to attack the problem of duplication by centralized administrative means, a more appropriate response may be the encouragement of decentralized internal governance within the scientific community itself, including greater laissez-faire in the selection and evolution of research topics. However, this runs counter to historically low levels of tolerance for autonomous institutions with heterodox ideologies.

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[58] See *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 1172, Jan. 18, 1980. See also, "Geologist Criticizes Petroleum Ministry on Sichuan Project," Beijing Xinhua, Sept. 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 16, 1980, pp. L/31-32. For statements by biologists on Hubei wildlife preservation, see Wuhan, Hubei Provincial Service, May 22, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 2, 1980, p. P/5.

[59] Fang Yi, "Several Current Problems in Scientific and Technological Work," loc. cit. Emphasis added.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] *The Conditions for Success in Technological Innovation,* Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1971.

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Prospects

The record of S&T development in post-Mao China reveals serious problems of policy implementation. I have attempted to link these problems to widespread resistance to institutional change, and have argued that while S&T development does foster change, it itself requires a degree of societal modernization. Examining the various components of what are on one level very well conceived S&T policies, one sees that the success of those policies is threatened by established interests which are deeply rooted in a historically dominant, politico-cultural tradition that has been profoundly suspicious of modern science and technology.

Although tension between achievement of S&T goals and the maintenance of political consensus is not unique to China, the *extent* to which the achievement of S&T policy objectives requires potentially destabilizing institutional change may be. An "effective policy," or one which moves the system toward its goals while containing the threat of political disruption, is the order of the day. Such a policy would have to eschew narrowly conceived criteria of optimal efficiency since costs must be incurred to maintain political consensus.

In making this argument, I have risked overstating the problems of institutional change and of maintaining political integration. In many ways, the record of the last three years is one of considerable effectiveness. China has achieved many of its interim goals pertaining to the revitalization of the educational system and the establishment of a domestically and internationally active scientific community. However, the very success of the policies has set the stage for continued tension between further progress toward the goals of S&T development and the political legacy. The former, in addition to requiring more financial resources, also seemingly entails a further development of the privileged position of technical personnel, greater cosmopolitanism and more of a foreign presence in China, a more central role for expertise in decision-making, and the elimination of inefficient economic activities. Somehow, these must be squared with the politico-cultural traditions of explosive reactions to elitism, a relatively high level of xenophobia, "politics in command" decision-making, and politically protected economic activities typified by the concept of the "iron rice bowl."

Recent initiatives to reform the nation's administrative apparatus and to recruit S&T personnel into the CCP can be viewed as efforts to manage the tension through incremental adjustments rather than by sharp political confrontation. But the forces responsible for the tension run deep, and assuredly the achievement of an effective policy will not be easy.

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Egalitarianism in Chinese Society

By William L. Parish

China has moved with astonishing rapidity to abandon many of the egalitarian goals which were so prominent in the 1966–76 decade. Talk of providing more material incentives, of utilizing the comparative advantage of each region, of licensing private and neighborhood entrepreneurs, and of allowing the rich to grow richer in order to spark "socialist enthusiasm" has conjured up in the writing of many observers visions of growing inequality. In this journal, for example, David M. Lampton has concluded that an increase in rural inequality in China is inevitable. Elsewhere, Gerhard Lenski has contended that the failure of the Chinese experiment in social equality helps demonstrate the biological inevitability of a certain degree of social inequality.[1]

Nevertheless, an argument can be made for considerable caution in assessing both the future of inequality in China and the imperatives of inequality in any society. To understand the current trend toward social inequality, we need to return to the history of egalitarianism in China—and especially to the 1966–76 decade—and ask what degree of equality was actually achieved and what it was about the egalitarian experience that alienated so many. In so doing, we should get a firmer sense of what is inevitable and what accidental about degrees of social inequality, and also of the positive and negative goals that motivate current Chinese policy.

For an investigation of these issues, the present article relies not only on the increasingly rich data available from Chinese sources, but on an independently collected data set as well. The latter is based on interviews conducted in Hong Kong with 133 émigrés who left China between 1972 and 1978, and provides information on the situation at the end of China's radical decade and the start of the post-Mao "restratification" policy. The primary units of analysis are not the émigrés themselves, but 2,865 of the émigrés' former neighbors on which we have compiled census-type data.[2]

A number of comparisons with official reports suggest that the sample of neighbors is representative of the general Chinese population. The age distribution of the 1,001 neighbors from Guangzhou (Canton) is quite similar to that which Chinese sources give for that city's population (see Table 1 on page 38), and broader comparisons yield similarly encouraging results. The sample is statistically strongest on cities and towns in the drainage basin of the West River which runs through Guangdong and Guanxi—i.e., on the Lingnan region. When the sample is weighted to reflect the distribution of population between large and small cities in this region, the distribution of residents of the region in the sample by enterprise sector is quite similar to that described by official reports for China as a whole. Private employment and collective employment are only slightly overrepresented in the sample, falling well within ranges of error one might expect from sampling deviations alone (see Table 2 on page 38). There is a similar correspondence between

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[1] David M. Lampton, "New 'Revolution' in China's Social Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1979, pp. 16–33; and Gerhard Lenski, "Marxist Experiments in Destratification," *Social Forces* (Chapel Hill, NC), December 1978, pp. 364–83.

[2] The data were collected jointly with Martin K. Whyte, as part of a collaborative project on urban life in China funded by National Science Foundation Grant SOC-770788 A02 and National Endowment for the Humanities Grant RC-25746-76-1200. Grant Blank and Doo-seung Hong gave able assistance in statistical analysis.

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Tables 1–4: Testing the Interview Sample Against Reported Data

Table 1: Age Distribution for Guangzhou (Canton)

(in percent)

Age group	Sample, ca. 1975	Reported, 1975
0–16	26	30
17–60	67	62
Over 60	7	8
Total	100	100
(N)	(1001)	

SOURCES: Whyte-Parish urban sample described in fn. 1 in the text, restricted to urban neighbors in Guangzhou alone, 1972–78; reported data from Zhu Yuncheng, "On the Question of Controlling the Size of Guangzhou's Population," *Zhungshan Xue Bao* (Guanghzhou), No. 1, 1980, p. 45.

Table 2: Nonagricultural Urban Employment, by Sector, in Lingnan Sample and Nationwide

(in percent)

	Lingnan region sample, ca. 1975		Nationwide, reported, 1977
	All sectors	State and collective	State and collective
State	73	76	79
Collective	23	24	21
Private	3		
Putting-out work	1		
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(1031)	(993)	

SOURCES: Parish-Whyte urban sample, economically active population, restricted to the Lingnan region and weighted to correct for disproportions in the share of the sample living in urban areas of various sizes within the region; reported data, from State Statistical Bureau, "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1978 National Economic Plan," *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1979, p. 40.

Table 3: Occupational Distribution of Nonagricultural Labor Force in Lingnan Sample and Nationwide

(in percent)

	Lingnan region sample, ca. 1975		Nationwide, reported, 1978	
Industry (mining & manufacturing), of which:		44.7		47.9
State	28.7		34.2	
Collective	16.0		13.7	
Capital construction		3.0		7.9
Transport, posts, telecommunications		10.5		8.4
Trade, food, drink		18.0		12.4
Finance, banking		0.5		0.7
Services		1.9		0.4
Public health		5.7		4.0
Education, research, cultural affairs		8.3		12.0
Government admin. & mass organizations		6.5		6.1
Urban public utilities		0.7		0.3
Total		99.8		100.1
(N)		(965)		

SOURCES: Sample, same as Table 2, state and collective sectors only; reported data from State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Work in New China, Beijing, November 1979, p. 11, as cited in John Philip Emerson, "Growth of Nonagricultural Employment in the People's Republic of China," paper delivered at a conference on China's population, Hawaii, May 1980.

Table 4: Selected Income and Employment Data for Nonagricultural Urban Population, in Lingnan Sample and Nationwide

	Lingnan region sample, ca. 1975	Nationwide, reported, 1976	1977
Average monthly income, in yuan:			
per state employee[a]	46		50
per collective employee	39		39[b]
Monthly per capita income, in yuan	24	22[c]	
Percent of registered nonagricultural population employed	53		48[d]

[a] Reported data for state employees include supplements and bonuses; generally the sample figures do not.

[b] Reported annual collective wage bill divided by midyear total of employees and by 12.

[c] Reported total wage bill divided by one fifth (assumed nonagricultural share) of total midyear population and by 12.

[d] Total employees divided by one fifth (assumed nonagricultural share) of year-end population.

SOURCES: Sample, same as Table 2, but including economically inactive population; reported data from Xinhua, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), Nov. 9, 1979, p. L/12, and from State Statistical Bureau, "Communique . . . ," p. 40.

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the sample and official data on the industrial distribution of the labor force (see Table 3). The most misrepresented sector in the sample is the trade, food, and drink industry, but the overstatement is less than 6 percentage points. Most other deviations, moreover, are considerably below this level. Employment and income statistics round out the confirmatory comparisons (see Table 4).

These various correspondences indicate that a certain boldness in using this sample is not completely out of line. Let us see, then, how the sample data set can supplement our information on the pursuit of egalitarian goals in China.[3]

Equality of Income

The system for distributing income in China was adapted from China's own past and from the model of the Soviet Union, with patching and amendment by the new revolutionary government to suit contemporary Chinese circumstances. Beginning in 1949, former high government officials were kicked out of office, and in time, landlords and capitalists lost their property and some professionals their private practices. Nevertheless, many people in cities, including engineers, doctors, and professors, were kept on at salaries similar to those they had been earning before the Communist rise to power. Then, in 1956, the Soviet wage system was adopted. The old revolutionary and relatively egalitarian free supply system was abandoned for a strict classification of administrative personnel into more than 20 salary grades; technicians, into 17 grades; and workers, into 8 grades. Prizes and bonuses were also offered for exceptional performance.

The Chinese were never very happy with this imported system, and began to soften some of its more materialistic aspects soon after it was adopted. In the late 1950's, during the Great Leap Forward, the use of piece rates in industry was sharply curtailed. By 1963, top salaries for government officials were reduced from some 600 yuan a month to a little over 400 yuan a month—only eight rather than twelve times the average worker's monthly salary of about 50 yuan. Despite such adjustments, however, the urban reward system adopted in 1956 remained essentially intact until the onset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966. The radicals who gained control of the government at that juncture tried to restore the revolutionary equality and élan of the pre-1949 revolutionary period. Higher and middle salaries were frozen, and some managers and administrators were demoted to lower-salaried positions for a time. The only general promotions after 1963 took place in approximately 1971 and 1973, and they were only for a minority of low-wage, medium-seniority workers. There were no merit raises. A few political activists moved into leadership positions, but in theory even they were supposed to retain their old, worker salaries.

A Uighur hawker displays his products on a Beijing sidewalk.

—Derek Davies/*Far Eastern Economic Review.*

[3] A few of the subsequent tables in this article, it should be noted, employ some rural data not included in this sample. The nature of these data is explained in William L. Parish, "China—Team, Brigade, or Commune?" *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1976, p. 52; and William L. Parish and Martin K. Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1978, Appendix 1.

An early 1980 State Statistical Bureau survey of 86,555 households in China's 44 largest cities gives additional support to the data and arguments in this article. When individuals are ranked by their household per capita incomes (household income/number of members of household), there is considerable continuity across both time and samples. Thus, according to *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Dec. 31, 1980, p. 1, the State Statistical Bureau survey reported that the poorest 40 percent of urban population received 30 percent of total urban income, while the richest 10 percent of the population received 15 percent of total income. According to the Whyte-Parish urban sample, the poorest 40 percent received 29 percent of total income, and the richest 10 percent, 18 percent of total income.

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In the countryside, prices paid to peasants for their produce were raised steadily through the 1950's and early 1960's in an attempt to compensate for the adverse turn of agricultural prices which had occurred during and immediately after World War II. But from 1965 to 1979, such prices were frozen as well. And though radical leaders moved skilled personnel, medical resources, and educational funds to the countryside, any increase of total rural income was restrained by an enforced emphasis on growing grain rather than commercial crops and by keeping the private sector in agriculture to a minimum.[4] Thus, except for the promotion of some low-wage urban workers, the system sampled in the mid- to late 1970's had been largely constant since the mid-1960's.

What was the net result of this system for income equality and inequality? Chinese cities had become more equal in terms of income distribution than cities in the average developing society. The poorest 40 percent of China's urban households received 25 percent of the total income distributed in cities, while in 24 developing market-economy states, the poorest 40 percent of households received only 15 percent of urban incomes (see Table 5). Some of the developing states were more equal than others. Ironically, the most equal of the developing market societies in our sample was on Taiwan. But the cities of the People's Republic (PRC) were slightly more equal even than those of Taiwan in income distribution.[5]

The Chinese countryside was likewise more equal than the countrysides of most other developing societies—though less distinctly so than in the case of

[4] Collective per capita income in villages rose by 10.5 yuan between 1965 and 1976 and stagnated near 70 yuan in the 1970's. Then, from 1977 to 1979, the figure increased 18 yuan, from 65 to 83.4 yuan. See Commentator, "High Hopes," *Renmin Ribao*, July 31, 1980, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Aug. 18, 1980, p. L/14; and Yao Yilin, Report at National People's Congress, Radio Beijing, Aug. 30, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 4, 1980, p. L/1.

[5] On calculating the Gini coefficient, see Henry S. Shryock et al., *The Methods and Materials of Demography*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 178–80.

Window-shopping in Beijing for bicycles, one of the most widely owned consumer goods in contemporary China.

—EUPRA.

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Table 5: Income Inequality in China and in Developing Market Societies[a]

	Gini coefficient[b]	Percentage of total income received by: richest 10 percent	poorest 40 percent
Urban households			
China	.25	21	25
Developing market societies:			
average (mean)	.43	33	15
range	.27–.53	22–40	23–10
Rural households			
China	.31	23	20
Developing market societies:			
average (mean)	.40	31	17
range	.29–.49	24–38	22–13
All households			
China	.38–.43	27–30	16–14
Developing market societies:			
average (mean)	.44	37	14
range	.27–.62	23–48	24–6

[a] Defined as market societies with a 1970 per capita gross national product of less than $US1,200 and population greater than 1 million. The number of societies varies from 24 for the urban figures to 14 for the rural and 23 for the national (all-household) figures.

[b] As a summary measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient ranges from a theoretical low of zero for complete equality to a theoretical high of one for complete inequality. The larger the coefficient, the greater the inequality.

SOURCES: For China, estimated from rural interviews conducted in 1973–75 by Marc Blecher, William Parish, and Martin Whyte and from Whyte-Parish urban sample (figures all apply to Guangdong Province and the Lingnan region of South China); for other societies, Shail Jain, *Size Distribution of Income*, Washington, DC, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1975.

cities. The poorest 40 percent of rural Chinese received 20 percent of all rural income, while the poorest 40 percent in developing market states received only 17 percent of all rural income. Again, ironically, the most equal developing rural sector was on Taiwan, where the poorest farmers got 22 percent of all income—a slightly larger share than that of the poorest farmers in the People's Republic. The collectivization of agriculture in the PRC, with emphasis laid on self-reliance in small production units (teams) of 30 or 40 households and restrictions on out-migration from poor villages, clearly left considerable room for variation in income among geographically diverse villages.[6]

Even with these modest and not so modest income differentials within the urban and rural sectors, however, the biggest gaps in income levels continued to be those *between* the urban and rural sectors—i.e., between city and village. Taking official rural collective income reports at face value and adding 30 percent to them to cover income earned in the private sector gives a ratio between urban and rural income of about three to one as of 1977.[7] Even if one assumes that rural income is understated because distributions of grain, oil, sugar, and other goods within rural production teams can be in cheaper 1952 prices, the ratio remains about two and one half to one.[8] Either way, this considerable gap between sectors causes China's total income distribution picture to be only slightly more equality-oriented in practice than that of the average developing society (see Table 5). China's poor, all peasants, get from 16 down to 14 percent of all income in the nation, while the poor in other developing societies with survey data are no worse off, or only slightly worse off, receiving on the average 14 percent of all income. In the Republic of Korea, where prices paid to farmers were raised in the late 1960's and where migrants to cities provide a steady flow of remittances to rural kinsmen, the poor did considerably better than in China, getting 24 percent of all income generated nationwide.[9]

The accuracy of income data on China will soon improve as more and more official sources become available and as field work by scholars intensifies. Better accounting of private income, including a small flow of remittances from urban kinsmen, plus national figures in place of the regional figures presented here will give us a firmer fix on China's rural and total income distribution. Yet the overall pattern is already clear. Even while China's urban income distribution has been quite equal, the attainment of national equality has been significantly retarded by remaining income differences among villages and between the city and the countryside.

[6] This theme is elaborated in Parish and Whyte, *Village and Family*, Chap. 5. For the methods used to produce the rural estimates, see ibid., p. 376. The distribution of team incomes used in our calculations approximates those for other provinces reported to visitors in recent years and the national distribution reported in Wu Xiang, "The Open Road and the Log Bridge," *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 5, 1980, p. 5, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 7, 1980, p. L/23.

[7] Published figures imply that 26 to 35 percent of total peasant income was earned in private household sideline production in 1979. See "Increase in Peasant Income," *Beijing Review*, July 7, 1980, pp. 6–7.

[8] Stephen Butler, personal communication, reports the use of 1952 prices in a commune in North China. In our adjustments, we use Lardy's report of a price increase between 1952 and the mid-1970's and O'Leary and Watson's report that 70 percent of rural income is distributed in kind. See Nicholas R. Lardy, *Economic Growth and Distribution in China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 177; and Greg O'Leary and Andrew Watson, "Current Trends in China's Agricultural Strategy," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (Sydney), 1980, p. 124.

[9] Urban-to-rural remittances are omitted from Chinese figures, but in light of the very tight restrictions on urbanward migration since the 1950's, one can assume that this omission is not a serious one.

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That urban income distribution has been quite equal can be demonstrated further by comparing China to other Communist states. China has been at least as equal in this regard as the most egalitarian states of Communist Europe (see Table 6). Under Stalin in the 1930's and 1940's, Russia was a highly inegalitarian society. Reforms in the late 1950's and mid-1960's narrowed income gaps in the USSR, but even in 1970 Russian workers at the 90th percentile of the personal income scale were earning 3.2 times as much as those at the 10th percentile. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were considerably more egalitarian, with the equivalent ratio only 2.3 or 2.4 to 1. China was at least as equal in practice as these more egalitarian European states, with the high-income earners receiving only 2.2 to 2.3 times as much as the low-income earners. Since economic development tends to increase income equality and since the European Communist states used for comparison are all much more highly developed than China, the Chinese urban accomplishment is impressive. China has not followed the Soviet course, which it mimicked for a time in the mid-1950's. While the Soviet Union was stressing more equality in the 1960's, China's cities moved even faster to avoid altogether the more inegalitarian aspects of the Soviet experience and to become among the most egalitarian of Communist urban settings.

Table 6: Urban Income Distribution in Socialist States[a]

	Decile ratio,[b] ca. 1970	Gini coefficient,[c] ca. 1964
China:		
State-employed population	2.2	.21
Total economically active population	2.3	.20
Romania	2.3	—
Czechoslovakia	2.4	.19
Bulgaria	2.4	.21
Hungary	2.6	.21
Yugoslavia	—	.24
Poland	3.2	.26
USSR	3.2	—

[a] All data are for nonagricultural work force.
[b] Decile ratio = ratio of earnings by workers and staff at the 90th percentile to earnings by workers and staff at the 10th percentile.
[c] See discussion of Gini coefficient in Table 5.

SOURCES: For China, Whyte-Parish urban sample; for the other countries, Jain, op. cit., and Peter Wiles, "Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution," *Survey* (London), No. 3, 1975, p. 33.

A friend behind the counter—an essential contact for any Chinese consumer to cultivate.

—Audrey Topping/Photoresearchers.

Equality of Consumption

Readers of the current Chinese press may well question whether these conclusions about China's urban equality are not overstated. The press is busy these days excoriating senior cadres for their excessive consumption and special privileges. Senior cadres, starting at rank 13 for heads of counties and running up through rank 1, have special access to cars and limousines graded by make, color, and curtains.[10] They have special rooms, and sometimes whole wings, reserved for them in hospitals. Some have state-supplied cooks and personal attendants, and at the top levels in Beijing, they have special supplies of food and other goods which permit them to avoid the lines and other inconveniences of the public supply system. They sometimes extend their privileges

[10] Simon Leys saves some of his best venom for "those-who-ride-in-cars." See his *Chinese Shadows*, New York, NY, Viking Press, 1977, Chap. 5.

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even beyond those allowed by official regulations—e.g., by getting special treatment for family and relatives in school admissions, employment, and the ability to go abroad, and before the police and courts. The most celebrated case of excess reported in 1980 was that of the head of the Commerce Bureau, Wang Lei, who had staged elaborate banquets at the Fengzeyuan Restaurant in Beijing but only paid the price of the ordinary "special" of the day. After reports by a bold cook brought the matter into the open, Wang Lei was forced to pay a large sum to cover back bills, and his case was held up as an example of the corruption occurring throughout the country.[11]

Class and Opportunity

Several considerations suggest that one should avoid overgeneralizing from such cases, however. First, the privileges being discussed are available to only a very few elite cadres. Adding any extra income these few individuals get through services and other non-cash sources would do little to change the overall income distribution picture in the society as a whole.

Second, this type of elite and its non-cash consumption are usually missed in surveys done in other countries as well. Either they are not included in small samples, or the questions asked in surveys are not sufficiently detailed to catch all sources of non-cash income. Thus, the comparisons we have made to other countries do not necessarily overstate China's relative urban equality.

Third, statistics on consumption among those just below the top elite suggest that administrative position does not add measurably to consumption level. With a severe shortage of housing in major Chinese cities, many people have had to share cramped quarters with others. Data have been tabulated which show that government administrators, along with doctors, professors, and other higher professionals, did have somewhat better than average kitchen, toilet, and bathing facilities—items that came with the newer official quarters in the major cities, where these groups tended to live. But these professionals shared meager space in a small number of rooms just as everyone else did. Moreover, rooms and bath and toilet facilities were more equally shared in China than in either Hungary or Poland.[12]

A prized new television is trucked home under the watchful eye of its Chinese purchaser.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

Consumer durables were also relatively equally distributed among urban dwellers (see Figure 1 on page 44). In the 1970's, some goods were much easier to buy and more widely distributed than others. Though still rationed, bicycles were common, as were watches and radios. Ninety-two percent of all households had at least one watch, and 76 percent had a bicycle. Variations among households showed up more in numbers of bicycles and watches owned than in the presence or total absence of these goods (see the right-hand scale of Figure 1). Sewing machines, electric fans, cameras, and televisions were scarcer. Sewing machines, like bicycles, continued to be rationed through work units. Electric fans, cameras, and televisions were unrationed, but high priced.

Simple visual inspection of the raw data in Figure 1 suggests, first, that the possession of scarcer goods was more tightly linked to income and occupation than the possession of other goods. Second, it suggests that the distribution system may have been subverted more by sales workers than by any design of the new administrative elite. There was a saying in the city of Guangzhou that every family should maintain relations with "three valuables" (*san-bao*)—a doctor, a truck driver, and a sales clerk. The doctor

[11] Xinhua English, Oct. 16, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 16, 1980, p. L/12. For other denunciations, see "There Must Never Be Any 'Special Citizens,'" Radio Beijing, Oct. 14, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 16, 1980, p. L/1; Commentator, "Do Not Seek Special Privileges for Our Children," *Renmin Ribao*, Aug. 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 19, 1980, p.L/2; Radio Beijing, Oct. 16, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 20, 1980, p. L/2; "Regulations on Benefits for High-Ranking Cadres," Radio Lhasa, Nov. 3, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 4, 1980, p. Q/1. The last source lists which regional officials are entitled to a car, attendant, and cook.

[12] The tabulations appear in William L. Parish, "Destratification in the People's Republic of China," in Tang Tsou, Ed., *Select Papers from the Center for Far Eastern Studies*, No. 4, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago, Center for Far Eastern Studies, 1981.

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could help one beat the lines and medical shortages at hospitals. The truck driver could get one cheap goods from markets outside the city. The sales clerk could notify one when scarce goods like electric fans, televisions, and better clothing were about to appear on the market. The consistency of the upward bump running down the middle of Figure 1 suggests that relative to their incomes, sales clerks (occupation category 5) were doing as well as, or better than, administrative officials in the distribution system. In the acquisition of scarce goods such as cameras and televisions, the higher professionals were doing the best of

Figure 1: Household Possessions, by Occupation[a]



1. High professionals
2. Administrative cadres
3. Managerial cadres
4. Low professionals
5. Clerical/sales
6. Skilled manual
7. Service workers
8. Ordinary/semiskilled
9. Unskilled/marginal

[a] Watches and bicycles are indexed on the right-hand side only; the rest, on the left-hand side only.

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: Whyte-Parish urban sample, restricted to economically active males. These males were taken as a proxy for households although this introduced double counting for certain households.

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all. Administrative privilege was thus not adding significantly to overall inequality.

This state of affairs would be even more apparent were one to chart the distribution of basic commodities such as grain, oil, and cotton cloth. Except at the very highest levels of the administrative bureaucracy, everyone shared the same rations of these controlled-price goods, and they continue to do so today. It seems safe to conclude, then, that the consumption factor has done at least as much to dampen as to heighten inequality in cities. The earlier conclusion of significant equality in Chinese cities need not be amended.

The discussion of equality of condition by itself, however, is excessively static. By focusing on inequality at one point in time it overlooks the changes in the social stratification system that were only beginning to emerge as a result of the post-1966 radical reforms when the reforms were short-circuited in the late 1970's. It deals neither with whether the old underclasses were beginning to rise in society nor with whether a new elite had begun to reproduce itself. Yet these are critical issues.

From the early 1950's to the late 1970's, it was not too hard to tell whether the old class order of China was being inverted, since everyone carried a class label which identified his class origin. In cities, the process of class labeling was never completely systematized, but in a series of political campaigns in the early 1950's families gradually began to be identified with a label such as "capitalist," "merchant," "peddler," "worker," or "poor peasant." Professionals, minor bureaucrats, and other intellectuals took the nebulous label of "staff," which remained a relatively neutral label through the early 1960's. Other labels were more highly charged, with "worker" and "poor peasant" being the more esteemed labels, while the "capitalist," "landlord," and "false staff" (for higher-level bureaucrats in the previous government) labels were officially despised. Some labels could be earned—e.g., the positive one of "revolutionary cadre," if one or one's father became a substantial administrative official, or the negative ones of "counterrevolutionary" or "rightist," if one was found in error in one of the myriad political campaigns of the 1950's. The degree of emphasis on these labels ebbed and flowed with the political wind, but with Mao Zedong's injunction to "never forget class struggle," the labels were never totally disregarded.

From the radical point of view, one's class label should affect all one's life chances—from education, through occupation, to rate of pay and promotion. In the early years of the Communist regime, the educational differences among urbanites of different class labels did narrow quite rapidly (see Figure 2 on page 46). Continuing a trend which had begun in the 1930's and had been slowed only by the Japanese invasion of the late 1930's and early 1940's, urban residents of peddler, worker, and peasant origin began to approach the educational level of the formerly dominant capitalists, staff, and similar classes. By the early 1960's, in the "children's generation," class origin was an even less reliable indicator of educational achievement. Yet, while the gaps between people of different class origin were narrowing, the rank order of educational accomplishment remained, with one major exception, the same as in the 1930's. By the early 1960's, the children of the new elite administrative cadres were receiving the most education. They attended elite boarding schools which later, during the Cultural Revolution, came to be attacked as "little treasure pagodas." Furthermore, since admission was as much by rigid academic exams as by recommendation, these children were often joined in the special schools by the sons of old professional and other intellectual staff members, as well as by the sons and daughters of former capitalists. China was falling short

Increasing priority has been placed on truck farming to provide vegetables to the inhabitants of Beijing and other cities in China.

—Lehtikuva via Photoreporters.

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Figure 2: Years of Education, by Class Label and by Calendar Year in Which Reached Age 20



[a] The scale used here is logarithmic, equal distances representing equal proportions.

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: The data are from the Whyte-Parish urban sample. "Negative" labels such as "counter-revolutionary" and "landlord" are combined here under the "capitalist" label; "intermediate" labels such as "middle peasant," under the "staff" label; and so on. "Peasants" here means all former peasants or the children of former peasants. In all cases, however, what is referred to is the class origin of urban dwellers.

of the goal of inverting the old class order and appeared in danger of quickly adding a new elite class on top of the old. Worker, peasant, and peddler children continued to get fewer years of education and were relegated to second-level schools which had smaller budgets than the elite schools and often combined work with study.

The issue of educational sorting came to a head in the 1960's as the state began to run out of urban jobs for new school graduates. The early 1960's was a time of retrenchment. Many unprofitable factories were being closed in the wake of the 1958–59 Great Leap Forward. In accordance with the Soviet model, investment was slanted toward capital-intensive indus-

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try, which generated few jobs for new workers. Moreover, many of the best jobs in China had already been taken by a young cohort in the 1950's. In the 1960's, that earlier cohort was far from retirement. As a result, there was little career mobility, and there were very few openings at the bottom for new entrants into the labor market. Those jobs which continued to be offered were handed out to a large extent on the basis of academic merit and recommendations from one's middle school. Therefore, as in other societies, the children of the old elite, who did best in school, managed to get the best jobs (see Figure 3 on page 48).[13] Indeed, the pre-1949 order was never thoroughly inverted, even in the first years of the regime. Although capitalist parents from the 1930–49 generation were hindered in getting and keeping the best jobs, their children regained part of their lost advantage in the 1950's and retained it into the 1960's.

During this period, the children of workers and peasants got the poorer jobs or no jobs at all. With increasing urban unemployment, the government turned to sending youth "down" to the countryside, and it was often the worker and peasant children, with poor academic records, who were sent first. Under these circumstances, there was ever more serious debate over the proper emphasis to be placed on, respectively, academic achievement, political commitment, and class origin. Stress on political commitment

[13] See Zhao Lukuan, "Several Problems of Labor and Employment," *Renmin Ribao*, Aug. 19, 1980, p. 5, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 4, 1980, p. L/24.

Peasant Jen Zhingfa, right, teams with Huang Libing, third from right, in carrying out the political reeducation of educated youth sent down to the countryside in Liaoning Province during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. On the blackboard is a quotation from Mao Zedong: "Intellectual youth and students must unite with worker and peasant masses to become one."

—EUPRA.

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Figure 3: Current Occupational Rank, by Class Label and by Calendar Year in Which Reached Age 20



[a] The scale used here is logarithmic, equal distances representing equal proportions.

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: The data are from the economically active portion of the Whyte-Parish urban sample. Class labels were grouped in the same manner as in Figure 2. Occupations were ranked in 32 income groups on the basis of the mean monthly income of the occupation; this gave a scale of 22 to 103 (measured in yuan), which approximates the range of occupational prestige scores in the West.

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or on "serve the people" might be the ideal, but commitment was hard to measure. Furthermore, it was feared that the children of intellectuals and capitalists were good at dissembling proper attitudes. Stress on class origin had drawbacks as well, for some very committed people would be left behind.

Nevertheless, the answer of the Cultural Revolution was that academic excellence had to be abandoned as a criterion, since it selected careerists and people of bad class origin. Class origin was to be the principal screening device, with staff children now declared suspect along with capitalist and other bad-class children. After an initial screening in terms of class origin, individuals were to be promoted on the basis of political commitment, which would best be measured by how one performed at lengthy stints of factory and farm work both during school years and for a number of years afterward. Work periods during school were increased, and the total number of years of pre-college education was abbreviated from 12 to 9 or, in some places, 10 years. College enrollment was drastically curtailed.

Despite loopholes and complaints that administrative cadres were getting their children in through the "back door," the new policy had much of its intended effect. Everyone moved rapidly toward the new norm of nine years of education (see the final data in Figure 2). With the special schools closed and exams watered down, worker, peasant, and other good-class children were simply passed through the school system for their allotted number of years. Staff and cadre children continued to do somewhat better than the rest, but capitalist children suffered more positive discrimination and lost their former favored position.

Similar trends developed in the occupational realm. The few urban jobs open tended to be worker jobs or jobs with low starting salaries (see Figure 3).[14] As intended by the radicals, capitalist and other bad-class children suffered the sharpest reversals, losing their favored occupational spots to others. The children of staff and other intellectuals got jobs no better than those given the children of former peasants. In an unanticipated development, but one later singled out for comment in the press, cadre children gained in occupational terms the position of advantage they had already gained in education. With this minor exception concerning cadre children, however, the radical policies were having their intended effect of narrowing and inverting the class order.

[14] Given the small cadre sample sizes—7 before 1966 and 18 afterwards—one should not make too much of this trend, even if it does coincide with occasional press reports and impressions of some Chinese émigrés.

Table 7: Determinants of Educational Achievement and Income by Year Reached Age 20

(Metric regression coefficients[a])

Child's achievement	Father's Education[b]	Father's Occupation[c]	Father's Class label[d]	Child's Education[b]
Education[b]				
Pre-1966 cohort	.36*	.09*	2.62*	—
1967-78 cohort	.07*	.01	.59	—
Occupation[c]				
Pre-1966 cohort	1.02*	.37*	10.95*	2.62*
1967-78 cohort	.10	.15*	.76*	1.02

[a] Simple regression, taking one variable along the top of the table at a time. See text footnotes for explanation of the coefficients.

[b] Education = years of education.

[c] Occupation is ranked in 32 income categories according to the mean income for each occupation.

[d] Class origins with the old high-status labels of "staff," "merchant," and "capitalist" are assigned a value of 1; all others, 0.

* Probability of error ≤ .01.

SOURCE: Whyte-Parish sample, restricted to economically active nonfarm population, ages 16-39. Size of pre-1966 sample = 117; sample for 1967-78 = 165.

Of course, the lives of urban children have been influenced not only by the class label which marked their father's position as of about 1949, but also by their father's current occupation and education. The degree of correlation between a father's current status and the status attainment of his children aged 16-39—the generation that has reached maturity since 1949—provides a good estimate of the extent to which post-1949 status groups have been reproducing themselves.

The data summarized in Table 7 cover both children who reached age 20 by the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and those who did so afterward. Prior to 1966, the Chinese process of status attainment resembled, if in muted form, patterns found around the world.[15] Fathers with more education and in higher-paying positions produced children who got further in both school and work (Columns 1 and 2). Those with negative-class labels continued to do well in both areas also (Column 3). And educational success still translated into occupational success (Column 4), with the best positions reserved for those with a favored start. These patterns are familiar. Familial influence over the education and status attainment of children is difficult to erase.

[15] Metric regression coefficients show the influence of a unit's change in each of the variables along the top of Table 7. To illustrate, the top left coefficient says that for each extra year a father was in school his son or daughter got .36 years more education. The next coefficient says that for each extra jump in a father's occupational rank the son or daughter got .29 years more education. The asterisk indicates that coefficients this large could have occurred from sampling error alone no more than 1 time in a 100.

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After 1966, however, the Chinese came very close to accomplishing just that. The numbers confirm what informants often report—that after 1967 there was very little that an upper-middle-class parent could do to help his children succeed in school or find a better job once their education was completed. The fit between parental status and children's status was reduced to near zero or to only a fraction of its former levels (Columns 1 and 2). Thus a note of extreme unpredictability was introduced into Chinese status attainment. For children, education provided much less guarantee of occupational success (Column 4). Government policy to break the reproduction of status groups and to weaken the link between education and status was indeed effective. The resulting patterns were more extreme than they have been anywhere else in the world.

Consequences

In China today, we are told that the policy of social equalization was disastrous. We are given one lurid example after another of problems created by the quest for equality. Political campaigns and the pursuit of class purity are decried for having caused factionalism, deaths, and a breakdown in production. Attempts to reduce the position of managers and to involve politically active workers in management and technical groups are criticized for destroying discipline, eliminating quality control, and promoting the stagnation of China's productivity. Freezing wages, eliminating bonuses, and restricting the collective and private sector are all criticized for destroying initiative among both factory and service workers. The weakening of teacher authority, the watering down of exams and of the technical content of education, and the testing of student mettle through rural sending-down programs are blamed for destroying hope among the young and helping to create high delinquency rates in the 1970's. Surprisingly, émigré criticisms of the decade are, on the whole, somewhat more restrained than those appearing in the Chinese press; but they, too, tend to support the image of a multitude of problems created by the radical decade.

One might conclude that many of our old ideas about the inevitability, even the imperative, of inequality to assure a stable and economically productive social order were correct. The temptation is to turn once again to Milton Friedman and others of the Chicago school of economics for guidance as to how to properly order a society with unequal material rewards as incentives. Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore's 1945 article on the functional necessity of inequality to both allocate labor and provide incentives looks once again attractive. And, indeed, some sinologists have hastened to draw just these conclusions.[16]

Despite the seeming obviousness of these ideas, though, there are reasons to demur from some of their harsher implications. For one, China's attempt at radical destratification was a flawed experiment. Many of its most negative features bore only a tenuous relationship to the goal of equality. The unpopular rural sending-down program for youth might have been avoided in China, and can be avoided in most countries that do not have China's severe unemployment problem. The divisive and sometimes deadly emphasis on class struggle, while clearly helping to invert the old class order, obscured the potential role of other kinds of moral incentives. Émigré workers often report, for example, that the alternative moral incentive of national growth, or making China strong for the first time in a century, frequently contributed to unity and productivity prior to 1966. The radicals made little use of such factors.

Second, among émigrés relative equality of condition was seldom criticized in itself. Those who complained most about the freezing of salaries and their inability to earn more were middle-grade workers who had been at the same income levels since the late 1950's and early 1960's, even while their children were growing up and putting more demands on the family budget. Providing periodic pay raises for these workers would have done little to change the overall picture of income distribution in the country and might have averted some resentment of the radicals' goals. In like manner, professional and higher-paid bureaucrats complained not about pay restrictions, but about how they were subject to capricious attack, how there was no recourse to law, how they were forced to do work that did not use their abilities, how they could not help their children in school or at work, and how their children could not support themselves in the countryside or were getting into trouble as they idled about the city.

The most common gripes about pay and social rewards centered on the question of equity, or distributive justice, rather than on that of equality. It was not that the range of rewards was too narrow, but that material rewards were going to the wrong people. With middle and upper incomes frozen, the only people who got pay increases were younger workers still at

[16] See Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore's "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review* (New York, NY), April 1945, pp. 242–49; and fn. 1.

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

What's in a red flag? A model textile worker displays a red banner for good performance. Slogans on the machine exhort her to observe the "three disciplines" and to refrain from talking on the job.

—Derek Davies/*Far Eastern Economic Review*.

lower pay levels. This situation violated the older workers' sense of fairness, both because it ignored culturally preferred principles of seniority and because younger workers were often among the worst workers. Brought up not with the goals of national growth and reconstruction but with the goals of class struggle and political activism, the young tended to be most likely to show up late for work, to take unnecessary sick leave, and to slack off on the job once they were there—or so one is told by older and even by some younger émigré workers. Symbolic rewards such as small red flags on the wall, a printed T-shirt, or honorable mention in a meeting provided little incentive for more work. When "political upstarts" were not only given pay raises but were also promoted to positions of responsibility as a result of political activism in the Cultural Revolution, some of the older workers became even more resentful. Some even slackened their own pace of work, feeling that the system had gone awry and that they were no longer considered part of a grand national purpose. They, too, began to succumb to the "iron rice bowl" mentality, which holds that as long as an individual merely just soldiers along on the job, nothing and no one can ever touch him or her.

It is to these concerns about equity that the most recent policies of the Chinese government speak. Some of the new policies will increase the range of rewards offered to individuals and hence overall inequality. Professors, managers, and bureaucrats have been promoted to higher ranks. Royalties for books and other kinds of art and literature have been restored, even if at reduced levels. Prizes are once again to be given for scientific and engineering innovations.[17] Clearly, incomes will increase at the highest levels.

[17] The awards for inventions are not to be sneezed at. Though recent awards have been in the 500–2,000 yuan range, they can theoretically go up to 10,000 yuan. See "Awards for Inventions," *Beijing Review*, Feb. 2, 1979, p. 8; Beijing Xinhua Apr. 5, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 14, 1980, p. L/11.

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Yet most of the new policies are designed simply to provide a better fit between performance and reward at the middle and lower levels of the work force. As a stopgap measure, pay increases in late 1977 concentrated on low-wage workers and only marginally on merit increases. Wage increases in late 1979, however, provided merit raises for 40 percent of the labor force at all levels. Demotions for poor performance have been reintroduced, and exams are to be used more frequently to determine which workers can be promoted or accepted back into a rank from which they have been removed. Individual material bonuses have again provided, on average, perhaps a month's extra salary to blue-collar workers; and collective bonuses for enterprises that have exceeded their production targets have provided extra housing, recreation, and other facilities for all personnel.[18]

To improve quality, service, efficiency, and employment for youth, more collective and individual producers have been licensed in cities. Collective neighborhood restaurants, bicycle repair shops, tailors, spare parts manufacturers, and so on have been urged to compete with state enterprises, with more income going to the winner. The number of licensed private barbers, knife sharpeners, photographers, cigarette vendors, mom and pop stores, and other individual producers has doubled since 1979, to 320,000.[19]

Still, though incomes for neighborhood and individual workers are to float with the profitability of their activity, it is assumed that these workers will average only 40 to 50 yuan per month. A progressive tax restricts individual producers to a maximum of a little over 100 yuan a month.[20] That these policies will cause more fluctuation in incomes over time as businesses rise and fall is obvious. That they will cause more inequality at any one point in time is less obvious.

In schools, the emphasis has also turned away from class origin—which is now supposed to be ignored—and from political attitudes, toward achievement measured by a rigorous hierarchy of exams. The probability that this approach will increase continuity of status between generations is being played down in the interest of the development of talent for purposes of national growth. Intellectual parents will again feel

[18] See, for example, "Where Does Labour Enthusiasm Come From?" *Beijing Review*, May 2, 1980, pp. 16–23; and Xinhua English, Aug. 22, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 23, 1979, p. Q/1.

[19] Xinhua English, Aug. 12, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 13, 1980, p. L/17.

[20] On average incomes (and associated low education and skill levels) of many individual and collective workers, see Xinhua English, Aug. 12, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 13, 1980, p. L/7; and Zhao, "Several Problems . . . ," p. L/26. On taxation's effect on collective and individual enterprises, see Xinhua, Oct. 19, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI* Oct. 21, 1980, p. R/3; and Radio Anhui, Nov. 21, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 26, 1980, p. Q/4.

Jobs for Chinese youth: at the left, young people seeking permanent jobs take temporary employment at a Beijing wine shop; at the right, some of more than 70,000 youths who took exams on July 30, 1979, for a total of 40,000 posts in state and collective plants, mines, and commercial operations in the capital and its environs. The signs reads: "'79 Worker Recruitment—Examination Hall No. 166."

—Eastfoto.

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that there is predictability in the system—study habits and aspirations taught at home will have some payoff in the long run, just as they do in other societies.

Conclusion

China's recent history provides a clear example of the social imperative of a link between effort and reward both within one's own career and in the academic and job career of one's children. Without this link, incentives for work and a belief in the fairness of the system are lost. Current Chinese policies seem designed to restore this link, providing both a sense of equity and a larger purpose of national growth.

China's recent history provides a much more ambiguous message about the imperatives of equality of condition or the range of rewards for which people must be allowed to compete. What little evidence we have suggests that equality versus inequality was not a major issue in China and that the range of rewards available need not be radically increased in order to promote national growth. A modest rise in rewards for those at the top might move China only to the degrees of inegalitarianism now present in Hungary or Yugoslavia. These are systems which offer many of the incentives that China is now advocating, but which, as we have seen, are only slightly more unequal in the urban sector than China is. Beijing's current policies of raising prices paid to farmers, encouraging commercial crops with the highest comparative advantage, increasing investment in agriculture, and promoting rural industry may also help narrow the massive urban-rural gap in income level.[21] Thus, it is not inconceivable that in years to come China may combine a constant or even increasing degree of overall equality with increasing attention to performance-linked material rewards. Such a solution would be consonant with the wishes of much of the Chinese population, and this, after all, is the framework within which China's accomplishments must ultimately be measured.

[21] Reflecting themes in the media at the time, David M. Lampton reported in 1979 how new policies would exacerbate rural inequalities. See his "New 'Revolution' in China's Social Policy." A year later there was far more media emphasis on tax remissions, loans, and other measures to help the poorest villages. See "Helping Poor Rural Areas," *Beijing Review*, July 21, 1980, p. 5; Xinhua English, Apr. 22, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 22, 1980, p. O/3. See also Radio Changchun, Nov. 11, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 19, 1979, p. S/5. In the meantime, the urban-rural gap in per capita income appears to have narrowed somewhat, from 3.1 to 1 in 1977 to 2.8 in 1979—if one takes reported figures at face value and assumes 30 percent private income for peasants.

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Chinese Global Strategy and Soviet Power

By Jonathan D. Pollack

Among the profusion of voices interpreting Soviet political and military intentions, few have been more pointed, vigorous, and voluble than those emanating from the People's Republic of China (PRC). By virtue of the seeming conviction and certitude of their opinions, not to mention their judicious and effective use of the Western media, officials in Beijing have become, and no doubt will remain, significant participants in this growing international debate.

Indeed, China's leaders regard the process of strategic assessment as critical to an understanding of contemporary world politics. They repeatedly stress that Beijing's effort to form "the broadest possible international united front against hegemonism" cannot be seen as a measure of simple tactical expedience, but must instead be viewed from "a long-term strategic perspective." Party Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping and other decision-makers further assert that key policies—for example, the burgeoning relationship with the United States, China's border war with Vietnam in February and March 1979, and the broader effort to challenge the expansion of Soviet power—embody judgments about long-term strategic trends in both global and regional politics.[1]

Somewhat surprisingly, however, what the Chinese call "the higher plane of global strategy" has received little systematic attention in Western scholarship. Careful scrutiny of Chinese strategic writings reveals a much more complex and differentiated range of opinion about Soviet power and policy than is generally attributed to the PRC. Not only have the interpretations underlying these writings shifted significantly; the immediate implications for China's security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union have been equally dynamic.

China's position and significance in the overall strategic competition has been an especially fascinating issue. Throughout much of the 1970's, Chinese strategists have disagreed with Western views that portray China as a pivotal factor in the global competition. At the same time, they have persistently taken issue with arguments that a Sino-Soviet war is imminent or even likely.

Most Chinese writings and policy declarations have instead asserted that the Soviet Union views East Asia in general and China in particular as at best a secondary target of attack. Zhou Enlai's statement in August 1973 that the Soviet Union was only "making a feint to the East [China] while attacking in the West [Europe]" established an authoritative strategic benchmark that remains generally unchallenged to this day.[2] (More recently, to be sure, Chinese writings concede that some Soviet deployments in Asia are di-

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[1] See, for example, Deng's extended interview with Earl Foell, "A Talk with China's Most Powerful Man," *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Dec. 4, 1980, pp. B/1–3.

[2] Zhou Enlai, Political Report to the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Aug. 24, 1973, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report—People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–CHI*), Aug. 31, 1973, p. B/8. This statement echoed an earlier statement on the subject by Party Chairman Mao Zedong.

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A Soviet tank is hauled into Kabul in January 1980, during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

—Hans Paul-Lehtikuva/Photoreporters.

rected against China, but they also contend that many of these forces remain primarily intended to threaten Japan and the United States.[3]) In addition, Chinese discussions of the doctrine of the "inevitability of war" refer almost exclusively to armed conflict *not* between the Soviet Union and China, but (as required by Leninist theory) between imperialist states or their surrogates, with China as peripheral or wholly uninvolved in any such conflagration.[4]

However self-serving or deceptive such logic might appear, it is clearly deserving of closer attention. The dynamic quality of Chinese strategic assessment seems a particularly significant factor. As the most important official interpretation of PRC foreign policy has noted:

> *Relations between countries or nations are based on relations between classes, and they are interconnected and extremely complicated. . . . The situation with regard to this struggle is intricate and volatile . . . . In waging the struggle in the international arena, the proletariat must unite with all those who can be united in light of what is imperative and feasible in different historical periods. . . . Therefore, we can never lay down any hard and fast formula for differentiating the world's political forces.*[5]

In this essay, therefore, we shall briefly consider some of the underlying issues evident in Chinese strategic assessment, and how they have been transformed over the course of the 1970's. We shall focus on the identification of basic assumptions and interpretations rather than on an extensive reconstruction of Chinese elite politics during these years. As we do so, however, the shifting frame of reference within which China's leaders have debated their foreign policy options should also emerge with greater clarity.

[3] See, for example, Special Commentator, "The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union for World Domination," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing—hereafter *RMRB*), Jan. 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 15, 1980, esp. pp. C/4-5.

[4] See, for instance, Editorial Department of *RMRB*, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," Nov. 1, 1977, in *Peking Review* (Beijing), Nov. 4, 1977, pp. 10-41, esp. pp. 19-24.

[5] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

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Some General Propositions

The essential questions raised in Chinese strategic assessment are few in number and simple in structure. At the most basic level of abstraction, there are at least four recurring issues. Which are the key states in world politics, and what are their strengths and weaknesses in terms of political, institutional, military, and economic power? Is their power relative to other states (whether adversary, ally, or friend) ascendant, descendant, or generally stable? What is the likelihood of armed conflict involving one or more key states, which other states might it involve, on what scale, and in what locale(s) or region(s)? What is the scope of various states' ambitions and interests, and how well matched are these to their power capabilities?

The elementary strategic model implied by these questions is both unduly rationalized and (notwithstanding the Marxist-Leninist framework) very state-centered. What the questions permit, however, is an overall description of trends and power relations between states, the degree of flux in these trends, and (most important) an evaluation of China's position—political, military, and geographic—relative to those other developments. The answers to these general questions, then, enable Chinese strategists to assess China's incentives, opportunities, and imperatives in light of various objective and subjective circumstances.

Probing this final level of analysis from the outside, however, often proves difficult, and with good reason. First, many methodological problems complicate the undertaking. Published strategic assessments may simply offer a means to legitimize or rationalize policy decisions and choices already made at other levels. To this extent, any assertion that they represent genuine strategic assessment on the part of Chinese officials must be somewhat tempered. Yet such documents offer a framework or set of guidelines for both the formulation and implementation of Chinese policy; they also help establish boundaries for intra-elite debate. However disputatious the political process from which these assessments emanate, therefore, on balance they offer a reasonable approximation of the collective judgment of Chinese decision-makers and strategic analysts. They thus have considerable value for explaining and predicting the contours of both external and internal politics.

Second, where China "fits" within the broad array of the world's political, military, and economic forces is rarely if ever stated explicitly. Indeed, one is at times tempted to wonder whether China is regarded as an active participant at all in the ongoing strategic competition. To help account for this reticence on the part of Chinese strategists, we need to consider the relationship between the international situation as a whole and China's internal political and economic dynamics.

War, Peace, and Development

In their most basic form, PRC views of global strategy derive from a set of underlying judgments about the stability of the international system at any given time. Yet Chinese assessments of international relations do not appear in a political vacuum. Discussions of the international situation, especially judgments about the likelihood of war and the principal locale of political and military tensions, have long had direct relevance for the general framework of domestic policymaking.[6] The effect on overall choices in resource allocation has been particularly significant. If armed conflict involving China seemed imminent or highly likely, then "preparedness against war" and higher levels of defense expenditure were judged necessary, and appropriate measures were in fact taken.[7] If the threat of war involving China was judged more remote, however, then agricultural, industrial, and scientific development (the broad tasks of "economic construction") could proceed less impeded by external threats, and reductions in Chinese defense procurement could be made. Thus, predictions of a more tranquil external environment have recurrently been used to restrict both the political and budgetary prerogatives of Chinese military commanders.

Rather than discuss this issue in any detail, we will instead turn to some of the underlying strategic arguments employed by Chinese policymakers over the past decade, and briefly consider their ramifications for the allocation of power within China. Our principal focus will be on Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, since both at various times exerted a singular influence on Chinese depictions of the international situation, and on the inferred or explicit relationship of China to global strategic trends.

In the broadest of terms, Zhou and Deng argued that China was not in the forefront of the international strategic struggle. As if to underscore this view, both

[6] See, in particular, Mao Zedong's April 1956 speech, "On the Ten Major Relationships," in *Peking Review*, Jan. 1, 1977, esp. pp. 12–14.

[7] This view is borne out by US government estimates on trends in Chinese defense expenditure over the past decade and a half. See Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Chinese Defense Spending, 1965–79*, Washington, DC, July 1980.

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pursued the development of external relations which would (1) reduce or eliminate any threat of a "two-front war" involving China with more than one major adversary; (2) counter any suggestion or indication that China represented the linchpin in the global strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union; (3) more generally deflect any political and military pressure against the PRC by seeking to prevent "encirclement" by the PRC's adversaries; and (4) gain stable, diversified foreign-trade partners and sources of advanced technology for the PRC, thereby enabling China to make economic progress unburdened by any imminent threat of war. The fact that it took nearly all of the 1970's to achieve a degree of closure on these issues is suggestive of the controversy which some of the questions provoked within the Chinese political leadership.[8]

To advance such policies, however, required a depiction of the international situation in which China was relatively insulated from the threat of war. In the face of major and at times disquieting shifts in the international situation (not to mention in Chinese domestic affairs), Zhou and Deng on successive occasions had to interpret global and regional trends in a manner least disruptive to China's politics and economics.

The late Zhou Enlai, then China's Premier, addressing the 10th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in August 1973.

—Camera Press.

This process has gone through a number of distinct phases. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, Zhou and his allies challenged the view that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were characterized principally by "collusion" at China's expense.[9] Zhou argued instead that relations between the rival "hegemonic powers" were marked by contention which was "absolute and protracted." Moreover, the presumed battleground for this competition (and the principal prize coveted by both) was Europe, not China. At the same time, according to Zhou, the Third World increasingly served as the broader backdrop of US-Soviet rivalry, which would progressively dissipate the resources of both superpowers. As Zhou, echoing Mao, stated at the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1973:

Today, it is mainly the two nuclear superpowers—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—that are contending for hegemony . . . strategically the key point of their contention is Europe. The West always wants to urge the Soviet revisionists eastward to divert the peril towards China, and it would be fine so long as all is quiet in the West. China is an attractive piece of meat coveted by all. But this piece of meat is very tough, and for years no one has been able to bite into it. . . . The U.S.-Soviet contention for hegemony is the cause of world intranquillity. . . . It has met with strong resistance from the Third World and has caused resentment on the part of Japan and Western European countries . . . the U.S. and U.S.S.R. find the going tougher and tougher.[10]

These views epitomized the core judgments in Chinese strategic pronouncements of the early and mid-1970's. Zhou, having succeeded in engineering "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries [China] and imperialist countries [the United States],"[11] still had to argue (at least on a doctrinal

[8] For further discussion, see Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Agonizing Reappraisal: Foreign and Security Policy in the 1970s," in Herbert Ellison, Ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: The Seventies and Beyond*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, forthcoming.

[9] On this issue generally, see Thomas M. Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle*, R-1902-NA, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, November 1977.

[10] Zhou, Political Report, p. B/8.

[11] Ibid., p. B/10.

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level) that Washington and Moscow represented co-equal threats to international peace and security. The centrality of Europe in superpower calculations became a virtual article of faith. China was depicted as largely tangential to this competition, and thus highly unlikely to become embroiled in the grand designs of others.

The increasingly strident Chinese attacks on both superpowers during this period are further revealing of these key underlying arguments. While the term "superpower" *(chaoji daguo)* had obvious intellectual antecedents in the 1960's, the term itself, with the exception of a single reference in November 1965, did not appear in Chinese media until the summer of 1970.[12] Even then, a comprehensive exposition of the concept and its implications took some time to develop. The principal arguments were clear. Two powers were locked in a prolonged competition for global dominance which might result in war. The United States had been progressively in decline since the Korean war and was now "more and more beset with difficulties at home and abroad." The Soviet Union had "inherited the cause of the hegemonists in history," but its effort was equally doomed to failure.[13] Through unrelenting opposition to the superpowers' policies of "hegemonism and war," all nations and peoples subjected to "superpower exploitation, bullying, and control" would presumably create problems for Washington and Moscow far greater than any benefits "hegemonism and war" might yield.

Thus, even if Chinese spokesmen described global politics in progressively less tranquil terms, both the short-term and long-term consequences for China were deemed positive. In the short run, superpower competition in more vital and vulnerable spheres of interest than Asia would provide China the international "breathing space" required to resurrect an economy and polity badly shattered by years of domestic turmoil. In the long run, both superpowers could be expected to fritter away their resources in an unceasing competition which neither could expect to win. For all the alacrity with which Zhou publicly attacked both the United States and the Soviet Union, it was only too obvious that China could benefit considerably from a world dominated by two antagonistic superpowers. The seeming contradiction between China's warnings of "the danger of war visibly growing" and the progressive reduction of PRC defense spending during the early and mid-1970's (if considered purely at the level of Chinese strategic assessment) was hence no contradiction at all: China was simply judged apart from the fray.[14]

Indeed, Zhou was the only Chinese decision-maker during this period who suggested that long-term peace—i.e., peace that would provide the international stability which China urgently required to fully reconstitute its political and economic structure—might be assured. While appropriately quoting Mao that "the danger of a new world war still exists," Zhou at the 10th Party Congress virtually conceded the Khrushchevian thesis on the noninevitability of such a conflict: "It will be possible to prevent such a war, so long as the peoples, who are becoming more and more awakened, keep the orientation clearly in sight, heighten their vigilance, strengthen unity, and persevere in struggle."[15]

Thus, it is clear that efforts to alter the direction of China's internal politics depended critically on depicting the international situation in nonthreatening (if hardly benign) terms. If events beyond China's borders did not sustain Zhou's underlying set of assumptions, then the domestic agenda he sought to fashion would be correspondingly threatened. Zhou's increasing physical infirmities occurred at a time both of challenges to his growing power within China and of developments abroad which called key premises of his strategic assessment into question. To consider these issues further, we need to examine the transformations in Chinese views of Soviet strategy evident since the mid-1970's.

"The More Dangerous Superpower"

If Zhou Enlai by late 1973 had seemingly succeeded in establishing a highly authoritative approach to global strategy in order to justify domestic policy change, events before long threatened to overtake his formulation. The depiction of superpowers locked in ceaseless competition also recognized that their relative power bases and the fervor of their ambition could (at least in theory) vary. In this context, the United States offered visible evidence of decline. As a lengthy end-of-the-year editorial in *Renmin Ribao* noted:

[12] Editorial Departments of *RMRB* and *Hongqi* (Beijing), *Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action,'* Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, p. 11. For the earliest reference from the 1970's of which I am aware, see "Heighten Our Vigilance, Defend the Motherland," *RMRB, Hongqi,* and *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing) Joint Editorial, Aug. 1, 1970, in *Peking Review,* Aug. 7, 1970, p. 7.

[13] The quotes are from Wu Qun, "Hegemony Cannot Decide Destiny of World History," *Hongqi,* October 1973, in *Peking Review,* Nov. 30, 1973, pp. 4–6.

[14] For a highly provocative interpretation, see Lucian W. Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Military Modernization," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1979, pp. 3–17.

[15] Zhou, Political Report, p. B/10.

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U.S. imperialism is finding the going tougher and tougher from year to year. It has been unable to surmount difficulties at home, and all its endeavors abroad have failed to turn the tide which shows all the characteristics of a decline. It has been compelled to withdraw its forces from Vietnam.

By contrast, the Soviet Union seemed more potent and active:

In this all-round striving for hegemony, Soviet revisionist social imperialism shows a greater momentum and extended its reach farther and wider than the U.S. . . . It concentrates its greatest attention in Europe . . . it has also made reckless inroads in other parts of the world. In a word, it has committed penetration wherever there is a chance. In some countries or regions, it arrived at the heels of the United States; in some others, it took the United States' place as soon as the latter left; and in still some other areas which the United States has not been able to lay hands on, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism took the advantage to step in.

To be sure, in overall terms the Soviet Union was judged "in a worse plight" than the United States, but this judgment pertained to its economic weakness, not its military power.[16] Thus, to the extent that the United States could no longer be considered as potent and as committed a rival to the Soviet Union, the retrenchment of US power evident at that time (especially in Asia) had negative as well as positive implications for China's security.

Deng Xiaoping was the first leader prepared to state Chinese concerns more explicitly, suggesting that one could not treat both superpowers as equivalent threats. Speaking to a visiting Japanese delegation in the summer of 1974, Deng argued that

of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union is more dangerous than the United States. . . . The United States is not as dangerous as the Soviet Union up to a certain point. The United States is rather on the defensive in order to maintain its rights and interests throughout the world. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has gone into the offensive with a view to intruding on U.S. vested rights.[17]

But Deng's views were not yet accepted as authoritative policy judgments. When Zhou gave his final speech at the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, the United States and the Soviet Union (listed in that order) were deemed coequal threats to peace. Zhou, it is true, did not make even passing reference to the possibility that the two superpowers might collude, if only momentarily; he remarked only that "their fierce contention is bound to lead to world war someday." Yet, in contrast to his address to the CCP congress in 1973, he failed to note any possibility of preventing or even postponing such a conflict.[18]

As has often proven the case in Chinese strategic assessment, a major international event—in this case, the final collapse of the Saigon government in the late spring of 1975—crystallized and clarified these seeming variations in interpretation. A *Renmin Ribao* editorial on May 9, 1975, in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of Hitler's defeat (and less than two weeks after the fall of Saigon) asserted that "the Soviet social imperialists . . . are leaving no stone unturned in their efforts to replace the U.S. imperialists at a time when the latter are becoming increasingly vulnerable and strategically passive."[19] Deng again was the first leader to state the implications of the American withdrawal from Indochina. In separate audiences in June and July with President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Prime Minister Khukrit Pramoj of Thailand, he warned both leaders "to beware of the tiger coming from the back door while pushing out the wolf from the front door." In the latter conversation, he further warned that "a superpower is trying to impose hegemony" in South Vietnam and that "a superpower may request the use of bases in South Vietnam."[20]

In mid-July, a Xinhua correspondent detailed in almost alarmist tones the expansion of Soviet power not only in Europe but on a global scale. He concluded:

U.S. imperialism, though it has long since been toppled from its pinnacle . . . is making desperate efforts to preserve its foothold. . . . Soviet social-imperialism . . . has been doing everything it can to squeeze into and take over U.S. spheres of influence. . . . As a breeding ground of a new world war, Soviet social-imperialism is far more dangerous.[21]

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[16] All the above quotes are from Zhung Zhiping, "The World Advances Amidst Great Disorder," *RMRB*, Dec. 31, 1973, p. 5, as excerpted in *Survey of People's Republic of China Press* (Hong Kong—hereafter *SPRCP*), No. 5533, pp. 30–34.

[17] *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Aug. 21, 1974, p. 2.

[18] Zhou Enlai, Report on the Work of the Government, Jan. 13, 1975, in *Peking Review*, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 24.

[19] "Commemorating 30th Anniversary of Victory Over German Fascism," *RMRB* Editorial, May 9, 1975, in *Peking Review*, May 16, 1975, p. 8.

[20] Xinhua, June 7, 1975, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 9, 1975, pp. A/9–10; *The Nation* (Bangkok), July 3, 1975, pp. 1, 8, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 3, 1975, pp. A/10–11.

[21] "The Brezhnev Clique Is Following Hitler's Beaten Track," *Peking Review*, July 18, 1975, p. 6.

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

CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt during Hua's October 1979 visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.

—Regis Bossu/SYGMA.

At the end of July, Deng's metaphor of tiger and wolf was more extensively developed by "Ren Guping," a writing group presumably linked to Deng and the most prominent name in Chinese strategic assessment. While many of Ren's views purported to reflect public and press opinion in Southeast Asia, they were clearly indicative of Chinese views which Deng (among others) wished to convey to Hanoi:

Soviet social-imperialism, like a hungry tiger coming out from its lair in the mountains, poses an even greater danger to the states and peoples in Southeast Asia than decaying U.S. imperialism. That is why it is far more important to heighten vigilance against the Soviet Union . . . [which is] trying its best to replace the United States as the overlord in Asia.[22]

Thus, over the course of 1975, Chinese analysts drew closer to asserting that Soviet actions were moving beyond a Europe-centered orientation. By year's end, Ren Guping, though still insisting that the core of superpower contention was in Europe, saw this struggle as moving increasingly into the Third World—and the tiger as now at the front door rather than the rear.[23]

The convulsive events within China in 1976 no doubt contributed to a certain immobility in Chinese strategic debate for much of that year. Deng Xiaoping's momentary eclipse seemingly slowed the momentum which had been building in preceding months. In Deng's absence there was no significant alteration in the formulas evident in 1975.[24] Indeed, no leader felt sufficiently emboldened to depart significantly from previously established views until there was a degree of power consolidation in the aftermath of Mao's death and the purge of the "gang of four."

In this brief period, military spokesmen had the best opportunity for freely conveying their views in national media since the disgrace and death of Lin Biao in the fall of 1971. They took full advantage of Mao's talk of the "visibly growing danger of war" to urge a more rapid course of military modernization and arms acquisition. The inevitability of a third world war made it imperative, they claimed, that China "race against time" to counter the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Union had yet to give up its "dreams of subjugating China."[25] The increasing prominence of such views in the spring of 1977 threatened to directly challenge Zhou and Deng's belief that, no matter how threaten-

[22] Ren Guping, "Repulse Wolf at the Gate, Guard Against Tiger at the Back Door," *RMRB*, July 29, 1975, in *Peking Review*, Aug. 8, 1975, pp. 11–12.

[23] Ren Guping, "The Factors for Revolution and War Are Increasing—A Look Back at the International Situation in 1975," *RMRB*, Dec. 25, 1975, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 29, 1975, pp. A/1–6. As early as March 1974, a signed article in *Renmin Ribao* had argued that the Soviet Union was casting a "covetous eye" on the Strait of Malacca in order to link its Vladivostok-based Pacific Fleet forces with those deployed in the Indian Ocean. Should the strait be subject to Soviet control, the author maintained, Moscow could then link its Asian-based navy with its forces in the Mediterranean to achieve "hegemony in this vast expanse of water." Xiang Dong, "Expansion by Soviet Revisionist Social-Imperialism in Southeast Asia," *RMRB*, Mar. 19, 1974, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 20, 1974, pp. A/1–3.

[24] See, in particular, various articles by Ren Guping: "Where Does the Main Danger of a New World War Come From?" *RMRB*, Jan. 27, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 28, 1976, pp. A/5–8; "Peace Program or Means to Contend for Hegemony?" *RMRB*, Mar. 10, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 11, 1976, pp. A/1–3; "Resolutely Oppose Soviet Modern Revisionism," *RMRB*, Oct. 10, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 12, 1976, pp. A/5–7; "Soviet Social Imperialism—The Third World's Most Dangerous Enemy," *Peking Review*, Oct. 29, 1976, pp. 27–29; and "Biggest Peace Swindler in Our Epoch," *RMRB*, Nov. 4, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 8, 1976, pp. A/4–7.

[25] For two of the more forceful presentations of their arguments, see "The Strategic Policy of Strengthening Defense Construction—On Studying Chairman Mao's Dissertation on the Relationship Between Economic Construction and Defense Construction," *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), Jan. 20, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 31, 1977, pp. E/1–5; and "A Great Call for Accelerating the Revolutionization and Modernization of Our Army," *Jiefangjun Bao* Editorial, June 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 6, 1977, esp. pp. E/7–9.

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ing Soviet actions, other states (especially in the West) were subject to much more immediate pressure and challenge.

The seeming dominance (or at least the greater visibility) of the advocates of "defense first" did not last long. During July and August 1977, advocates of "development first" regained the ascendancy in this debate, a position they have successfully maintained ever since. The coincidence of this development with Deng Xiaoping's political resurrection immediately before the 11th Party Congress in early August hardly seems fortuitous. Indeed, it was at this precise time (in Hua Guofeng's political report to the congress) that the possibility of delaying or otherwise impeding the outbreak of the inevitable world war was raised for the first time since Zhou's passing reference at the 10th Congress:

So long as the people of all countries heighten their vigilance, close their ranks, get prepared and wage unrelenting struggles, they may be able to put off the outbreak of war, or will find themselves in a favorable position when war does break out.[26]

Even if (as Hua also asserted) the USSR was still "bent on subjugating our country," the appropriate strategy was to emphasize China's long-term scientific, industrial, and technological development, not an abrupt (and by implication illusory) "quick fix" to compete with the Soviet Union.[27] In a word, China needed to buy time rather than race against it.

To buy time, however, required far greater efforts to form a coalition of forces to counter Soviet power. China's determined measures and considerable successes in this realm will not be directly discussed in this essay.[28] We will, however, examine how major Chinese reassessments of Soviet strategy have contributed to the building of a united anti-Soviet front, especially since such reassessments are highly revealing of the underlying premises guiding Chinese foreign policy as the 1980's begin.

Building the United Front

Since the summer of 1977, those responsible for Chinese strategic assessment have made far-reaching changes in their basic interpretations of global politics. First, strategic imperatives—in particular what Chinese analysts have viewed as the largely unchallenged expansion of Soviet power—have justified major measures by which the PRC has attempted to draw all the "forces opposing hegemonism" (including both the United States and China) into much closer, if informal, working arrangements. Second, Chinese observers have been compelled to rethink (or at least restate) certain long-dominant assumptions about the focus of Soviet competition with the West and about the most appropriate means of combating Soviet power. Third, and perhaps most important, a far more discriminating framework for analyzing Soviet political and military strategy has gradually emerged in China, a framework that provides a continuing context within which Chinese policy calculations and choices over the next decade can be interpreted. While considerations of space do not permit extensive discussion of these issues here, we can indicate several key realms in which reappraisal has been most evident.

In retrospect, no document is more revealing of Chinese strategic reassessment than the November 1, 1977, issue of *Renmin Ribao,* devoted exclusively to Mao's "theory of the three worlds."[29] This rich and complex essay, in focusing attention on "the overall situation in the international class struggle in different periods instead of following any hard and fast formula," clearly conveyed the extraordinarily dynamic quality of Chinese strategic thinking. Yet the authors' judgments were remarkably unequivocal, and marked the further triumph of Deng Xiaoping's views:

Of the two imperialist superpowers, the Soviet Union is the more ferocious, the more reckless, the more treacherous, and the most dangerous source of world war. . . . All [US imperialism] can do at present is to strive to protect its vested interests and go over to the defensive in its overall strategy. . . . The Soviet Union has decided to employ an offensive strategy to encroach on the sovereignty of all other countries and weaken and supplant U.S. influence in all parts of the world. . . .

The people of China and the people of the rest of

[26] Hua Guofeng, Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Aug. 12, 1977, in *The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China,* Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1977, p. 41.

[27] Ibid., pp. 53–54.

[28] For my views on these issues and their consequences, see Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Implications of Sino-American Normalization," *International Security,* Spring 1979, pp. 37–57; and idem, "Sino-Soviet Relations in Strategic Perspective," in Douglas Stewart and William Tow, Eds., *China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions for the 1980s,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, forthcoming.

[29] According to this theory, the countries of the world are divided into three categories: the United States and the Soviet Union form the first world; Japan, Europe, and Canada, the second world; and the developing countries (including China) the third world.

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the world firmly demand peace and oppose a new world war. Faced with the gigantic task of speeding up our socialist construction . . . we in China urgently need a long period of peace. . . . It is not only the common wish of the people of the world to put off the outbreak of war by stepping up the struggle against hegemonism and spiking the war plans of the Soviet Union and the United States, but it is also practical and possible to do so. World war, though inevitable, can be postponed.[30]

However, conditions no longer allowed for "undiscriminatingly put[ting] the two superpowers on a par and fail[ing] to single out the Soviet Union as the more dangerous instigator of world war." On this basis, all issues had to be subordinated to the larger task of interpreting the "grand design" of Soviet strategy and finding the most appropriate means of defeating it.

At about the same time, Chinese writers began to concede that Soviet actions had implications closer to home than they had previously been willing to admit. Soviet pressure against vulnerable locations in Asia and Africa was interpreted as "striv[ing] to create a situation [to] outflank Europe from the north and the south"; it was asserted that such actions reflected the more realistic opportunities for the expansion of Soviet power.[31] According to the Chinese, less direct but ultimately more compelling means of subjugating the West would focus on the supply lines to Europe, control of which would "put a stranglehold on Western Europe." So construed, Soviet involvement in Angola, Zaire, and the Horn of Africa could still be treated as "peripheral wars" in the larger Soviet-American competition "for hegemony over Europe and the world as a whole."[32]

With the dramatic escalation of Sino-Vietnamese tensions in the spring of 1978, however, Chinese strategists no longer sought to separate their analysis of developments in East Asia from discussions of global strategy. After several months of treating the conflict largely as a localized dispute between Hanoi and Beijing, Chinese analysts in mid-June dramatically altered their orientation. "It is now very clear," the *Renmin Ribao* Commentator declared on June 17, "that the Soviet leadership is the main backer and instigator of the anti-China and anti-Chinese campaign in Vietnam." Soviet motivations, the author further asserted, had to be "seen in the international context":

At present, Moscow is stepping up its strategic dispositions along the arc from Africa through West Asia to Southeast Asia . . . to gain a hold over the Pacific and have an edge on the United States in their contention for hegemony. . . . It is anxiously seeking a base it can count on in Southeast Asia. . . . The Kremlin has spared no efforts to bind independent Vietnam to its chariot for global expansion.[33]

By August 1, the *Hongqi* Commentator saw trends in even more ominous terms. Soviet actions in the re-

[30] This citation is from "Chairman Mao's Theory. . . ," pp. 22–23, 33, and 35.



Forces of the Hanoi-backed United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea enter Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979, after ousting the regime of Pol Pot, which China had backed.

—MTI/SYGMA.

[31] Speech by Foreign Minister Huang Hua to the UN General Assembly, Sept. 29, 1977, in *Peking Review*, Oct. 7, 1977, p. 35.

[32] Zhu Yu, "From Angola to the Horn of Africa," *Hongqi*, April 1978, in *Peking Review*, Apr. 21, 1978, p. 9.

[33] Commentator, "Who Is the Instigator?" *RMRB*, June 17, 1978, in *Peking Review*, June 23, 1978, pp. 24, 26.

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

A photo released by Chinese sources, showing alleged intrusion into Japanese territorial waters by a Soviet "warship . . . in the guise" of a fishing boat (background). In the foreground is a Japanese fishing boat.

—Camera Press.

gion were merely the latest steps in a long-term Soviet effort "to dominate Southeast Asia and Asia," which included "cast[ing] a covetous eye on the military bases in Vietnam." Such designs required that the Soviet Union "viciously malign China to pave the way for its expansion." But Moscow now had considerable help from Vietnam, for the first time identified by Chinese analysts as an exponent of "regional hegemony." All such activity was one component of Moscow's "global strategic plan . . . to outflank and encircle Europe and isolate the United States" by gaining control of various strategic materials, locations, and routes. Moreover, it involved a Soviet effort "to encircle China."[34]

With each successive interpretation of Soviet actions in the Third World, the Chinese buttressed their case for "an overall [Soviet] strategic design . . . to outflank Western Europe." After years of insistence that the Soviet Union was resolutely seeking military superiority in Europe as its primary strategic objective, a very different argument now appeared:

The confrontation of the two blocs in Europe itself makes it difficult for the Kremlin to press on there. That is why it attempts to break through the weak link in the chain of the West's strategy outside Europe and clean up the southern flank for a push towards Europe.[35]

On October 1, the ubiquitous *Hongqi* Commentator offered an extended analysis of the Soviet Union's use of Cuban mercenaries in Africa and of "new agents patterned after Cuba" in Asia. While the article was notable for its exceptional detail, it was far more significant for several of its conclusions:

For the sake of preparing for the new world war, the Soviet Union is presently scrambling around for peripheral areas. It uses every means to scramble for strategic bases, passages, and materials in the areas of the Middle East, Africa, and even in Asia. . . . The intensification of the Soviet expansionist offensive has accelerated the danger of a new world war. The urgent task for people of various countries is to unite with all forces against hegemonism, foil the Soviet offensive, sabotage the Soviet strategic arrangements and strive to postpone the outbreak of a world war. . . . The international united front against hegemonism . . . is consolidating and expanding. The one who is plotting encirclement is now being encircled by the people of the world.[36]

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[34] Commentator, "The Soviet Strategic Intention as Viewed From the Vietnamese Authorities' Anti-China Activities," *Hongqi*, August 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 1, 1978, pp. A/11-15.

[35] "A New Move in the Kremlin's Global Strategy," *Renmin Ribao* Editorial, Sept. 19, 1978, in *Peking Review*, Sept. 29, 1978, p. 13.

[36] Commentator, "The Cuban Mercenary Troops Are a Product of the Policy Adopted by Soviet Social Imperialism," *Hongqi*, October 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 25, 1978, pp. A/4-5.

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Thus, with no particular fanfare, the need to combat the "hegemonism" of the "less dangerous superpower" had been removed from the tasks of the global united front.

At year's end, the *Renmin Ribao* Commentator sought to take stock of the extraordinary changes in the international situation and in PRC strategic views. Rather than viewing Asia as peripheral to Soviet strategic designs, the author argued that developments in the region were now at the forefront of the global struggle. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was not an isolated act; rather, it was "supported and instigated by Soviet social-imperialism" and was thus "an important part of the 'global strategy' employed by Moscow." Victory in Indochina would enable the Soviet Union to complete "an arc of strategic encirclement" across Asia. Such Soviet moves reflected the fact that in Europe, "the two sides are essentially at a stalemate." By this alternative approach, the Soviet Union could

edge the United States out of Asia. It would be disastrous to Southeast Asia and would also put the United States and Japan at a distinct disadvantage in the Pacific and pose a serious menace to Western Europe.

True to past form, however, the article regarded any Soviet effort to encircle China as a decidedly lesser goal:

Its [the USSR's] more important objective is to enlarge its sphere of influence and push out the influence of its arch rival, the United States, from Asia and threaten the peace and security of Japan and other Asian nations. . . . It is short sighted and dangerous to overlook this.[37]

Such reasoning, of course, enabled China to justify its subsequent military actions against Vietnam not as part of a regional settling of scores, but as a necessary and indeed essential requirement of global strategy.[38] But China again sought to depict itself as a bystander, if a very interested bystander, in the global struggle. The Chinese approach to reconciling the two positions—Beijing's obvious activism in the region (military against Vietnam but visibly and even stridently political in all other areas) and its attempt to depict itself as a bystander—becomes clearer from an examination of PRC perspectives on Soviet power in the 1980's.

China's Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping meets with US President Jimmy Carter during Deng's January 1979 visit to the United States.

—James A. Parcell/*The Washington Post.*

Soviet Power in the 1980's

With the onset of the new decade, PRC commentaries and policy pronouncements have dwelt increasingly on the urgent need to "combat and frustrate" the further expansion of Soviet power. Indeed, in early 1980, the *Renmin Ribao* Commentator (echoing earlier remarks by Deng Xiaoping) declared that "opposing hegemonism and defending world peace" would serve as China's paramount policy objective in the 1980's.[39] A fuller understanding of Chinese assessments of Soviet global strategy therefore assumes vital significance in any judgments

[37] Commentator, "The Social Imperialist Strategy in Asia," *RMRB*, Dec. 30, 1978, in *Beijing Review*, Jan. 19, 1979, pp. 13–16.

[38] See, for example, Deng Xiaoping's interview in *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), Mar. 30, 1980; see also Observer, "Crucial Choice," *RMRB*, June 19, 1980, in *Beijing Review*, June 30, 1980, p. 9.

[39] Commentator, "The 1980s—Full of Promise," *RMRB*, Feb. 5, 1980, in *FBIS–CHI*, Feb. 6, 1980, p. L/8.

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about Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade.

Notwithstanding the importance of this question for analyzing PRC policy choices, many of the assumptions underlying Chinese perspectives on Soviet strategy remain insufficiently explicit. For example, selected Chinese writings refer to the "laws governing imperialism" possessing their own "strategic logic"; on the other hand, these discussions recognize that the actual exercise of power by different states is centrally affected by a range of objective and subjective factors. As Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian has noted: "When we say that a new world war is inevitable, we are talking about an objective law and a tendency. We do not mean that a war is imminent." Each superpower, Xu further contends, has "its own weaknesses and difficulties"; hence, in the absence of strength commensurate with its ambitions, any state is likely to be constrained from acting aggressively.[40] Thus, any decision to go to war is centrally affected by the constellation of forces arrayed in opposition to that action.

Despite the ambiguity in Chinese writings, it is nevertheless possible to discern some consistent themes. While the Chinese assert that the Soviet Union seeks "global hegemony," they express a parallel conviction that "the war schemes of the hegemonists can be frustrated." According to the Chinese, the Soviet Union will feel constrained from acting aggressively if it feels that the "forces opposing hegemony" pose too great a challenge. Thus, the seeming pessimism inherent in numerous Chinese assessments can be counterbalanced by more optimistic projections, often within the same document. In late 1978, for example, as Soviet actions (according to most Chinese assessments) were assuming a much more threatening form, the *Hongqi* Commentator expressed confidence that the struggle against the USSR was "reaching an unprecedented level. Soviet social imperialism is being placed in an increasingly isolated position." The USSR, rather than marching inexorably toward global conquest, found itself increasingly beseiged and beleaguered on numerous fronts. Under such circumstances, the author concluded, the prospects for "delay[ing] the outbreak of a world war and safeguard[ing] world peace" could only improve, with consequent advantages to China's need for a peaceful international environment within which to modernize successfully.[41]

At various times, to be sure, discrepant interpretations have appeared in the Chinese press—which suggests that uncertainty or debate continues within the Chinese leadership. In November 1979, for example, the *Hongqi* Commentator argued in a major article that the international situation had "become more tense, with factors involving the danger of war increasing." Concerns that the USSR would reach the zenith of its military power in the early 1980's promised to make those years especially critical ones. At the same time, the author maintained, the "forces opposing war" were also "on the increase," thereby creating the possibility of "deferring the oubreak of war and gaining a longer period of peace." As he further argued:

The possibility of putting off the outbreak of war still lies in the weakness of the hegemonists . . . who still do not have an ability equal to their ambition. . . . The Soviet hegemonists are very ambitious and attempt to dominate the world, but they are plagued by economic ills and their development is very slow. . . . In short, their strategic deployments for starting a war have not been completed and difficulties are increasing.[42]

On such a basis, Commentator concluded, one might even look forward to normal state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union.[43]

A month later, however, the same author spoke far more harshly about Soviet behavior, asserting that tactical ploys by Moscow in the name of "anti-hegemonism" were confusing the world's people. Referring further to the "set principles and policies of the ruling clique of the Soviet Union" (language not found in the earlier *Hongqi* analysis), the author was consistently negative on the prospects for altering Soviet behavior:

This clique has gone wild for a long time and has been going swiftly down the road of hegemonism. It is . . . impossible to suddenly grind to a halt or make any abrupt about face.[44]

The most telling indication of possible differences in Chinese views has been the varied assessments of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its strategic consequences. Since the first indications of a possible inva-

[40] Xu Xiangqian, "Heighten Our Vigilance and Get Prepared to Fight a War," *Hongqi*, August 1978, in *Peking Review*, Aug. 11, 1978, pp. 7-8.

[41] Commentator, "The Plotter of a Siege Is Being Besieged," *Hongqi*, November 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 29, 1978, pp. A/9-13.

[42] Commentator, "The Current Danger of War and the Defense of World Peace," *Hongqi*, November 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 27, 1979, pp. A/1-7.

[43] Ibid., p. A/7.

[44] Commentator, "On the Soviet Hegemonists' 'Anti-hegemonism,'" *Hongqi*, December 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 14, 1979, pp. C/1-4.

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sion, some Chinese analysts have interpreted Soviet threats and actions as a component of a larger strategic design to acquire warm-water ports on the Indian Ocean and gain control of Persian Gulf oil. Other authors, however, have depicted Soviet moves as a sign of weakness, bankruptcy, and desperation. While the Vietnam analogy is in critical respects inappropriate and overly facile, certain Chinese analysts from the first raised precisely this parallel. The initial *Renmin Ribao* editorial reaction to the invasion, for instance, asserted:

The turbulent situation in Afghanistan has compelled Moscow to effect a "military takeover" in a bid to put the country under its direct control. Consequently, Moscow has landed itself inextricably in a quagmire, just as the United States did in Vietnam years ago.[45]

Such divergent strains in interpretation were a recurring element in Chinese assessments of the Soviet invasion throughout 1980.[46] At year's end, the two principal views were amply reflected in a major *Renmin Ribao* commentary published under the seldom employed, but highly authoritative, by-line "Observer." According to the author, the invasion had revealed "the wild and dangerous nature of Soviet hegemonism," with Moscow having every intention of permanently occupying Afghanistan and then attacking Pakistan and Iran. In an oblique criticism of West European views, Observer asserted that Soviet actions should not be seen "as a local and individual move to consolidate the control of Afghanistan":

Volumes of facts prove that the Soviet Union's ultimate aim is certainly not the long-term domination and occupation of Afghanistan; the Soviet Union wants to turn strategically important Afghanistan into the forward base for its southward advance to the Indian Ocean.

Yet, in further assessing Soviet actions, Observer also offered directly contradictory judgments:

The development of the Afghan situation has also revealed the weakness of the Soviet Union . . . it has been unable to stamp out the Afghan people's resistance, while itself suffering over 10,000 casualties. Today, the Soviet army can only control the cities, military bases, and key lines of communication. . . . The heroic resistance and victories of the Afghan people have exploded the myth of the invincibility of Soviet hegemonism. This proves that the Soviet Union, though a colossus armed to the teeth, can be defeated. . . so long as they [the victims of aggression] dare to fight. . . to the end.

By this logic, therefore, Observer saw a genuine prospect for containing Soviet expansion and upsetting its "global dispositions." Such steadfast resistance was "the sole correct way to preserve world peace and delay and eventually avert world war."[47]

To be sure, some of these divergent views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. No matter how one interprets them, however, the prevailing Chinese strategy is based on all states' being patient and unyielding on matters which should permit no compromise. Thus, according to the Chinese, any attempts at legitimizing the presence of Soviet-backed forces either in Kampuchea or Afghanistan must be resisted. In mid-June, the *Renmin Ribao* Observer had conveyed these arguments in exceptionally explicit terms:

Waging resolute struggle means that the Soviet Union's moves for global strategy to dominate the world will meet with resistance and be frustrated. All peace-loving countries in the world should unite and wage a tit-for-tat struggle against the Soviet and Vietnamese aggressors. . . . In this way. . . the Soviet Union and Vietnam would inevitably be burdened by an ever increasing drain on their manpower and material and financial resources and be bogged down in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. This will make it possible to upset or even disrupt the global strategic plan of the Soviet Union, to delay and check the process of Soviet war deployment and to put off the outbreak of war while gaining precious time for the peace-loving countries and peoples.[48]

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[45] "New Soviet Move to Escalate Expansion," *RMRB*, Dec. 31, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 2, 1980, p. C/3.

[46] For examples, see Observer, "An Alarm Has Been Sounded," *RMRB*, Jan. 15, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 16, 1980, pp. C/1-3; Sima Da, "'Limited' and 'Unlimited,'" *RMRB*, Apr. 12, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 25, 1980, pp. C/3-4; Commentator, "The Aim Remains Unchanged Despite All Apparent Changes," *RMRB*, June 25, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 26, 1980, pp. C/1-2; and Sima Da, "The Afghan Trap," *RMRB*, Aug. 9, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 11, 1980, pp. C/2-3.

[47] All the above quotes are drawn from Observer, "What the First Anniversary of the Afghan Incident Explains," *RMRB*, Dec. 26, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 29, 1980, pp. C/1-2. The following day, a second Observer article drew comparable conclusions about events in Indochina: "It Is Necessary to View the Kampuchea Issue in Light of the Overall Strategic Situation—Commenting on the Second Anniversary of the Kampuchean Incident," *RMRB*, Dec. 27, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 29, 1980, pp. E/1-3.

[48] Observer, "Crucial Choice," *RMRB*, June 19, 1980, in *Beijing Review*, June 30, 1980, pp. 8-9.

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Thus, the long-term PRC approach to the Soviet challenge seems closely akin to what B.H. Liddell Hart termed the "conservative approach" to grand strategy—to convince one's adversary that ultimately "the game is not worth the candle."[49] Chinese insistence on "frustrating the war schemes of the hegemonists" does not presuppose a frontal military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Rather, the far-flung efforts of Soviet power in various regions of instability provide ample opportunities for states in a given region to make life difficult for Moscow or its surrogate forces. Underlying Chinese assessments of global strategy, therefore, is an irreducible element of optimism: the capabilities of a "hegemonic power" can never equal its presumed ambitions.

The implications of such views for China's own security are only too obvious. By mobilizing disparate regional forces to combat and frustrate Soviet power, the PRC fosters the creation of an informal security coalition whose aggregate capabilities pose a major challenge to the untrammeled exercise of Soviet power. Preoccupying the Soviet Union on as many fronts as is possible shields China from undue political or military pressure. Not surprisingly, the imbalance of forces along the Sino-Soviet border—considered by many the central anxiety of Chinese security planning—is rarely if ever mentioned in PRC strategic assessments. Unlike Afghanistan or Indochina, the border is portrayed as a peripheral (or at least relatively stable and hence predictable) factor in overall Soviet strategy. Thus, obvious advantages accrue to China by depicting the USSR as a far more active and greater threat to other states and on other fronts. Such a situation gains China time and enables it to assume a more detached, if hardly disinterested, posture in the overall strategic competition, with consequent advantages for the long-term strengthening of China's economic power.

The coalescence of an anti-Soviet security coalition has been highly encouraging to the PRC. Indeed, in late November 1980, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang came closer to declaring the noninevitability of world war than had any Chinese decision-maker since Zhou Enlai at the 10th Party Congress:

It is our view that if only all peace-loving countries and peoples unite and take firm steps to curb the hegemonists' aggression and expansion, it is possible to postpone or even prevent the outbreak of a great war.[50]

Eight days later, Foreign Minister Huang Hua further elaborated on Hu's remarks:

We should make a sober estimate of the Soviet Union's military capability and adventurism. Likewise, we should see its weaknesses and difficulties. The Soviet Union's southward thrust can be frustrated and war can be postponed or prevented.[51]

This long-term optimism (of an admittedly still guarded sort) reflects a carefully considered view of Soviet strategy which neither overstates Moscow's capacities nor understates its long-term staying power. Such thinking is increasingly evident in Chinese writings. It was most apparent in a remarkably comprehensive assessment of Soviet military power and strategy published in *Renmin Ribao* in January 1980.[52] While the author revealed in painstaking analytical and descriptive detail the present state of Chinese knowledge on the USSR's prodigious military effort, he also recognized the considerable (and potentially growing) constraints on the use of force by the Soviet Union. The existence of multiple and widely dispersed fronts, declining economic growth, and tensions between nationalities, when combined with the "daily growing resistance" among various "anti-hegemonic" forces, he declared, had placed the USSR "in a more disadvantageous position." Thus, the prospects for frustrating Soviet strategy seemed promising, if not altogether certain.

Indeed, a test case for determining the validity of these precepts already exists, for events in Poland since the summer of 1980 have raised the obvious possibility of Soviet intervention there. And the prevailing Chinese attitude regarding Soviet hegemonic practices would seemingly apply with greatest force to developments in Eastern Europe.

Throughout the summer and fall of 1980, Chinese interpretations of developments in Poland were decidedly low-key and equivocal. In early September, a Xinhua dispatch posed the issues for the Soviet Union in remarkably frank terms:

The Soviet Union. . . took a very cautious attitude at the beginning, imposing a news blackout on the strikes and keeping quiet for over 50 days. It voiced intimidating warnings only after the situation. . . continued to spread and. . . there appeared the possible

[49] B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1954, Chap. XXII.

[50] Hu made this statement at the conclusion of the visit of Spanish Communist Party Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo. Xinhua, Nov. 25, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 26, 1980, p. G/2.

[51] Huang made these remarks in a conversation with Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito. Xinhua, Dec. 3, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 4, 1980, p. D/1.

[52] "The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union. . . ," pp. C/1-6.

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danger of the Polish situation "going out of bounds." This precisely reflected the embarrassment facing the Soviet Union. At the moment it has not yet freed itself from the international difficulty in which it had landed itself after Afghanistan and could not afford another stormy international reaction such as occurred after the "Czechoslovakia invasion". . . . Judging from Moscow's past behavior, it could have made another adventurous move at this critical moment, yet it had to be very cautious before making such a move.[53]

An article in *Renmin Ribao* in November observed that Soviet views of the evolving situation are "causing concern in world public opinion." Various Soviet troop movements and Soviet references to "anti-socialist elements" were also noted. But the conclusion was appropriately inconclusive: "People cannot help but keep close watch on this."[54]

With the subsequent escalation of tensions in Poland, however, Chinese commentaries adopted a harsher and more worried tone. On December 6, for example, a Xinhua commentator warned that "the shadow of outside armed intervention looms large." Noting "the habitual practice of the Soviet hegemonists to resort to the threat of arms or naked military intervention at times when developments. . . run counter to the will of the Kremlin," the author argued that as a sovereign state, Poland had the right to determine its own affairs. While implicitly conceding that the Polish trade union movement diminished the dominance and authority of the Communist party, the article's key judgments still concerned the international context and consequences of a possible Soviet intervention:

Warsaw in 1980 is not Prague in 1968. The Polish people have the right to decide their own destiny, the firm will to preserve their national interests, and the ability to settle their problems by themselves.[55]

Moreover, Soviet decisions with regard to Poland have potentially very significant implications in the context of overall Chinese strategic debate. In contrast with the previous article, an additional Chinese commentary posed the issue of a Soviet intervention in terms of the increasing demands on Soviet capabilities along multiple fronts. Although granting that Moscow was "preparing pretexts for eventual intervention," the author noted that:

Of course, the Soviets are not without difficulty when it comes to mounting an invasion of Poland. The Afghanistan burden is heavy enough as it is. They would be compelled to think twice before they undertake another and even more staggering burden. . . . Then there is the overwhelming universal condemnation which Moscow must consider if it has not lost all reason.[56]

By mid-December, the *Hongqi* Commentator discussed the Polish situation far more explicitly in terms of Soviet global strategy. While again alluding to events in Poland as "an internal affair," the author reminded the journal's readers that the Soviet Union had increasingly assumed "the role of international gendarme on the world political stage." Commentator then drew specific parallels to earlier American behavior. The United States, he asserted, had ultimately landed itself in

an extremely isolated and pathetic situation. . . resulting in great damage to its national power. This has led some people to think that today America is no longer a superpower and that it is only a big power.

If the Soviet hegemonists want to be the new international gendarme, their fate will be even worse than the Americans. . . [*since*] *America relied* [*also*] *on dollars, aside from military strength, to play its role. . . . At present the Soviet Union has overstretched itself in its external expansion. It is now overburdened and has sunk into quagmires in several places. If it still engages in brutal intervention against the Polish people. . . the result will be even worse for the Soviet Union.*[57]

Thus, Soviet decision-making vis-à-vis Poland possesses immediate relevance to the present framework of assumptions governing Chinese foreign policy. To be sure, the "either/or" quality of Chinese assessment will enable PRC analysts to interpret Soviet action (or inaction) within the confines of the PRC's existing approach to global strategy. Yet the contradictory themes also suggest division and uncertainty within the PRC on the efficacy of current Chinese efforts to form a

[53] Xinhua, Sept. 4, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 10, 1980, p. H/1.

[54] Fang Xuen, "Eye Catching Situation in Poland," *RMRB*, Nov. 12, 1980, p. H/2.

[55] "Be on Guard Against Possible Soviet Armed Intervention in Poland," Xinhua commentary, Dec. 6, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 9, 1980, p. H/2.

[56] "The Rumor That Sounds the Alarm," Xinhua commentary, Dec. 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 11, 1980, pp. C/1-2.

[57] All the above quotes are drawn from Commentator, "Angry Roar Coming From Poland's Eastern Neighbor," *Hongqi*, Dec. 16, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 29, 1980, pp. C/3-4.

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global "anti-hegemony united front." Thus, should the USSR ultimately intervene in Poland, it would confirm the beliefs and policy preferences of those Chinese who deem Soviet hegemonic ambitions as unlimited and insatiable, despite Moscow's increasing military burdens and diplomatic isolation. Should Moscow exercise restraint over the longer run, however, those leaders who view the Soviet Union as an increasingly beleaguered if not enfeebled power could well draw conclusions compelling a degree of reassessment in PRC policy options toward Moscow.

As the above quotations reveal, however, there is nothing deterministic in Chinese strategic assessment. Chinese views of the Soviet challenge, as always, remain subject to revision in light of events which PRC decision-makers cannot accurately foresee, let alone control. Thus, Chinese strategic writings are best understood as a set of questions rather than a set of answers. Such indeterminacy, however, in no way diminishes their value as a revealing and accessible indicator of PRC policy debate in the 1980's.

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Books

The Military Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy

By Max Beloff

CHRISTOPH BERTRAM, Ed. *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980's*. Hamden, CT, Shoestring Press, 1980.

ROBERT CONQUEST. *Present Danger: Towards a Foreign Policy*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

PEER H. LANGE. *Zur Aufwertung der Aussenpolitischen Rolle der Sowjetischen Militärmacht* (Toward an Assessment of the Foreign Policy Role of Soviet Military Power). Ebenhausen bei München, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Forschungsinstitut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 1977.

JOHN ERICKSON and E.J. FEUCHTWANGER, Eds. *Soviet Military Power and Performance*. Hamden, CT, Shoestring Press, 1979.

IN DEALING with the fast-moving world scene in relation to Soviet activities, one is up against the difficulty that while there are constant principles underlying Soviet action, the opportunities (or if one prefers it, the necessities) that provoke action cannot be forecast with any accuracy. The books under review here were published between 1977 and 1980, but even the most recent, *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980's*, actually consists of papers delivered originally at an International Institute of Strategic Studies conference held in September 1978. In none of them, therefore, could the lessons of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan be discussed. Similarly, by the time this essay sees the light of day, we may be facing further Soviet involvement in Southwest Asia as a result of the "Gulf war" between Iraq and Iran or, alternatively (or additionally), Soviet military intervention to curb any further concessions to popular demands in Poland.

In this respect, of course, the Soviet Union resembles any other power with sufficient strength to be capable of making choices as and when they become necessary. At the most, the student of Soviet affairs is working within a set of probabilities. The task is in a sense made easier by the fact that Soviet official doctrine is usually spelled out and can be assumed to influence action all down the line; one is not confronted with the often chaotic voicing of contradictory assessments such as one gets from a pluralist democracy. On the other hand, it is made difficult by the absence of precise information about the inner decision-making processes of the Soviet Union and the pressures and personalities involved. This is not to say that one knows nothing about them. David Holloway's essay in *Prospects of Soviet Power* shows what one can discover concerning them. Yet the authors of all the books under review were aware that the inner Soviet leadership is aging and that it is essential to try to peer into a post-Brezhnev world. By the time this essay appears in print, however, the succession crisis in the Soviet Union may have begun or may even have been resolved.

What can be said with confidence is that the structure of Soviet society and the elaboration of Soviet ideology and of the Soviet "style" in politics have after more than 60 years come to be firmly established and fully capable of analysis. As in all other societies, the use of force and the occasions of recourse to force reflect Soviet society's conception of itself and the assessment of its rulers as to how its belief system is to be defended and extended. What is disquieting is that such analysis is so often dismissed by Western political leaders who make light of it when some alternative and more agree-

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able view commends itself. Both in the United States and Britain and now increasingly in continental Europe as well—*Prospects of Soviet Power* includes contributions from French and German as well as British and American scholars—there is an abundance of serious scholarly work being done to explain the Soviet phenomenon and not least its military aspects; such work, however, seems to play but a small part in the molding of the political mind of the West. What was excusable in the 1940's, when I did some work in a field in which there were few competitors, is now wholly unwarranted.

THE FACTS are not obscure, and no particular effort is made by Soviet leaders to conceal them. One may suspect that Soviet statistics underplay the true burden of the Soviet military effort, yet even on their own showing it is formidable enough. All the books under review, for example, rely heavily upon Soviet statistics, Soviet economic and military publications, and the public statements of Soviet leaders. It would appear to be the Soviet leadership's calculation—and it may be correct—that so great is the fear of modern weapons that peoples will prefer to surrender their political independence rather than face the implications of trying to preserve a balance.

I suspect that some apprehension in this regard explains the hortatory aspect of Robert Conquest's book. It was originally written for a British public, and it is in Britain today that neglect of evidence about the threat posed by Soviet military strength has been most visible. Not, I hasten to add, where the present government is concerned. At the 1980 conference of the Conservative Party, the nature of the threat was the underlying theme of Francis Pym, then the Secretary of State for Defense, in his presentation of the case for a greater British defense effort. But a week before that, at the parallel Labour Party conference, we witnessed a commitment to Britain's unilateral nuclear disarmament and to a rejection of policies based on nuclear deterrence. If carried into effect, this commitment would render Britain's membership in NATO meaningless, for unilateral nuclear disarmament makes sense only if one accepts its supporters' contention that Soviet weapons and weapons development are irrelevant because the Soviet Union is inherently peaceful.

Britain is not, of course, unique in Europe in its exposure to arguments and pressures seeking to drive it toward neutrality in the global struggle. The modernization of NATO's theater nuclear weapons has met with political resistance in the Netherlands, in Belgium, and in Denmark—none of them, be it noted, countries in which Communist parties as such play a major role. It remains to be seen how the strengthening of the left wing of the German Social Democrats in the election of October 1980 will affect the ability of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to maintain a balanced *Ostpolitik*.

The conversion of the British Labour Party to unilateral nuclear disarmament and the resistance in other West European countries to upgrading NATO weapons represent significant victories for what Peer Lange in his brief paper published as long ago as April 1977 saw as one of the three main objectives of Soviet military-political endeavor—the dissolution of Western Europe's alliance system and, ultimately, the neutralization of Western Europe. The other two are, of course, the establishment of a favorable power relationship with the United States, and the exploitation of the economic and social problems of the Third World to secure an increasing Soviet presence and the possibility of denying to the Western industrial nations the supplies they need for the working of their own economies.

Reviewers in This Issue

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What makes exploitation of the fear of modern weapons so easy from the Soviet point of view is that the Soviets can assume that many people in the West and in the Third World will take the line that there is a symmetry in these matters—that the "peace-loving" Soviet people will themselves share the determination to avoid war and particularly the horrors of nuclear war, that there must be a similarity of argument, and that therefore there is nothing to prevent the West from "giving a lead" in the field of disarmament in the certainty that the moral example thus set will be followed. John Erickson's own chapter in *Soviet Military Power and Performance* is just one example of how a study of the Soviet military scene can show the irrelevance of such an approach in the face of the realities of Soviet power. Regarding nuclear war as "unthinkable," the West has placed its hopes on the notion of mutual deterrence, as formulated in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. But as Professor Erickson demonstrates, such a doctrine has never been accepted by the Soviet leadership. While it is true that there is no attempt nowadays to pretend that nuclear weapons have made no difference to the power struggle, Soviet armaments and Soviet military doctrine see a continuous range of weapons, nuclear and conventional, as being at once deterrent in their effects and guarantees of victory if armed combat comes about after all. Soviet military doctrine and training are based on war-winning, not war-avoiding, concepts. Avoiding war—and from the Soviet perspective there are good reasons for caution—is a matter for the diplomats.

WHAT THE STUDENT has to account for is the way in which a regime whose ideological justification was originally utilitarian—a better means of producing material goods and a fairer distribution of their benefits—has become one whose most remarkable feature is the extent to which it subordinates everything to military production and military preparedness. Of course, there have been other empires in the past which gave up most of their substance to providing themselves with great military strength. But in the Soviet case, this huge military effort has to be in terms of the most modern technology. It is not just a question of recruiting individual fighting men or providing their basic supplies. A constant exertion has to be made to keep up with scientific and technological development. And whatever shortcuts espionage and treachery might have offered in the early days of the "bomb," no one can now doubt that the Soviet effort is self-sustaining or that the Soviet educational system is able to produce the large numbers of scientists and engineers needed to achieve both the intellectual breakthroughs and their development into a proliferation of military hardware. And so one comes to the extraordinary paradox that while the consumer goods taken for granted in the West are perpetually in short supply in the Soviet Union, the far more sophisticated goods that make up a modern army's weaponry can be produced in abundance.

We therefore need to understand both the reasons and the consequences of this state of affairs. The reasons are three. The one of which some Western observers make the most is national defense. Russia has historically faced invasions from outside, and the early history of the Soviet regime reinforced its leaders' sense of insecurity. Yet today—except perhaps in relation to China in the very long run—this element is the least important. The idea that the Europeans of today or the North Americans could throw up another Napoleon or another Hitler is patently absurd. Much more serious is the regime's view of the inevitable struggle for the future of mankind between forces pursuing a Communist destiny and those attempting to thwart it. Seeing this struggle as ineluctable and as being decided ultimately by the balance of forces—economic and military—the Soviet leadership cannot surrender the right to pursue it without sacrificing their own legitimacy. And this necessity has in turn led the Soviet leaders, in the face of an apparent stalemate in Europe and on their eastern borders, to embark upon what has been the major military development of the last two decades—the creation of a capacity to project their power anywhere in the world. Finally, the Soviet Union's success in expanding its area of ideological control has created a demand for military force in order to keep satellite governments in power. Eastern Europe has required a very important commitment of conventional forces. Afghanistan has shown that similar intervention to preserve a favored regime in a Third World country may entail another heavy commitment of the same kind, but one involving actual fighting and loss of life and equipment.

The consequences of this heavy military burden are equally striking. A country with little spare manpower and with low productivity can keep up such a rate of military expenditure only at the expense of civilian consumption. And this means a continual postponement of the day when the Soviet consumer can be rewarded for his abstinence. Whatever the degree of control a government so totally in

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command of the means of communication and the instruments of repression can enforce upon its subjects, there must always be some severe tensions in a society which can see the degree to which civilian demands are subordinated to military ones. Even a modicum of liberalization thus becomes unthinkable.

Furthermore, since the Soviet government disposes, through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), of the material resources of the satellite regimes (or does its best to), similar problems arise for these regimes. So that while the satellites' own military expenditures are relatively modest—the Soviets cannot fully trust any East European army—their peoples contribute indirectly to the Soviet Union's own armed might. And this in turn aggravates the economic difficulties inherent in an economic setup which cannot be changed to any marked degree lest the change weaken the hold of the satellite Communist parties and so of their Soviet mentors. The East European glacis is thus itself a source of weakness, but one which cannot be liquidated because to do so would be to admit that the very foundation of the ideology, the necessity of the ultimate victory of communism, is unsound. The same obstacle prevents the abandonment of the Afghanistan adventure, in an area of much less importance to the Soviet Union, in favor of a neutralized, nonaligned Afghanistan, which might suit the Soviet Union's material interests just as well.

Another weakness in the Soviet position is the possible effect of the differential birthrate as between the Russian and non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union upon the armed forces themselves. One of the most illuminating chapters in *Soviet Military Power and Performance* is Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's "The Soviet Army as an Instrument of National Integration." The Soviet military system, with its large-scale use of conscription, is one of the means by which individuals from other Soviet nationalities can be Russified. There is no attempt to use any language but Russian as the language of command, the military districts of the Soviet Union take no account of republic boundaries in this allegedly federal system, and the Russians retain as in other areas of public life a high proportion of all leading positions. Yet it is suggested on the basis of what evidence is available that while Russification may work in respect of recruits from the smaller nationalities with no political aspirations of their own, recruits from the large groups seem unaffected in their national outlook. If, under pressure of the manpower shortage, more and more Central Asians and other non-Russians have to be not only recruited but also promoted to key positions, then the internal nationalities problem of the Soviet empire may become an even more sensitive point in the whole system.

IT IS CLEARLY HARD to avoid feeling that further gains by the Soviet Union, if not in territory then at least in influence, are likely while, as one anticipates, the overall balance moves in the direction of the Soviets in the early 1980's, in consonance with the advantages they enjoy because of their command, within their own borders, of most indispensable resources. On the other hand, the Soviet military system if tested in action may reveal weaknesses due to the exaggerated demands for centralization of decision-making and the distrust of initiative that seem to characterize the Soviet military style. But even this point should not be pressed too far. As John Helmsley remarks in his chapter on Soviet ground forces in *Soviet Military Power and Performance:*

it is possible that what we in the West think of as a weakness may to the Soviets be a strength. It is at least arguable that somewhat inflexible tactics and a rigid doctrinal approach may be a sensible system to adopt for an army based on conscription and with a low standard of junior leadership but possessing a vast numerical superiority in men and equipment.

From this superiority, the Soviet leaders will try to obtain what political and economic advantages they can. The interpenetration of civil and military elements in the leadership signalized by Brezhnev's adoption of military titles renders outdated the fears (or hopes) of those who saw the Communist regime giving way to some kind of Bonapartism. The Soviet military have their own outlook and their own demands, as do military establishments of other countries, but there is nothing to suggest that they are not getting what they require. As the West haggles over defense spending, the Soviet Union goes on giving military preparedness the first priority.

In almost every part of the world, the fact of Soviet military power is having its effect. Even though in many areas Soviet interests might best be served by peace, a military imbalance on this scale must be a constant source of concern.

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The Soviet Political System Since Stalin

By Rolf H.W. Theen

DAVID LANE. *Politics and Society in the USSR,* 2nd ed. New York, NY, New York University Press, 1978.

DONALD D. BARRY and CAROL BARNER-BARRY. *Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Introduction.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1978.

KARL W. RYAVEC, Ed. *Soviet Society and the Communist Party.* Amherst, MA, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978.

BORIS MEISSNER et al., Eds. *Einparteisystem und bürokratische Herrschaft in der Sowjetunion* (One-party System and Bureaucratic Rule in the Soviet Union), Köln, Markus Verlag, [1978].

ONE OF the important underlying questions lingering in Western scholarship on the Soviet Union in recent years has been the proper characterization or conceptualization of the Soviet political system in the post-Stalin period. More specifically, the issue has been whether, or to what extent, the concept or "model" of totalitarianism is still applicable to that system and useful as an analytical tool for its study.[1]

Scholarly opinion on the subject has ranged from defense of the concept (albeit in modified form)[2] to rejection of it as totally useless.[3] Some analysts, employing such terms as "change" or "adaptation," have concerned themselves with the deviation of the present-day Soviet system from the classic totalitarian syndrome of the Stalin period. There has been at least one promising attempt to deal with the Soviet variety of totalitarianism under Iosif Stalin in terms of a broader classification of movement-regimes.[4] Other analysts, especially Anglo-American writers, have sought to avoid the concept altogether. They have conceptualized the Soviet polity variously as a "directed," "command," "mono-organizational," or "administered" society, as a "bureaucracy writ large," an "oligarchy," a "participatory bureaucracy," a form of "consultative authoritarianism," or "institutional pluralism."[5] Not content with the application of the conflict model and the use of the interest-group approach, they have sought to use analytical frameworks ranging from modern elite theory to communication, information, and organization theory. Most recently, one writer has even explored the utility of coalition theory for the study of Soviet politics.[6]

Important and useful as the new theoretical constructs have been in illuminating significant changes in Soviet society since the death of Stalin and in serving as correctives to the totalitarian paradigm, none has thus far succeeded in gaining general recognition and acceptance among scholars. Were Daniel Bell to write his famous essay

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[1] The classic formulation of the concept is Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1956, especially pp. 9 ff.

[2] See, for example, Carl J. Friedrich, "The Evolving Theory and Practice of *Totalitarian Regimes,*" in Carl J. Friedrich et al., *Totalitarianism in Perspective,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1969, pp. 123–64.

[3] Benjamin R. Barber, "Conceptual Foundations of Totalitarianism," in ibid., pp. 3–52.

[4] Robert C. Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI), June 1961, pp. 281 ff.

[5] See, inter alia, Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1964, pp. 558–75; T.H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market and Organizational Societies and the USSR," ibid., pp. 539–57; Alfred Meyer, *The Soviet Political System,* New York, NY, Random House, 1965; Darrel P. Hammer, *USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy,* Hinsdale, IL, The Dryden Press, 1974; Robert V. Daniels, "Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," in J.W. Strong, Ed., *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin,* New York, NY, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971, pp. 277 ff.; and Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1972, pp. 25–45.

[6] Dennis Ross, "Coalition Maintenance in the Soviet Union," *World Politics,* January 1980, pp. 258–80.

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today,[7] it would have to be much longer and cover many more approaches—even if he were to limit its scope to political science alone!

Apart from the natural cantankerousness of political scientists, one of the reasons for this is, no doubt, the fact that all of the new approaches fall short in reflecting the reality and complexity of Soviet politics and in capturing the salient features of the Soviet political system. With few exceptions, they focus on time-specific qualities or subsystem properties of the Soviet polity that are all too quickly elevated into systemic characteristics by the analyst. Furthermore, few of the new theoretical constructs meet the requirements of a general classification of political systems or, at the minimum, of a classification of dictatorships.

In a way, the volumes under review illustrate the range of perceptions found in Western scholarship on the Soviet Union—both at the level of the introductory textbook and at the level of the essay by and for specialists. Thus, in his summary of the "salient features of the Soviet power structure and political process," about midway through his well-nigh encyclopedic study, David Lane maintains that "the USSR is far from being a stereotyped form of totalitarianism with a dictatorial ruling elite." While the *structures* differ in liberal-democratic societies and in the Soviet state, Lane argues, "the political *process* is essentially similar in all modern industrialized states" (p. 257). The Barrys, in contrast, conclude that "in our opinion, the totalitarian concept still offers the best framework for the beginning student to understand the Soviet system." In their view, the six features of totalitarian regimes proposed by Carl Friedrich in 1969 "are in considerable degree to be found within the contemporary Soviet system" and, in spite of the changes that have taken place since the death of Stalin, "remain prominent characteristics of the Soviet system" (p. 314).

One finds a similar range of perceptions of the Soviet system in the essays of various specialists published in the collections edited by Karl Ryavec and Boris Meissner et al. Taking issue with the concept of totalitarianism and past attempts to replace it with new theoretical constructs, George Breslauer, in the former volume, proposes the concept of "welfare state authoritarianism" to characterize the Brezhnev regime—thus adding yet another conceptualization to the plethora of would-be substitutes for totalitarianism (Ryavec, pp. 3 ff.). As a group, the essays in this book endeavor to provide "new perspectives on Soviet society" and "to take issue with the traditional view that the amount of adaptation and change on the part of the Party has been negligible." In the words of the editor, the study "seeks to add a new dimension by viewing the CPSU as dependent upon (or, more exactly, structurally responsive to) societal forces" (Ryavec, p. x). By contrast, with the notable exception of the thought-provoking essay by Richard Löwenthal, the contributions to the collection edited by Meissner et al. raise serious questions about whether sufficient change has taken place in the Soviet political system in the post-Stalin period to justify the wholesale scrapping of the totalitarian model. In explaining the exceptional position of the ruling bureaucracy, Meissner, for example, stresses the "complete dependence of the social structure on the power structure of the one-party system" (Meissner et al., p. 96)—a perspective persuasively argued as well by B. Lewytzkyj and G. Jósza in their contributions, dealing with "The Guidance Mechanism of the Soviet Bureaucratic System of Rule" and "The Ruling Function of the Party Apparatus of the CPSU" respectively. Georg Brunner, another contributor to and a coeditor of the volume, does not address himself to the subject of totalitarianism in his essay on "The Sociological Structure of the Political Elite," but elsewhere he has expressed the view that "the monistic power structure, the total scope of political power, and the total exercise of political power have remained the constant limiting conditions of any change," that "the Soviet Union was and is a totalitarian dictatorship."[8]

MUCH OF the controversy over the totalitarian concept arises from differing perceptions of the ruling body in the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Approximately a decade ago, Jerry Hough explicitly challenged the image of a relatively homogeneous CPSU apparatus then prevailing in Western scholarship. He developed a line of argument which stressed "the divisions within the party apparatus," and explored the "many sources of cleavage, which moreover are reflected in political behavior."[9] In subsequent studies,

[7] Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences," in Alexander Dallin, Ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1960, pp. 1-36; originally published in *World Politics*, April 1958.

[8] Georg Brunner, *Politische Soziologie der UdSSR* (Political Sociology of the USSR), Wiesbaden, Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1971, Part I, p. 193.

[9] See, for instance, Jerry F. Hough, "The Party Apparatchiki," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffith, Eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 87, 50.

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Hough sketched a picture of a party apparatus characterized by an increasing lack of cohesion and interest identity, an apparatus no longer exercising all the prerogatives of a ruling party but instead serving as a kind of broker or arbiter among different and competing interest groups—a party apparatus, in short, falling considerably short of the monopolistic state party that is a hallmark of totalitarian regimes. A similar perspective is developed by David Lane:

Unlike the view taken by many contemporary writers the CPSU here is not regarded as a "ruling party." Such writers exaggerate the party's power: they tend to ignore or minimize the real powers of social forces and institutions outside it; they too readily accept Soviet and "totalitarian" ideological beliefs.

What evidence is there that the CPSU apparatus—once it was restored to its former position of political preeminence by Nikita Khrushchev, who thus undid one important aspect of Stalin's "victory over the party"—has become increasingly fragmented and factionalized during the 1960's and 1970's, that it has ceased to function as a "ruling group" in Soviet society?

It would seem, first of all, that those who perceive a weakening in the ruling function of the CPSU have significantly underestimated the numerical strength of the CPSU apparatus. Hough's estimate of 100,000–125,000 in the early 1970's appears unrealistically low.[10] If we assume that the proportion of full-time party officials to rank-and-file members implicit in Stalin's calculation of "the leading forces of our party" in 1937[11] has not substantially changed, we arrive at a figure of 457,143, based on a general CPSU membership figure of 16 million. Even if we assume the lower ratio given by V.M. Molotov in 1925 (i.e., 1 full-time party official for every 40 members), we arrive at a figure of 400,000—i.e., nearly four times the estimate given by Hough. In actuality, the growth of the party apparatus has, if anything, probably outpaced the growth of party membership. At least the frequent CPSU decrees in the 1950's and 1960's calling for a substantial reduction in the size of the party apparatus would seem to indicate a genuine concern among top party leaders about an excessive growth of full-time party officials as a component of the party structure and the Soviet system. Thus, it would appear that Józsa's estimate of "at least half a million party functionaries" in the existing control organs of the party is much more realistic (Meissner et al., p. 180). According to recently published Soviet data, CPSU members serving in leadership positions at the district (*rayon*), city (*gorod*), national area (*okrug*), regional (*oblast*), territorial (*kray*), and union republic levels, as well as in central institutions and their structural subdivisions, on January 1, 1977, accounted for 5.5 percent of the total CPSU membership, i.e., 879,696.[12]

Second, if we consider the composition of the present Central Committee, elected in 1976, we find that officials from the party apparatus continue to constitute the single most powerful group within the Committee (44.6 percent of the membership, as compared to 32.4 percent from the state and the economy, 6.6 percent from the military, 5.2 percent from science and culture, 5.2 percent from the foreign service, etc.).[13] While there has been a tendency toward increased representation of state officials and economic managers in the Committee, the same is true with regard to the party apparatus if the Politburo is counted as part of the CPSU apparatus—as no doubt it should be.

Third, an interview with a former Central Committee official published in 1974[14] casts considerable doubt on the perception of the CPSU apparatus as an organization incapable of defending itself successfully against "technocratization" or rationalization—a perspective on the CPSU apparatus that has been corroborated by the research of Robert Blackwell and, more recently, T.H. Rigby.[15] As a matter of fact, Paul Cocks has even concluded that "to protect its monopoly of power. . .the Party leadership continues to impose limits on administrative rationality" (Ryavec, p. 59). More recently, the same author has contended that "political dynamics and systemic inertial forces militate against any comprehensive and fundamental systems change" and make it dif-

[10] Ibid., p. 49.

[11] See I.V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967, Vol. 1 [14], pp. 220–21.

[12] See "The CPSU in Figures," *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), November 1977, pp. 21, 28.

[13] B. Meissner, "Party Leadership, Party Organization and Social Structure of the CPSU," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 8–9, 1976, p. 608.

[14] See A. Pravdin, "Inside the CPSU Central Committee," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1974, pp. 94–104.

[15] R.E. Blackwell, Jr., "Elite Recruitment and Functional Change: An Analysis of the Soviet Obkom Elite 1950–1968," *Journal of Politics* (Gainesville, FL), February 1972, pp. 124–52, and "Career Development in the Soviet Obkom Elite: A Conservative Trend," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), No. 1, 1972, pp. 24 ff.; T.H. Rigby, "The Regional Secretaries of the RSFSR," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* (Köln), No. 28, 1977.

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ficult, if not impossible, for the Soviet leadership to make better use of the "organizational weapon."[16]

Finally, if one examines recent personnel changes in the CPSU Central Committee, one does not get the impression that the apparatus has been "slipping." All of the new Central Committee secretaries elected since 1976—K.U. Chernenko, M.V. Zimyanin, K.V. Rusakov, and Ya.P. Ryabov (who served from October 21, 1976, to April 17, 1979)—have been highly experienced party officials. The majority of the candidate members of the Central Committee promoted to full membership since 1976 have also been party officials.

In sum, the central apparatus of the CPSU appears to have been much more tenacious in defending its hold on the reins of power in the USSR than many Western analysts predicted a decade ago—as is attested by the increasingly and now uniquely gerontocratic structure of the top Soviet leadership. The long-awaited and frequently predicted change of generations still has not taken place. Moreover, there is no assurance that when it finally does come, it will propel the Soviet system in the direction of a more rational, pragmatic, pluralistic political evolution.

IN WRESTLING with the problem of how to conceptualize the Soviet political system in the post-Stalin era, we should never lose sight of the fact that the Soviet Union, 63 years after the Bolshevik Revolution, is, after all, still a one-party state. This point, it seems, has all too often been overlooked in discussions about the viability of the totalitarian model in the post-Stalin era. The erosion of ideology, which has frequently been cited as evidence of the degeneration of Soviet totalitarianism, may well serve to strengthen rather than to weaken the Soviet regime—as Samuel P. Huntington has pointed out.[17] Finally, the assumption of the basic incompatibility of authoritarian politics and modern industrial society remains a proposition to be demonstrated. One-party systems, constituting the primary form of authoritarian politics in the 20th century, can change, adapt, and evolve in a number of ways, not all of which necessarily entail the demise of the system or the political decline of the "ruling party" and/or the effective modification of authoritarian politics in the direction of greater rationality (from the Western point of view!), greater pragmatism, and democracy. Let us not forget that Soviet dissidents other than Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn have persistently characterized the present regime in the Soviet Union as "totalitarian."[18] Should we not give greater weight to their judgment—a judgment which is, after all, based on an inside perspective?

The great merit of the volume edited by Meissner et al. is its incisive discussion, from a variety of viewpoints, of the role of the one-party system in Soviet society and the emergence of a centralized political bureaucracy which in terms of personnel is virtually indistinguishable from the higher echelons of the party apparatus. While the various contributors do not deny that a great many changes have taken place in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin, they question whether these changes add up to a systemic transformation that would justify the kinds of conceptualizations now prevalent in American scholarship on the Soviet political system.

[16] Paul Cocks, "Rethinking the Organizational Weapon: The Soviet System in a Systems Age," *World Politics*, January 1980, p. 256.

[17] Samuel P. Huntington and Clement M. Moore, Eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, New York, NY, Basic Books, 1970, especially Chap. 1.

[18] See, for example, A.D. Sacharow, *Mein Land und die Welt* (My Country and the World), Vienna, Molden, 1975, pp. 11, 22, 35 ff.

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Mathematization of Soviet Planning

By S.E. Goodman

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN. *The Mathematical Revolution in Soviet Economics*. London, Oxford University Press, 1975.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN. *Mathematical Theory in Soviet Planning*. London, Oxford University Press, 1976.

ARON KATSENELINBOIGEN. *Studies in Soviet Economic Planning*. White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1978.

IT IS more or less universally recognized that the growing size and complexity of the economy of the USSR demand methods of economic planning that go beyond the seat-of-the-pants practices that sufficed in their way during most of the Soviet period. There are those in the USSR, and some analysts in the West, who see in the use of mathematical techniques, cybernetic concepts, and computers the potential to improve significantly the effectiveness and efficiency of the planning process. Some of these advocates think that this is possible without much institutional change and without substantial redistribution of political power. Others apparently feel that the rationalization of the planning process through these means will necessarily remove some political control over this sector of Soviet economic activity. There are also those who dismiss such applications of mathematics and computers as little more than theoretical masturbation. Who is right?

Mathematics and computers as applied to economic problems do not form one large, highly integrated, methodological edifice. The mathematics employed ranges from the glorified arithmetic of accounting to the topological analyses of catastrophe theory. Between these extremes, there is a spectrum that includes statistics, stochastics, mathematical programming, game theory, functional analysis, differential equations, and much more. On this spectrum, moreover, less sophisticated does not necessarily mean less useful. No modern economy can function without the accounting and statistical methods that have pervaded practical management and economic analysis. Similarly, there is a vast spectrum of possible economic uses of the computer. Very little of this computer use involves esoteric mathematical models, and an increasing percentage is not even tied up with arithmetic/statistical computations, although computer use in all areas is growing rapidly. The science of cybernetics is concerned with the control of large systems.[1] Mathematics is important to cybernetics as a means of formulating concepts and quantifying relationships. Cyberneticists see computing and telecommunications as key technologies for the implementation of cybernetic systems. Even this oversimplified discussion should make it clear that there is considerable diversity and independence, as well as interdependence, among the various mathematical and computing techniques that might be applied to economic and industrial problems.

In the USSR, there have been differences in high-level Soviet political attitudes toward different techniques for a long time. The use of mathematical techniques in economic planning, for example, was clearly restricted during Iosif Stalin's tenure. It is commonly believed that cybernetics and computing were also severely suppressed. Actually, the condemnation of cybernetics seems to have been less intense. Only about a half dozen politically motivated anti-cybernetic articles appeared, and none of these was authored by powerful figures like Stalin or Mikhail Suslov—in marked contrast to the treatment of mathematical economic planning. Furthermore, by 1953 the Soviets had put considerable effort into de-

[1] An elementary and entertaining Soviet introduction to cybernetics is V. Pekelis, *Cybernetics A to Z*, Moscow, Mir, 1974, an English translation and revision of the 1970 Russian edition.

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veloping computer technology and had achieved several major practical accomplishments near the levels of what had been done not much earlier in the United States. Of course, the application of computers and cybernetics for the implementation of mathematization of economic planning was still beyond the Soviet reach, although it is worth noting that hardware for any serious application of this sort was not available anywhere in the world at the time. The so-called Soviet-American "computer gap" really opened up during the decade following Stalin's death, when, ironically, both cybernetics and mathematical methods in economics were being discussed with considerable enthusiasm in the USSR.[2]

THE THREE BOOKS being reviewed are concerned primarily with mathematical economic models of the more esoteric varieties and with verbal critiques that have a more formal, more modern, "economic science" flavor than is to be found in most books on the Soviet economy. Still, the non-mathematically-inclined reader with an interest in the economy of the USSR need not stop reading just yet. Two of the books, Aron Katsenelinboigen's *Studies in Soviet Economic Planning* and Alfred Zauberman's *The Mathematical Revolution in Soviet Economics*, can be profitably read without a lot of background in mathematics since neither deals much with explicit mathematical formulations.

Economic models of the kinds covered in these books have considerable value with respect to conceptualization, definition, and investigation of basic relationships among variables. Unfortunately, unlike what has happened in physics, it has proven difficult for economics to find a few outstanding parameters, with relatively simple and complete formalizable relationships, which are effective approximate models of the real world in that they accurately describe and predict phenomena of interest and practical importance. In all fairness to economic theory, however, theoretical physics developed more intensely over a longer time period, and has been blessed with the apparent truth that Mother Nature has not changed the rules governing the behavior of matter since man began investigating them. In spite of a relative lack of practical success in solving real-world problems, mathematical economics does provide a broad theoretical approach and some significant practical potential.

Zauberman's *Mathematical Revolution* is a survey and analysis of Soviet contributions to the mathematics of economic planning. Although somewhat hard to follow at times, Zauberman does a reasonably good job of plugging a hole that existed in the English-language literature. In addition to describing various models, he notes some of their limitations. He recognizes that the applicability of "the mathematical method" suffers from the real-world curses of size and complexity, but makes the point that these difficulties also plague "the traditional method." These weaknesses are simply more explicitly exposed in the former case, which precludes "what one could perhaps call 'the reliance on impression'—. . .which is in a peculiar sense the source of flexibility and manoeuverability and in this sense the basis of vitality—of the traditional method" (p. 45). Zauberman makes an effort to present arguments advocating the use of mathematical methods and to put the approach in a reasonable theoretical perspective.

The "revolution" of his title has an intellectual meaning, not one pertaining to institutional structure or practical implementation. The book is primarily a theoretical exposition, and although it makes some general observations about practical problems, even the discussions of the limitations of various models are theoretical. There is little serious discussion of experiments conducted at any level of the economic hierarchy; furthermore, *The Mathematical Revolution* is devoid of any detailed historical treatment of the troubles mathematical economic theory and mathematical economists had under Stalin or of their emergence since his death.[3] Given his own mathematical background and knowledge of the literature, institutions, and people involved, Zauberman missed a splendid opportunity to write an integrated history and theoretical analysis—something almost promised by his book title. As it is, the reader may feel that he has read a book that is somewhat detached from the reality of the Soviet Union.

The same author's much longer *Mathematical Theory in Soviet Planning* is a vastly more detailed survey intended for professional mathematical economists and applied mathematicians. It, too, plugs a gap in the English-language literature, for few Western mathematical economists are familiar with the considerable

[2]See S.E. Goodman, "Soviet Computing and Technology Transfer: An Overview," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1979, pp. 539-70.

[3]The best study that I know on this subject is Richard W. Judy, "The Economists," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 209-52.

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Soviet work in the field. One of the particular strengths of this volume is its extensive treatment of optimal control theory, a subject much less familiar to students of the Soviet economy than, for instance, input-output analysis.[4] All in all, this is a dense, technical study of Soviet contributions to the mathematics of planning and optimization—contributions of considerable quality and quantity that continue to appear today.[5] Like Zauberman's *Mathematical Revolution, Mathematical Theory* seems to exist in something of a theoretical vacuum. This is not surprising, since the former is basically a mathematically sanitized version of the latter. Both inexplicably lack subject and name indices.

THE INTENTION of Aron Katsenelinboigen, another prominent figure in the field, was to write "a series of essays united by the idea of using economic invariants." A secondary goal in his *Studies in Soviet Economic Planning* was to share his experience as a former Soviet economist "to call attention to a number of aspects in the functioning of the Soviet economy which, because of their informal character, have been illuminated to a lesser degree in Western literature." On balance, I would say he has been more successful with the secondary goal.

Katsenelinboigen's first essay/chapter includes a discussion of the relationships between economics and mathematics, and an attempt to define and justify the concept of an "economic invariant." By the end of the chapter, one is left with the expectation that the somewhat vague definition provided will be strengthened and that this concept will have a central function in the ensuing material that will be analogous to the function of conservation laws in physics. But "economic invariants" provide only a weak qualitative linkage among the essays that follow. The author's relative lack of success in this regard, to be sure, is really more a reflection of the state of economic science rather than of any lack of capability on his part. Nonetheless, most of the rest of the book could have been written, with little loss of content, without further explicit appeal to "economic invariants."

Having said this, I would like to praise some of the author's other essays. Chapter 2 contains a well-argued and thoroughly enjoyable critique of the constructive aspects of Marxist theory for the actual planning and operation of any kind of sophisticated economic system (the deficiencies of Marxist theories have, of course, stimulated interest in mathematical methods). Later on, Chapter 7 describes a partition of Soviet production-consumer markets into a color spectrum of red, pink, white, gray, brown, and black that reflects legal status under the Soviet system. The characteristics of each market are well defined, as are its functions within the spectrum, and good examples are used for further description. Katsenelinboigen's book is also distinguished by its observations on the political environment and constraints that continue to be imposed on those who would try to use more rational planning techniques based on modern economic science, as well as by its stock of interesting anecdotes. Although this book is relatively theoretical by the standards of much of the English-language literature on the Soviet economy, Katsenelinboigen, unlike Zauberman, never loses sight of Soviet reality.

ALL THREE of the books under consideration here share, in my view at least, two important shortcomings with most of the rest of the extant literature on Soviet economic planning. First, they lack detailed discussion of what is actually being implemented and used by the Soviets at various levels of planning practice. Second, most discussion of how mathematical methods, cybernetics, and computers are used in the Soviet economy is done in a comparative vacuum. The Soviets are generally found wanting here, without any detailed appreciation of the difficulties and learning experiences of other countries, particularly the United States. These two problems are closely related.

We know that considerable technology is available to the Soviets and that they are using some of it, at least experimentally, at various levels of the economy. But we do not seem to know much concretely about how, or to what extent, or how successfully they are employing what they have. Some mathematical techniques considerably more sophisticated than accounting and simple statistics are certainly being used extensively in the West, as they may be in the

[4] In this area, the work of Vladimir G. Treml and his associates is prominent. See Vladimir G. Treml et al., *The Structure of the Soviet Economy: An Analysis and Reconstruction of the 1966 Input-Output Table*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1972; Vladimir G. Treml, *Input-Output Analysis and the Soviet Economy: An Annotated Bibliography*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1975; and Dmitri M. Gallik et al., "The 1972 Input-Output Table and the Changing Structure of the Soviet Economy," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *The Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 423–71.

[5] Of recent note is the Shor-Khachiyan approach to linear programming problems, which for some reason warranted no less than three articles in *The New York Times*, Nov. 7, 11, and 27, 1979. See also L.G. Khachiyan, "A Polynomial Algorithm in Linear Programming," *Soviet Mathematics Doklady* (Moscow), Vol. 20, No. 1, 1979, 191–94; and two 1970 articles by N.Z. Shor in *Kibernetika* (Kiev).

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USSR. Notable among these are simulation and some areas of mathematical programming. The Soviets are now producing thousands of fairly respectable computers each year, including some of considerable size. Surely they must be building large computerized models of their entire economy or at least of major sectors of it.[6] Furthermore, as in the West, there is a gradualism in the adoption and spread of mathematical algorithms in the USSR. Computer and telecommunications performance is improving,[7] and hardware is becoming more available. Algorithms are being refined almost continuously. Together, technology and theory are increasingly providing the means to solve larger and more complex problems.

As the economy of the USSR grows in size and sophistication, it seems that the Soviets will have little choice but to look toward mathematics and computers for relief of some of their economic problems. This is exactly what they appear to be doing. The same is true of the United States, although on a much more decentralized scale. One of the major differences between the two countries is that we take a bottom-up approach, with the tasks and the technology growing together.[8] The Soviets take much more of a top-down view. They decided that they were going to institute a comprehensive national centralized planning system long before either the theory or a really effective technology existed to make it work in a sophisticated, developed economy. In a sense, the Soviets were fortunate not to have had to deal with such an economy during their first few decades in power.

To cope with current economic realities, the Soviets have launched an ASU (automated systems of control/management) "crusade." The ASU spectrum of activity runs from the non-real-time, no-direct-control monitoring of a small production process, to a grand national automated data system for planning and controlling the entire economy of the Soviet Union (OGAS).[9] The Soviet commitment of priorities and resources to ASU is enormous. There has been a continuing stream of high-level Communist Party and government endorsements, and ASU represents a centerpiece technology of the "scientific-technological revolution." The budgetary commitment for the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976–80) was several billion rubles, a figure that will probably be doubled in the 1981–85 Five-Year Plan period.

Yet it seems that most Western analysts too readily dismiss ASU as some sort of ineffective white elephant. Much of this negative judgment appears based on a mixed bag of primarily anecdotal evidence and is a natural reaction to some of the exaggerated claims about ASU in the Soviet media. But a detailed inspection of the large body of technical and semitechnical information available on ASU and their supporting technologies would seem to indicate that the Soviets are progressing at a respectable rate and have made substantial progress. Progress has been slow by US standards, and there have undoubtedly been a lot of problems. But many of the difficulties encountered by the Soviets reflect learning experiences similar to those that took place, and are still taking place, in the US, Western Europe, and Japan. Every "computer horror story" emanating from the USSR can be matched with one from the US.

To be sure, Soviet problems are compounded by systemic grief peculiar to the Soviet social-political-economic environment. In the ongoing discussions of mathematics and computers and the Soviet economy, analysis is rarely couched in such a comparative context. To do so could be particularly important at the lower and middle levels of the Soviet economic hierarchy. Sophisticated, large-scale, highly mathematized economic planning at the upper levels of the economic hierarchy is not possible without—as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition—computers and a lot of experience in using computers to perform all sorts of less ambitious tasks at lower levels of economic administration.

IN CLOSING, it is necessary to look at the all-important question of the impact the pervasive use of mathematical methods and computers will have on the politics and structure of economic management. It is still too early to do more than speculate on this for the Soviet case. A serious practical commitment and the technological means have not existed in the USSR long enough to make it possible to say much. It is difficult to discuss what is happening even in the United States in this regard, although it is clear that a wide spectrum of change has already taken place, and the potential for further change is enormous.

[6]One such model of the Soviet economy has been developed in the United States. See Donald W. Green and Christopher I. Higgins, *SOVMOD I: A Macroeconomic Model of the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Academic Press, 1977.

[7]Telecommunications technology and availability are now greater constraints on Soviet aspirations than computing.

[8]This has been particularly true of the development and application of computers.

[9]For a fairly complete list of the pervasive ASU hierarchy, see N.I. Pevnev, *ASU v Moskve i podmoskov'ye* (ASU in Moscow and Environs), Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1976.

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Nevertheless, a few modest comments on the short-term Soviet future might be in order. It seems that for both political and practical reasons there will be little more than glacial change in actual practice at the highest levels of the economic hierarchy, although one can expect to see a continuing increase in the use of computers for straightforward tasks of a data-processing nature. At the lower levels, a few areas should be watched for technically feasible progress across a broad base. By "technically feasible progress," I mean what has already been done with varying degrees of success in the West and Japan.[10] For instance, the Soviets desperately need to improve the general availability of technical services and support. They also need a much improved national telecommunication system. Other areas worth watching are the use of automation in production processes themselves and the use of computers at the association (*ob"yedineniye*) level—a level that, in theory at least, would seem more suitable for all sorts of integrated applications than the levels above or below. It will also be interesting to see if the Soviets remain overly compartmentalized and secretive about the flow of good information among the organizations that make up the economic system.

The Soviet Union is clearly expending great effort to do something about such problems. But progress will require institutional rearrangements, changes in traditional attitudes, and shifts in status among different forms of management. None of these comes easy in the USSR.

[10]This would rule out OGAS, among other things.

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Notes & Views

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KHRUSHCHEV AND AGRICULTURE

TO THE EDITORS: The problems of Soviet agriculture and agricultural policies can hardly be unraveled successfully with the negativistic approach adopted by Thane Gustafson ("Roots of Brezhnev's Agricultural Policy," *Problems of Communism,* January–February 1979). The most insidious danger in this approach is that it lends itself to Solzhenitsyn-type oversimplifications such as claiming that Khrushchev hardly differed in method from Stalin. An article on agriculture may not be the best place to emphasize Khrushchev's tear-streaked denunciation of Stalinist cruelty, or his wide-ranging cultural thaw, or his great improvement in relations with the West in general; but neither it nor any other place is a proper one to claim that Khrushchev barely differed from his rivals or predecessors except in his emphasis on agriculture, and that this amounted to little more than "repeated and resounding failure. . .the worst of the Stalinist approach to agriculture."

Stalin attacked the earth unrealistically, applying an excessively voluntarist approach; in the 1930's he tried and failed to expand wheat acreage in the Asiatic USSR, and in the late 1940's he had very minimal success with a program of shelter belts and other reclamation projects in the drier agricultural areas. Although Khrushchev admittedly employed a slapdash style and overly centralized decision-making, he knew his subject much better, and in the case of the Virgin and Long-Idle Lands program, the results were essentially *beneficial* to Soviet agriculture—and they have stood the test of time over a quarter century.

Commentaries calling that program a failure because its yields are relatively low and unreliable fail to take into account the fact that it utilizes land with very low average rainfall and great natural variability of rainfall. Cultivation of equivalent land in North America has also been tried and been found to involve great difficulties, and the land has now reverted mainly to grazing purposes. This has happened mainly because North Americans do not need it, having also available much better land—the largest extent of high-quality unirrigated farmland in the world, far exceeding in quality what nature has allowed the Soviet Union.

Despite many problems—poor seed, insuffient fallowing, lack of storage facilities, the need to import vast quantities of labor, and so forth—the Virgin Lands project has in almost every year since it was first fully developed (i.e., since 1956) supplied important increments to the Soviet grain crop. And, gradually, the Soviets improve their methods. A few years ago they entertained Canadian experts who explained the rationale behind the 50 percent fallow which is common in similarly-endowed Canadian wheatlands. Subsequently, the percentage of fallow in many Virgin Lands districts has been increased—although not nearly to 50 percent.

Neither Gustafson nor any other American commentator on Soviet agriculture known to me has properly emphasized the saving role of the Virgin Lands area in the bad harvest year of 1972, when disastrously low yields in the European area of the USSR forced large purchases abroad, but when complete catastrophe was averted by a record high yield in northern Kazakhstan (12.9 centners per hectare, according to Soviet statistics). That year alone possibly would have justified the development of the project.

Although he accuses Khrushchev of seeking to vindicate his policies by good results which actually were due to good turns in the weather, Gustafson fails to *blame* the weather for the *bad* harvests. Of course, Fëdor Morgun was correct in saying that soil fertility had declined for years prior to the crop failure of 1963 (cited in Gustafson, p. 47); in all parts of the earth, fertility of virgin land declines under continuous cropping. But 1963 also happened to have been a year of very low rainfall in the Virgin Lands area.

Moreover, it is important to note that 1963 was the only year in the history of Russian weather records when drought struck both the Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan more or less simultaneously. Normally, patterns of rainfall have been complementary in these two regions, as Russian meteorologists had been pointing out for several years prior to 1963. (For a summary of such earlier work, see the long study by M.Kh. Baydal et al., *Dolgosrochnyye prognozy pogody i kolebanii klimata Kazakhstana* [Long-Range Predictions of Weather and of Climatic Variations in Kazakhstan], 2 Vols., Leningrad, Gidrometeoizdat, 1964.) It would seem quite logical to suppose that their sound scientific analyses played some role in encouraging Khrushchev's decision to plant again where twice before—first under Stolypin in Tsarist times and then under Stalin—plans for acreage expansion had failed. A few years ago, I heard this possibility expressed by Harvard University water resources engineer Harold Thomas, Jr., reflecting

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on information and innuendos he had received on a trip to a meeting in Tashkent in 1962. Unfortunately, such environmental perspectives are too seldom utilized in the deliberations of social scientists.

Baydal's work convincingly tied rainfall cycles in the Virgin Lands to solar cycles—which in turn demonstrate a regular periodicity of about 11, 22, and various larger numbers of years. This gives us a tool for analysis of past and prediction of future agricultural performance—one which is independent of Soviet or any other governmental policy.

In this vein, I have computed some still-unpublished statistical correlations between sunspot numbers, precipitation totals, and yield figures for Kazakhstan stations in the period since the opening of the Virgin Lands. Although they show the low correlation coefficients usually associated with precipitation data (due to the very spotty patterns of such data), the coefficients are at least positive, and they compare favorably in significance to similar coefficients for North American stations during the drought of the 1930's, when independent evidence proves that at least the rainfall totals (if not also the sunspot numbers) were causally connected with the low yields. This rough comparability of the two regions is rather remarkable in view of the very small number of continuously-reporting meteorological stations in northern Kazakhstan compared to the number in the North American Great Plains. Moreover, in the last five years, there has developed a new degree of appreciation among climatic-change specialists for the thesis that North American droughts are correlated with 22-year sunspot cycles. (The most recent conclusions supporting this thesis are presented in J. Murray Mitchell et al., "Evidence of a 22-Year Rhythm of Drought in the Western United States Related to the Hale Solar Cycle since the 17th Century," in B.M. McCormac and T.A. Seliga, Eds., *Solar-Terrestrial Influences on Weather and Climate*, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1979, pp. 125–43.)

Using such methods to analyze Russian wheat yields, we could have predicted that the European regions of the USSR would have had some bad harvests in or near 1972, despite increased investment. We can also predict that the next downturn in production in northern Kazakhstan will likely begin by 1983, whatever the Soviet government does.

As such kinds of environmental causes begin to be better understood and as we begin to appreciate how environmental causes may shape not only our agricultural yields but also our cultural forms, it may even be possible to attribute to these causes, primarily, the very differences between collectivist and individualist systems which underlie the hostility between the major competing ideologies. (The case for a reevaluation of ideas of environmental influences on culture is developed in several of the author's publications, notably: "The Ecological Dimension: Russian and American Views," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* [Washington, DC], Vol. 65, 1975, pp. 144–62; "Crucial Deficiencies in Cultural Determinism," *Geographical Survey* [Ball State University, Muncie, IN], April 1980, pp. 3–18; and "Environmental Causation," a chapter in Brian Holly and Milton Harvey, Eds., *Themes in Geographic Thought*, London, Croom Helm, 1981.) Such lines of analysis may help to dispel the tendency to level praise or blame based unrealistically only on human beings and cultural systems, and by introducing a spirit of humility in the face of uncontrollable forces, somehow reduce antagonisms and thereby also the risk of conflict between the competing systems.

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CORRECTION

Table 1 on page 18 of the article "Venezuela's MAS" in Problems of Communism, September–October 1980, contained an error. The figures for total votes were results for the Venezuelan Communist Party, not for MAS.

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